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ABSTRACT

The Second Canadian Conference on Multiculturalism was held to clarify some of the issues upon which multiculturalism as a concept and as a policy depend. Cultural pluralism was investigated within the social, political, and historical framework of Canadian society. The opening session, called "The Bear Pit," invited questions and discussions from the audience in response to five introductory presentations. The second session heard presentations regarding the Francophone viewpoint and the Anglophone viewpoint of multiculturalism as well as a major address about governmental commitment to multicultural policy. During the last conference session, two studies were reported: one dealt with non-official languages and one with majority attitudes. Final presentations included discussions regarding Indian affairs and the United States' attitude toward multiculturalism, and an overview of Canadian cultural pluralism. (MK)

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Multiculturalism as state policy

Conference report

Second Canadian
Conference on Multiculturalism
Government Conference
Centre
Ottawa, February 13-15, 1976

UD020889

Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism

Conseil consultatif canadien du Multiculturalisme

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION

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The CCCM is an advisory body to the Minister responsible for multiculturalism on matters pertaining to the development of the multiculturalism policy.

The composition of the CCCM reflects the ethno-cultural heritage of Canadians as well as their regional distribution.

The Council is headed by a National Executive with the following membership:

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Ontario	Mr. Ted Glista
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Atlantic Provinces	Mr. Joseph A. Ghiz

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Introduction

The Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism was pleased to have been designated the hosts of the Second Canadian Conference on Multiculturalism by the Honourable John Munro. This gave us the opportunity to develop a theme and conference program that would address itself to the concept of multiculturalism in its Canadian context.

The conference itself helped to clarify some of the broader and deeper issues upon which multiculturalism as a concept and as a policy depends in the larger social, political and historical framework of Canadian society. I can certainly state that this success can be attributed to the interest developed by the panelists in all the sessions and to the enthusiasm exhibited by the discussions carried on by the delegates. Yet the most pleasing fact to note is that the issues continue to be discussed throughout Canada with the aid of the Canadian press — both the large dailies as well as the smaller, yet very important, ethnic newspapers.

When we are dealing with cultural pluralism, we are dealing with a very large concept in scope. It will no doubt have a significant effect on the lives of Canadians as it shapes our society in the generations to come. Because of its utmost importance, I extend an invitation to those individuals and organizations who are interested in sharing with us their "viewpoints" on the issues raised at the Conference, to mail them to the CCCM Secretariat, 15th floor, 66 Slater Street, Ottawa. Your viewpoints would certainly be of major assistance to the Council as an advisory body to the Minister responsible for multiculturalism.

On behalf of the Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism I would like to extend a special thanks to the Honourable John Munro for the opportunity of hosting the Conference. May I express our gratitude to their Excellencies, the Governor-General and Madame Léger for being honorary patrons, and for being present at the official opening welcoming some 550 participants.

It is without saying that we are indebted to all the panelists for their excellent presentation and to the moderators for accomplishing extremely well what is always a difficult task with such a large number of delegates.

JULIUS KOTELES
National Chairman CCCM

Résumé of Conference Proceedings

The opening session, "The Bear Pit", chaired by the Under-Secretary of State, Mr. André Fortier, invited questions and discussion from the audience. Panelists were Miss Monique Bégin, Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs; Ms. Rosemary Brown, Member of the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia for Vancouver-Burrard; Mr. Arnold Edinborough, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Council for Business and Arts in Canada; Mr. Douglas Fisher, journalist for the Toronto Sun and Mr. Charles Lynch, Chief of Southam News Press.

Second day sessions were on "Multiculturalism — The Francophone Viewpoint" and "Multiculturalism — The Anglophone Viewpoint." The objective of these two sessions was to determine the feelings of the two majority groups towards multiculturalism.

The session on the francophone viewpoint was chaired by the Honourable Renaude Lapointe with three panelists — Rev. Father Léger Comeau, Director of the Extension Department of the Ste. Anne's College in Church Point; Prof. Robert Painchaud, Assistant Professor of History at the University of Winnipeg and Professor Leslie Laczko of the Department of Sociology at the University of Ottawa who presented a paper on behalf of Professor Guy Rocher of the University of Montréal.

The session on the anglophone viewpoint was chaired by Senator Paul Yuzyk. Panelists for that session were Senator Eugene Forsey, Dr. Nathan Keyfitz, Andelot Professor of Demography and Sociology at Harvard University and Dr. Howard Palmer, Assistant Professor of History at the University of Calgary.

The Honourable John Munro delivered an address to delegates at the banquet held on the Saturday evening. Mr. Munro reaffirmed the government's commitment to multiculturalism both as an active government policy and a fundamental cornerstone of the society being built in Canada.

Sunday morning sessions were on two major studies compiled for the Department of the Secretary of State. Both sessions were chaired by Dr. Jean Burnet, Chairman of the Department of Sociology at Glendon College, Toronto, and Chairman of the Canadian Ethnic Studies Advisory Committee.

Panelists for the Non-Official Languages Study session were members of the research team led by Dr. Ken O'Bryan, Director of Project Research at

the Ontario Educational Communications Authority; Dr. Jeffrey G. Reitz, Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Toronto and Ms. Olga Kuplowska, Project Officer at the Ontario Educational Communications Authority, Toronto.

Panelists for the session on Majority Attitudes Study were members of the study's research team led by Dr. John Berry, Associate Professor of Psychology at Queen's University; Dr. Rudolf Kalin, Associate Professor of Psychology at Queen's University and Dr. Don Taylor, Associate Professor of Psychology at McGill University.

"Multiculturalism — A Neighbour's Viewpoint" was chaired by Professor Manoly Lupul. The guest speaker was Mr. Michael Novak, Executive Director of the Ethnic Millions Political Action Committee in New York.

The closing session, "An Overview", was given by the Quebec Regional Chairman of the CCCM and Chairman of the Conference Planning Committee, Mr. Saul Hayes, O.C., Q.C.

Table of Contents

1. BEAR PIT SESSION — PAGE

Presentations by Panelists:

Miss Monique Bégin 3
Ms. Rosemary Brown 7
Mr. Arnold Edinborough 11
Mr. Douglas Fisher 15
Mr. Charles Lynch 21

2. MULTICULTURALISM — THE FRANCOPHONE VIEWPOINT

Presentations by Panelists:

Rev. Father Léger Comeau 27
Prof. Robert Painchaud 29
Prof. Leslie Laczko
(for Prof. Guy Rocher) 47
Special presentation by:
Mrs. Suzanne Drouin 55

3. MULTICULTURALISM — THE ANGLOPHONE VIEWPOINT

Presentations by Panelists:

Senator Eugene Forsey 61
Dr. Nathan Keyfitz 65
Dr. Howard Palmer 81

4. ADDRESS DELIVERED BY

The Honourable John Munro 119

5. NON-OFFICIAL LANGUAGES STUDY

Presentation by Panelists:

Dr. Ken O'Bryan
Dr. Jeffrey G. Reitz
Ms. Olga Kuplowska 131

6. MAJORITY ATTITUDES STUDY

Presentation by Panelists:

Dr. John Berry
Dr. Rudolf Kalin
Dr. Don Taylor 149
Special presentation by:
Mr. Wsevolod Isajiw 169

7. SPECIAL PRESENTATION BY:
Clive Linklater (on behalf of the
National Indian Brotherhood) 173

8. MULTICULTURALISM — A NEIGHBOUR'S VIEWPOINT
Presentation by:
Mr. Michael Novak 181

9. AN OVERVIEW
Presentation by:
Mr. Saul Hayes, O.C., Q.C. 193

1

Bear Pit Session

Presentation

by

Miss Monique Bégin

I am not a specialist in cultures, other than as a consumer. However I was born in Rome to a Flemish mother and a French-Canadian father who had lived several years in different parts of the world. My parents each spoke eight languages. As a child, I was brought up in Italy, France and Portugal and, once in Canada, in the English-speaking part of Montreal. Thus, I am not a real immigrant and I am not even a pure "French-Canadian" in the eyes of some. But I recognize myself in Quebec, and I feel at home everywhere in Canada. This is in lieu of an introduction to the Second Canadian Conference on Multiculturalism.

In my first speeches in the House after my election, I spontaneously felt compelled to address myself to multiculturalism. I am pleased to do it again tonight, once more, with much heart and enthusiasm, maybe because we know less and less what it is all about, but also because I believe and I support it firmly.

If I may add, I do think we must define at once its exact objectives. No need to say, here I speak personally as Monique Bégin. I haven't read the numerous speeches of the Minister that were delivered to my office by messenger this afternoon at 3:00 o'clock. That's my own view, with much heart, and as I said, enthusiasm.

Before going any further, in order to avoid confusion of semantics, I give to the word "culture" its ethnological meaning which is a comprehensive one that embraces ways of life, expressions of beliefs, values, artifacts, hopes, and cultural manifestations in the most conventional sense. Ruth Benedict expressed it poetically when she related this Indian proverb: "In the beginning, God gave to every people a cup of clay and from this cup they drank their life. They all dipped in the water, but their cups were different. Our cup is broken now. It has passed away." We do not want what has happened to the Diggers Indians of California to happen here. We want to save the cups of clay.

I speak as a lay person. I am not an administrator of multiculturalism. I am not in the Cabinet. I am in none of the decision-making parts of that policy of ours.

What we desperately need, it seems to me, for multiculturalism in Canada are people with a dream. Instead we are confronted with the politics and politicians of multiculturalism. That is of no interest and of no value to Canadians, since it only serves the personal interest of small establishments, if I may say, using multiculturalism as a selfish channel for their own promotion.

We need someone with a dream who will share with me and with his community of origin his vision of life through a Canadian window.

This is no easy task of definition. Someone like William Kurelek, for instance, whose paintings of Alberta and of Manitoba give me an insight of Prairie winters, and fields, and people, different than my own perceptions. Still the same winter, but making me stop and think, adding an emotion different than Gilles Vigneault's song "Mon pays, c'est l'hiver." It could as well be a television program or community project through which Canadians of French, English and other origins, would share cooking recipes of national dishes. I am not interested at all in an elitist view of cultures.

My contention with the multiculturalism policy as established by Cabinet, and stated by the Prime Minister in the House on October 8th, 1971, is that it bears some profound ambiguities which came fully into light with the first report of the Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism.

In other words, I am saying that the objectives of multiculturalism in relation to national unity, and to the integration to active Canadian life of immigrants or older new Canadians, has never been clearly stated. Nor has the fine line between multiculturalism and multilingualism been drawn. I think the distinction between multiculturalism and immigration has never been made either.

I know the high expectations Dr. J. B. Rudnckij and other commissioners of the B & B had on the policy of multiculturalism. Their criteria are nothing less than excellence, accessibility and relevance. Rightly so, but they have not always been done justice.

Poor folklore dances, lousy handicrafts, local newspapers with nothing on Canada, or little clannish egocentric group meetings are not multiculturalism in my way of thinking. In fact, I would go as far as saying they do a disservice to the 17 and some million dollars already devoted to the program from the beginning to the end of 1976.

Another question has never really been tackled. Is multiculturalism at all possible without multilingualism? At least it is the way I see and hear the question. If the answer is no, then the program is in jeopardy. I think Canadians do not want multilingualism as federal government policy, be it flatly stated or subtly hidden under the concept of a third regional official or semi-official language.

This is not to say that all Canadians do not want to learn more than two languages. I personally support very strongly the provincial departments of education which put in their curricula the teaching of other languages. This should be increased and, in a sense, it is the provincial contribution to multiculturalism.

Now, if the answer is yes, that multiculturalism is not necessarily a complete equation with multilingualism, which I believe, then there is a lot of work to do and a long way to go.

Multiculturalism within a policy of bilingualism is difficult to achieve but feasible with imagination, generosity and political will.

Let me just refer you to the numerous examples, for instance, of community needs expressed by the witnesses who came in recent months to the meetings of the Joint Special Committee on Immigration we had all over the country. I recognized some of the faces here tonight when I arrived. I have no intention of trying to do tonight the work of our officers, and of those directly working in the field, who know what they want and who do a beautiful job. But I would like to mention, as a lay person, what I thought was very interesting.

I recall one report on the work group and multicultural programs through the Board of Education of the city of Toronto. This and the proceedings of the Immigration Committee are a gold mine of ideas for projects, and for concrete incarnation of what multiculturalism is.

I will finish by saying that I see two fundamental problems in the world today, and in the western world in particular. One is the development of peace and security based on the eradication of poverty. The other is the preservation of cultural diversity. The latter is the acute problem of North America and now of Europe.

Homogenized mass culture is spreading extremely quickly over every one of our countries. It leads, I would go as far as saying, to mental atrophy and it amounts to the murder of hopes and dreams.

Multiculturalism is a unique Canadian initiative that could have benefits for all of us.

You have noticed that I talk a bit almost in the future tense. I think the multiculturalism policy of the government has achieved a first, a beginning. It has achieved an awareness, a cross-cultural awareness that was totally absent in Canada even five years ago. It has shown that everyone is equal in this country — although this is a constant process, and must be a continuing one — it has added positively to the notion of tolerance.

It did not do justice, on the other hand, to all the cultures and the communities of the country. In this, we politicians, I as a politician, together with my colleagues have to be blamed. I am not sure that we gave political leadership on what we wanted for multiculturalism. All efforts combined should keep in mind the generation of Canadians who are today's school children.

Presentation

by

Ms. Rosemary Brown

Fellow immigrants, descendants of immigrants, and descendants of descendants of immigrants, it is a real pleasure for me to have an opportunity to think aloud with you tonight. I think if you find my presentation disjointed, it is a very honest indication of how disjointed my ideas on multiculturalism are. I have a real problem with this concept, not just with the differences between what is preached and what is practiced, but even with some of the pitfalls which surround the philosophy of the concept itself. Maybe I should start out, as Monique Bégin did, by giving you a sort of a history on my blood line because that might clarify my confusion.

I am a descendant of slaves who were taken to the West Indies many years ago. I came to Canada in 1950 to get an education. Here I ran into another descendant of slaves from the United States who convinced me that if I lived with him forever in Canada, he would see that I lived happily ever after. I am not quite sure if, at the time when he made his promise, he had taken a serious look at the statistics on how long Canadian women live. However, what I want to do very briefly tonight is to explore a few of the themes with you in the hope that, over the next two days, the kind of dialogue coming out of this conference will help us all to resolve some of the dilemmas surrounding this very important area.

First of all, I accept that the federal policy of multiculturalism marks the federal government's recognition that Canada is made up of many cultural and ethnic groups. Further, that the objective is to ensure the fundamental principle of equality for all Canadians. Third, that the overall objective is a strengthening of national unity. And finally, that all of this has to be achieved within a framework of bilingualism and multiculturalism. All of these statements I got from the many speeches of the Minister.

Now I take all of these objectives and try to measure them against what my commander, the Prime Minister of Jamaica, insists are the four major categories of our human experience against which a specific objective of any

liberation must be considered: the political, the economic, the social and the psychological. Then, for me at least, some themes begin to emerge.

What I am going to do is run very quickly through these themes and conclude with what I refer to as random thoughts on the whole concept of multiculturalism.

First theme: This one I will refer to as multiculturalism and political cynicism. The recognition that our society has been composed of many cultural groups, being a mosaic, must not blind us to the frequent cynical use of this fact for political purposes. Multiculturalism can be a very negative aspect of Canadian life if cultural groups are viewed as a voting block, if ethnic leaders are seen as ward healers to discipline their co-ethnic groups for political purposes and if the dispersal of funding through this program is done with the purpose of delivering up a vote. Used in this way, multiculturalism is an abuse of the cultural aspects of the concept and is really a disguised form of racism since it attempts to identify the political behaviour with ethnic or racial characteristics.

Second theme: Multiculturalism and political myths — the nature of a true multicultural society. The vision of a true multicultural society is one in which ethnic groups retain some of their cultural forms and are encouraged and supported in this by the rest of society because it is enriching, expansive and socially very good. Multiculturalism should not, and must not, be a situation where ethnic groups retain their cultural identities because they are alienated, isolated, oppressed, ostracized, categorized and manipulated on account of a particular cultural background. In other words, what we must ensure and protect ourselves against is multiculturalism becoming a fancy word for ghettoization.

Now back in the good old days, when a ghetto was called a ghetto, some European countries and the United States did a very excellent job of preserving, in hostile and negative ways, the culture of the Jewish people and the black people living within their borders. The members of those groups saw the other side of the cultural retention coin.

It is very easy to exploit cultural differences. In Canada, it is as short a step from admiring the native costumes of a particular ethnic group to assuming that they are culturally well-suited to stoop labour and agriculture, as it has been for this society to admire the maternal instincts of women and assume that those instincts have made us admirably more suited to doing all of the lowest and worst-paid jobs in the economy.

Therefore multiculturalism must not be a way of avoiding the basic social issues of an advanced class society. It must not blind us to the reality of a society in which some people, many of them immigrants, are exploited in the name of profit. Nor must it be a substitute for genuine changes in the economic structure of the country.

A clear understanding of society recognizes that, culture or no culture, the difference between an Italian and an East Indian, both new-comers, and a native Indian, all working for low pay at a lousy job with poor access to

facilities and services, is much less than the difference between these three people and the owner of a large business corporation or a financial institution.

If we view ethnic groups only from a cultural perspective and ignore class relationships, we fall into a posture of patronizing and condescending. Ethnic people are not separate from but are part of, and located in, a class society just like everyone else. The status of their culture, our culture, exists in direct relationship to their status, our status, in the economic and political structure.

It is a possible vision of the future to look forward to the day when we have a more equal society. One in which young people grow up with a sense that they are not only contributing to the well-being of a society, the common wealth, if you will, but one in which the richness of cultural heritage is an emblem of that society. We can all live together in harmony with respect for, and understanding of, other cultural backgrounds in a society which is free, just, and recognizes the importance of full social and economic democracy.

Third theme: This one I call Canadian multiculturalism's contribution to our global perspective. If we reflect on the many and varied cultural differences among Canadians, it should lead us to a greater understanding of the global mosaic and recognition that the Canadian heritage is a consequence of the world of many peoples who, like Canadians, are constantly struggling to build a better world.

We must come to recognize that part of our responsibility is to understand the day-to-day struggles in which these people are locked against economic and political elites who would shatter their cultural forms and oppress them in the name of corporate profits. Racism at home is, in many respects, merely the opposite side of the coin which is imperialism abroad, and our policy must ensure that Canadian companies and Canada avoid the Coca-Cola diplomacy, that powerful force working to homogenize and destroy other cultural identities.

After all, it was our Prime Minister who said: "We are on this earth, we are one on this earth. Each has the power to injure all others. Each of us must assume the responsibility that that implies, and each must understand that the nature of that injury is not ephemeral and it is not transient. It can be real and it can be permanent. Cooperation is no longer simply advantageous. In order to survive, it is an absolute necessity."

Now to my random thoughts. First, the recognition that Canadian ethnic groups are not frozen, that there is a continual adaptation to Canadian and cultural forms, and that there is tremendous potential for growth and enrichment of these inherited cultures. *Québécois* culture, for example, is French but not Parisienne.

Secondly, that any discussion of multiculturalism must also include subcultures, such as the youth culture which is perhaps not quite as permanent and solid, but nevertheless part of the cultural mosaic.

Thirdly, in my opinion, it is not possible to do a serious appraisal of multiculturalism without doing a serious assessment of our immigration policy

as well. These are not two separate entities. They are one and the same. Immigration is part of our multicultural policy.

Fourthly, using multiculturalism as a tool for increasing understanding between people is not so important in terms of horizontal communication as it is in terms of vertical communication. People who share common oppression and exploitation understand each other. They also understand the people at the top, the ones who are responsible for their situation. They have to, in order to survive. What they would like is to see the people at the top acquire a better understanding of their needs. As a weapon against discrimination and racism, multiculturalism is totally useless if it is used for horizontal understanding only, and if it is used in isolation.

Fifth, and this is my final random thought, the culture of the native people of Canada, the culture that was here when we all came here, remains the one that still has the most to teach us. Not just in terms of folklore and music and art, but specifically in terms of people's relationship to the environment, the resources and the creatures that share this corner of the earth with us.

It is easy to compare the results on the environment of the native people's culture of preservation, conservation, love and nurturing, with ours of exploitation, pollution, harassment, want and wastefulness. Our multicultural policy should have begun hundreds of years ago. It should have begun, not through trying to impose a decadent and tired European culture on these people whom we found here, but in trying to absorb and learn something of the respect and dignity so inherent in their culture.

I accept and support the concept of multiculturalism. I also accept the status of the French and the British as the two earliest immigrant groups to this country, and I agree that multiculturalism must be developed in the framework of a bilingual nature.

I also accept that multiculturalism must go beyond folkways, crafts, arts and even the language of a people. I accept that multiculturalism must be developed within the framework of an advanced class society. I accept the work of the Advisory Committee and the federal government as an important first step. I hope that the dialogue over the next two days will help us design the blueprint for future action towards meeting the admirable objective, laid out by the Minister, of equality for all Canadians in a unified nation.

Presentation

by

Mr. Arnold Edinborough

I think that the multiculturalism policy, when it was pronounced by the Prime Minister, came as a result of his thinking of a little nursery rhyme. He gets a fair amount of that, I think, at the present time. "Yesterday upon the stair I met a man who wasn't there. He wasn't there again today. I wish that man would go away."

Multiculturalism was here in Canada. It has been here for a very long time. I think that we all forget what Ms. Brown has just been saying, that there were people in Canada long before anybody came here.

The native people were Inuit and Indian. They were here, and then about 300 years ago, give or take a bit, the French came and settled in what is now Montreal. Very soon after that, the English came and they settled in Hudson's Bay. They had the worse of the deal in that part of history but since they brought the Scots to man the factories, it didn't really matter.

Then, about another 100 years went by, and as we now know from the constant barrage from the country to the south of us, the American Revolution took place 200 years ago this year. As a result, we got a lot of American-English coming to settle in this country.

By the middle of the 19th century, we had the Scots and the Irish. The Irish came because there weren't any potatoes, and the Scots came because there were sheep in their native country. By the late 19th century, we had the beginning of great floods of people from Central Europe, an immigration wave which kept up both to the United States and to here so that by the First World War, or certainly by 1920, we had here a completely multicultural, multinational society.

It is my view, strongly held, that this has always been a relatively tolerant society. Of course, our forefathers should have dealt better with the Indians and they should not have brought slaves to this country or any other country, but we cannot judge on hindsight. We must do better not in hindsight to tell them in hindsight to do better.

We were a relatively tolerant society which I take from the fact that, though there was a battle on the Plains of Abraham, the Quebec Act guaranteed language and the faith to the French-Canadians. It was no great liberalism on the part of the British Colonial Office, not ever a fountain of liberalism, but the fact was that they thought that if they did this and guaranteed the francophones their language and faith, they wouldn't join the Americans in revolting. Though they weren't liberals, they were shrewd and underhanded, and that is what happened — they didn't.

That brings us really to the next thing, that this whole mosaic of people from 1759 onwards was a British colony, and therefore, though the fabric and the kinds of people in it were of several nationalities, the institutions were British.

Then, after the Second World War, there was a great influx of people from all kinds of countries, and suddenly again a sort of an international consciousness of self-determination. We suddenly had independent nations everywhere.

Sir Winston Churchill said he would not preside at the dissolution of the British Empire, so the British voter relieved him of the responsibility and let Clement Attlee do it instead.

The British Empire was no more; the French Empire was no more. The German Empire had gone 30 years before. Now we are seeing one of the last empires, the Portuguese, also collapse. With the result that we now have an enormous number of independent nations and independence, and a sense of independence, within those nations.

Because of this, that whole attitude spread to other countries and it certainly came to Canada. It led to, amongst other things, the feeling of separatism in Quebec, of nationalism in Quebec. It also made other people who have been here a very long time, as well as the people who had just come here, very proud of their nationality. With the result that, as I say, though it had been there a long time, suddenly this was an insistent social and political pressure. We were a nation made up of all kinds of cultures and we should recognize this fact. It is interesting, and I think buttresses my argument, that it was a bilingual and bicultural commission which eventually discovered that we could be bilingual but must be multicultural.

For the kind of vision that both the previous two speakers have mentioned, I would work very hard. I think the vision is of a country with differing approaches to problems, a country that is prepared, because of its minorities, to see that those minorities are not made economic and political minorities, just cultural minorities.

We must also take some soundings as to how this can be done. The ladies on the panel say it is a vision, Mr. Hayes says we have got to steer the mule right. Whichever way you put it, you have to have a goal. But you also have to know, even a mule has to know, if there is a road. It is therefore my point, which I have mentioned before to other groups within this major group, that you have to be pragmatic how you go about it.

The first thing you must do is to find out what multiculturalism is but you also must know what your own cultural group really believes and feels. We have had talk here, for example, of ghettoism.

I was interested to read just this week in the current issue of *Mosaico*, the Canadian journal for Italian-Canadians, a very forthright editorial asking what are we trying to do when we bring over all of these films which are called *The Aunt, The Cousin, The Nephew, The Godfather*, or whatever they are. We see these pictures of an old society. We don't need that, said the editor of *Mosaico*. He said we cannot get a sense of community by just insisting on an antiquated Italiana. We must have a positive approach. An old lady in a shawl who was watching a film, commented on the fact that she saw two people passing in the film, and one said "Buon-Giorno, Signor Macoce" and the other said, "Buon-Giorno, Signor." This old lady turned to her companion and said, "Just think, this film was made in a country and at a time when people said good morning to each other." He replied, "That is not this country." However much you may regret it, it isn't so.

Now are you going to concentrate on just nostalgia and dreams of the past or are you going to have a vision of the future? And, if you have a vision of the future, how are you going to implement it? It seems to me that you have to find out how you are going to implement it in constitutional terms.

Several of the recommendations that are in the multiculturalism report, in my view, could only be possible if our constitution were to be changed. If you think that is an easy thing, talk to any politician in this room. We not only, ladies and gentlemen, cannot change it, we cannot even bring it home. We are so full of our multiculture that we say leave it with the Brits in Westminster, which is exactly the same as the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem where the keys are given to the Moslems because the seven Christian groups can't agree how to run it.

So when you talk about the constitution, be good and sure you know what the constitution is. It is not easy to find out that Senator Eugene Forsey, if he did not write it, thinks he did, and he will be here tomorrow.

Let me also remind you that in the gray past, which is taught as social studies in this country in English and in French, there is too little mention made of two very divisive influences, one of which is language and the other of which is religion. Religion has always been a very divisive influence in Canada.

When the Prince of Wales came to Kingston in the last century, the Orangemen, who are now shooting Catholics over in Belfast, built an arch, and the Kingston Knights of Columbus said if the Prince of Wales came through that arch they would boycott the whole affair. So be aware then of the deep, deep roots which are divisive about religion before you look at what appears to be a monolithic English kind of culture.

The English surface tension is exactly that, and underneath it there are all kinds of murky things swimming about as in *Jaws*. If you want, for example, to set up schools in which the language of your culture is taught,

first of all read the debates in the province of Manitoba and see what Clifford Sifton said about 80 years ago. Don't tell me that that is all past history. Five years ago, I went to address the Manitoba Teachers' Association and by the time I had stood vertical and therefore got away from the woman on my left, I was almost too pooped to give the talk I gave, because I said to her, "What do you think about tax deductions for people who send their children to private schools?" I tell you, it took her two hours after my talk as well to tell me what she thought. She is one of the *Jaws* that lurks below the concepts.

Again, there are some other historical facts you should take into account. These are practical, pragmatic things. In your recommendations in the multiculturalism report, you said we should have special treatment at the Post Office in postal rates for our ethnic friends. Nobody gets special treatment at the Post Office in Canada. When you post it, you take your chances. You know that. The amount of money that you put on it, the sort of stakes you wager that it will one day be delivered, which in other countries they call a postage stamp, is the same price for all. There are many Canadian newspapers, religious papers, labour papers, and general interest papers that went under when those postal rates were raised about five years ago. You are not going to serve your cause by suggesting that you get special treatment in that area.

In other words, what I am saying is that this is a multicultural nation by tradition, and a British country in its institutions, and as I have said before, the Crown is not negotiable. Furthermore we have a non-elected judiciary which is not negotiable. Although, I have had some thoughts about that since the other day when I said this in the United States and a man there said to me, "The only difference between your system and ours is that our man has to run and get elected. It seems to me most of your judges have to run and be defeated first." Be aware then of the total culture. Be aware of history. Find out the shoals, do your research. Then, with initiative, with energy, and with intelligence, we shall evolve that culture which will combat that homogeneity Monique Bégin told me about on television, which seems principally concerned with the police department in San Francisco. Anything is better than that.

Presentation

by

Mr. Douglas Fisher

Mr. Lynch and I are the two native sons of this panel. We have had a very brief discussion beforehand, and the only thing we got to is that we are both very cynical about multiculturalism policy. I put my remarks into three margins. The first is very short. It is my conclusion about multiculturalism. I wrote a note on the reaction to the first report of the Council. It is simply this. You and me and our children have enough to do with the basic problem of hyphenated Canadianism, that is the French and English duality, without enshrining the whole world's diversity within our history and our borders.

The second part of my remarks is very easy. I am going to read from a report that has, just in the last few days, had a great deal of publicity and attention. It is a report on the Canadian educational system by the O.E.C.D. The appendix deals very thoroughly with the problems of bilingualism and the teaching of French in English Canada and the reverse. It also deals fairly thoroughly with the problems of the Indians and Indian education. There are some comments about multiculturalism. I think they are very wise. I am surprised that the group from outside our borders could come in and define and see the problem, because I find that they say exactly what I believe.

This section I am going to read follows after one of the things we must recognize with our educational system in Canada: We must overcompensate towards the French-Canadian and to French language teaching and French-Canadian culture because of the imbalance between the strengths of the English and French-Canadian communities. That is something I agree with.

Then it goes on to say for Indian cultures an educational strategy "with strong elements of segregation may appear as the best alternative simply because a full integration alternative does not seem to function at all at present, except for a small minority of individuals who are certainly not typical. The task of building success possibilities within a fairly segregated Indian community is a difficult but not wholly unrealistic task which faces all concerned with Indian cultural development. Geographical

isolation may point to similar solutions for the Inuit. Then, as far as other minority groups are concerned, the situation appears different. The nature of the imported cultures may serve as a welcome addition to cultural varieties but it seems highly unlikely it can form the basis for successful policies involving elements of segregation."

"Attempts in this direction are probably bound to fail simply because the alternatives offered by isolated minorities, in terms of meeting individualized aspirations within a relatively segregated minority framework, can hardly compete with reasonably successful opportunities outside. Thus the policy of increased symmetry between different cultural groups is only feasible in Canada when the weakest of the groups has a reasonable chance to build up sufficiently interesting opportunities within its own frameworks, as compared to accessible opportunities offered outside such a framework."

Such a policy is definitely feasible in the case of the province of Quebec, although it may be more debatable for French-speaking minorities in other provinces unless some extraordinary efforts are made. The attempts to follow a similar strategy for Indians and Inuit is at least understandable. "For every group, use of minority languages in schools should rather be regarded as a valuable pedagogical tool and hardly as a means of creating genuine multiculturalism, although it is to be hoped that the survivor of such minority cultures will for a long time provide an interesting flavour in the Canadian scene." That's the section from the O.E.C.D. report that touches on multiculturalism.

Now, the third part of my remarks is going to be personal, because I think I should explain, as the others explained, why I have always been attracted to the melting pot idea, to the idea of assimilation or integration or integration or aculturation, if you want to call it that.

I am a fifth-generation Canadian. Enough generations so that I don't really know where my people came from. I grew up in a small town in northern Ontario that is only a couple of years older than myself. It is a community that has less than 50 percent British stock.

There were ethnic groups there when I was a kid although I didn't realize that's what they were. There were a lot of Finlanders, a lot of Ukrainians, a lot of Indians and a great many Italians.

One of the things that happened there, although I wasn't aware of it when I was in grade school, was that the second generation, the kids in the school process that I was in, were being assimilated to what was the Canadianism being offered at that time by the schools.

I grew up in a community that was what Arnold Edinborough has been talking about — genuinely multi-ethnic and multicultural in terms of heritage. But all the kids in it were going through an assimilation process. I think that, particularly with the second generation in that kind of open frontier hinterland situation, there wasn't a great deal of the kind of class distinctions that Rosemary Brown talked about.

So, I came out of a community where one didn't think it strange to know something about Ukrainians, Finns, Poles, Indians, and so on because they were all part of the community and everybody was taking part. It wasn't just the schools, it was the sporting life. I'm talking about baseball and hockey, talking about the community in a small town in a bush. I went on from there to work as a miner and bush worker where, again, the majority of the people who were breaking rock and chopping trees or sawing trees, were so-called third or fourth extraction. My own impression was that it worked fairly well.

This was reinforced by my experience of almost five years in the army with no rank above that of private at any time. When I go down the honour role of our regiment now, I find a complete diversity of names from all the stocks that had come to Canada up to that time, including a number of people not so much of stock but of colour, of black colour, who came out of the Nova Scotia and Lunenburg — Halifax area.

In other words, I have seen and grown up through a period or time, as a native Canadian, when I have been in touch and have been influenced. I will admit I have not been sensitive to the trials and the troubles that the first generation of these classmates and associates of mine had. But it seemed to me that it worked, that we were moving towards an identity, if you want.

I had no doubts about a Canadian identity. I had it, so did all the others that were with me. I give that as an explanation as to why I have this view about aculturation, assimilation, melting pot or integration. That, in a sense, is the natural thing and the thing we have to have if we're going to have a bonding.

Now I also recognize, apart from having been a student of history and gone through history courses at the university, that we have a responsibility that must be met. I think it is being met better than one could really imagine by our politicians and political parties to keep the country together insofar as a basic duality is concerned. As I expressed in my very first words, I am much more concerned, deeply concerned, about that as a problem than the whole multicultural idea.

Now I have had experience as a politician, and I recognize the temptation of what I used to call "ethnicing" in John Diefenbaker's day and what is now multiculturalism. I know the temptation. I know the tendency of politicians to go towards that kind of exploitation that Rosemary Brown talked about.

I think it is, in some ways, a passing phase, and I hope that politicians of all parties, more and more of us, will not be tempted to try to exploit that.

One of the things that bothered me about the recent Liberal convention in Ontario was a statement made from the platform that one of the unfortunate things that had happened to the Liberal party in Ontario was that it had lost its grip on the ethnics.

Now, I'm bloody happy that the Liberal party has lost its grip on the ethnics and I hope all the other parties have lost their grips on the ethnics, if they ever had them.

I want to just conclude with one story about "ethnicing" or multiculturalism to indicate the kind of experience you can encounter. I was visiting a pulp and paper town in my constituency up in the bush and I heard a group of men in a Legion talking about a very sad case.

An elderly man of Ukrainian descent had committed suicide and there was some argument as to whether he did it because he was worried about his health. One of the men brought it up and said, "You know, I think he never got over being rejected so many times by the Citizenship Court." I inquired about this, and they said, "Well, time after time he went down to the Lakehead to get his citizenship. He had been here since right after the First World War. He started going up for his citizenship papers right after the Second World War and the judge always turned him down."

This intrigued me so I began digging into the background and I discovered that there was simmering, seething bitterness in the whole region over the citizenship judge, or he was a judge of the Superior Court of Ontario who heard citizenship applications.

He was extremely British. One of the things he used to do was quiz poor people like this elderly Ukrainian about the constitutional niceties of the British North America Act, or ask him about the significance of 1066.

Well, the more I heard about this, the more burnt up I became about it. I talked with lawyers, talked to various people from groups such as the Croatian Society, got the evidence and then I went to the people who appoint judges, the Department of Justice and the Minister of Justice. I put in a pretty good case and, by what I call lobbying, I managed to get this judge to take early retirement.

I was just delighted with myself. I had gotten rid of this man who was enforcing his citizenship terms amongst what I call new Canadians, although many of them had been here a long time.

I awaited eagerly to see who the new appointee was going to be. This was just at the time John Diefenbaker was "ethnicing" so boldly and madly across the country. He appointed a judge who came from one of the ethnic groups that I gather never had a judge appointed to this rank. He chose a man who didn't know anything about our particular community. He chose him on the basis that his brother was one of the most prominent churchmen in Canada. I thought it was pretty good until the man arrived and began to operate as a judge.

Within about six months, I was getting stories that were almost the same as before, although the man was not guilty of any particular prejudice. He just wasn't meant to be very stable or capable. So, I spent the next three years lobbying to get that man out of northwestern Ontario and out of that particular role.

I just mention that as an indication that I was happy that Mr. Diefenbaker or his ministers had made this particular appointment and pleased

with this man because of his ethnic background. I thought he would be great and, as it turned out, he was a complete bust and, in a few years, we had to get another one.

I always think of that story as an example of the perils of "ethnicing" or multiculturalism if you put too much faith in it.

Presentation

by

Mr. Charles Lynch

I want to tell the members of the panel and the members of the audience that I am not here to sum up, but to be objectionable.

Doug Fisher said at the outset of his remarks that he and I had agreed that we were both cynical about multiculturalism. Ladies and gentlemen, that is the only thing that Doug Fisher and I have ever agreed upon in the whole of our professional careers.

The thing that impressed me most was that Saul Hayes and one or two other members of the panel said that they had read all of John Munro's speeches. That to me is an incredible achievement and one that I am sure has made his whole evening. I would say it is a punishment.

It is show-and-tell time. Everybody has told who they were and where they have come from. The Lynchs came from Austria, initially from the city of Lins, and they went through Europe looking for tin and eventually got to Ireland where they found women. Then they got involved in a hanging episode that put the name into the English language and, I think, into virtually every other language in the world. They scattered to the four winds and can be found in every nation of the world. I have travelled most of the nations and have seen not only the Lynchs but the treatment of the minorities in other countries, and I have been very depressed as part of my attitude towards multiculturalism in Canada. I have seen the treatment of minorities in the Soviet Union, in the People's Republic of China, in Brazil, in Argentina, and in Australia. I have come to know, through observations in other countries as well as our own, what is meant by tokenism.

In the Soviet Union, I have seen the official treatment of resident minorities, ancient minorities that had been on their land for long as time. I have seen how the constitution takes them in and assures them the freedom of their language and their culture but also is very careful to ensure the overriding authority of the central government and the political body. I call that kind of glorification of minorities, tokenism.

It is the same in the People's Republic of China, and there is no country in the world whose constitution and whose everyday practice is more glorified for the minorities. They are minorities in China because China is an extremely cohesive country racially and culturally. The minorities are treasured and brought out on every high day and holy day and at Communist election time. They dance and they sing in the Teinament Square in Peking and they add colour to a very drab society. The Chinese seem to enjoy this colour, and then they put the minorities back in the drawer until the next ceremony. And, it is tokenism.

And, I think there is tokenism for the native people of Brazil, one of the most democratic countries in the world, a country that like us has huge influxes from Europe and also has had a very large and continuing native population.

I have doubts about the seats of our government not having any alternative solutions. Certainly I would be the last to seek them in this hall, the scene of all our federal and provincial conferences, ladies and gentlemen, and you know how many of those we have had and how many solutions have ensued from them.

I think we could talk as long as some of those conferences have lasted without coming to any conclusions, but I can express to you some of my doubts. I think, along with some of the other speakers, that I have no trouble putting in a special category the native people of Canada, the Indians and the Inuit people. I don't think any of us have any doubts about that.

I would add to that, in terms of discrimination, the persecution and worry of the Jewish people. I think most of us will agree that they belong in a special category, not only of Canadian history but of world history, and they are special because of the very existence of the Zionist movement, the strength of the movement here in Canada, and the existence of the state of Israel. Beyond that I have trouble with special status. I have trouble persuading myself that our government needs to address itself to the cultural or linguistic specialty of such a huge number of minorities.

Your host here is the largest council ever to be inflicted upon us. If you see the size of the council and the number of people that are represented on it, and if you have any doubts at all about the effectiveness of councils or committees, and 40 years of writing about them have given me grave doubts, you would wonder about the usefulness of so vast an apparatus.

I am a racist to the extent that I believe that origins are important. I think we can look at one another and find it interesting and valid to know where the roots of this or that person might have been. To that extent I am interested in my own Irish background. To any further extent, I am embarrassed about it.

I rejoice in the fact that the Canadian Irish community, which in my youth fought one with the other, has not involved itself in the terrible events that are going on in the name of multiculturalism, if you like, in Ireland today. I don't think Canada would be a bit the richer if Irishmen were going at one

another the way my grandfather, according to one travelling story, went at another Irishman.

My grandfather was sailing a wood schooner down the St. John River in New Brunswick, and a farmer came out in his rowboat to try and get a lift down to the city. He gave an Orangeman's salute and my grandfather picked him up and threw him into the St. John River and left him there to drown. That is the way they settled questions between Canadian Irish people 75 years ago. That sort of think doesn't seem to happen now, and I regard that as an enrichment.

I don't like professional Irishmen. I find them a bore, and I find professional Scots to be a bore, and I find professional Welshmen to be a bore, except when they are singing. Professional Englishmen I don't know about.

John Diefenbaker tells a story about an amateur storywriter in northern Saskatchewan who went out among the native people to do a thesis. At the end of his research he was sitting talking in the home of one of the Chiefs. The wife of the Chief was also sitting and he turned to her and said, "Tell me, Mrs., how is it that I meet Welsh halfbreeds and I meet Scots halfbreeds and I meet Irish halfbreeds and I meet French halfbreeds but I don't meet any English halfbreeds. Why is that?" And she looked at him and she took a puff on her pipe and she said, "Well, Mr.," she says, "We have to draw the line somewhere."

I want to talk also about what I regard as one of the myths that underlies Canadian multicultural programs. The myth is that the United States is a melting pot.

I was born in the United States, in Boston, of Canadian parents who brought me back to Canada at the age of two weeks. I subsequently went back to the United States to work there for a while and I went as a Canadian, passing up what the American immigration officer told me was God's greatest gift to mankind, the right to American citizenship. Then they passed up the citizenship back here in Canada and I found Canada didn't want me either so I ended up for six months belonging to nobody. That was eventually rectified and I came back. But, having lived and travelled extensively in the United States, I know that the United States' melting pot is not the thing that we were told it is in some of our own literature.

Nobody who has been among the Scandinavian people in Minnesota, or the Polish people in Pennsylvania, or the Italian people in New Jersey or New York, or the Jewish people in New York is going to believe that they have lost their identities. I was going to say the Boston Irish but I think they have ironed out almost as much as the Canadian Irish probably have.

But the idea that the sledgehammer that the Americans hit their kids with every morning, up to salute the flag and the pledge, makes them all the same and makes them forget their background, I think has been greatly overdone.

I want to know where the American ethnics are in your council and to what extent that enormous group of new Canadians is represented in your thinking. Is there a place for the ethnic American who has been coming to

Canada in such large numbers and with such great hopes, not only to invest their money but many to come and live and make their lives among us? Do we regard them as new Canadians? Do we want to keep their cultures alive? We are passing laws against it every day, or trying to, up here in the House of Commons. Do we want that, or is it part of the philosophy of this organization to regard that as an enrichment, in which case we should not try to expel it but to treasure it.

I just close by saying something that underlies my whole thinking. On the multicultural question, the fact is that this country, in my view, is coming unravelled. I have come to terms with it, and I think we can solve it as well before it comes apart. But we seem to have deepened a lot of our problems as between the English and the French smithsonians of our society. We are full of doubts about the quality of French instruction in English-language schools across the country, and we are full of doubts of the quality of English-language instruction in the French-language schools. These pressures come at a time when Quebec is deeply involved in French education with difficult adjustments under way and great stresses and strains. It is going to stress us and put tremendous strain on the goodwill between the English and the French components of our society. It is often said how lucky we are to have inherited the two great cultural strengths of Europe without remembering that we also inherited one of the most ancient hostilities that has filled the pages of history with gory as well as glorious details.

I don't worry much about our being diverted over multicultural preoccupations because I think you have been conned by the government. I think it is ethnicity as Doug Fisher pointed out. I think it is vote gathering. We were saying at dinner it must be great because every political party is for it. What political party would be against it?

I think what you have got is the minimum possible in the initial announcement. I don't think you have got a strong minister. I don't think you have got a large enough budget to be anything but tokenism. I think that as soon as that particular minister fades from the scene the government will show its sense of priorities for the program by making it part of another minister's portfolio. I think I know what the government is trying to tell you and it is singing my song.

So I don't come and say, stop this enormous wastage of public funds. I do invite you to be understanding, though, of some of what I regard as the deeper problems of the country in which you can play so much a part towards the solution.

2

Multiculturalism – The Francophone Viewpoint

Multiculturalism — The Francophone Viewpoint

by

Reverend Father Léger Comeau

Hopes and Fears

As a result of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism and subsequent measures taken by the federal government to guarantee equal rights and privileges to the two official language groups in Canada, French-speaking minorities had their hopes rekindled. Now, confronted with other federal government trends, French-Canadians cannot help feeling a bit uneasy. Accustomed to living in a state of insecurity, French-Canadians, particularly those living outside Quebec, automatically fear any hint of a relaxation of the federal and provincial governments' efforts to maintain and develop their ethnic, linguistic and cultural identity.

Most French-Canadians outside Quebec rightly or wrongly view the federal government's multiculturalism policy as a real threat. Pierre Tremblay expressed this sentiment in a September 25, 1975 editorial in *Le Droit*, entitled "A Multiculturalism Department:"

> (TRANSLATION)
> We cannot help but see this as an insidious and steady shift away from biculturalism toward a crushing of francophones' special needs under the political weight of "multiculture" — the new expression of the "Canadian mosaic," the seal of approval stamped on our national identity.

Shift in the Secretary of State Department

A change in orientation in the Secretary of State Department soon heightened French-Canadians' fears. In 1972, the Social Action Branch, which was concerned with French-language minorities, disappeared, re-emerging as merely one of the programs under the Citizenship Branch, on the same footing as assistance to the development of multiculturalism. There has been no subsequent indication that the federal government considers francophone groups outside Quebec as an essential component of Canada, which is officially a bilingual and bicultural country. French-speaking minorities are just one group in a host of other Canadian minorities. No special attention is paid to French culture.

Multiculturalism and Anglicization

The federal government's massive contribution to the expansion of bilingualism will raise prompt objections. It is easy to counter that institutional bilingualism will be of little use to a population in danger of disappearing into the "melting pot" of an anglicizing multiculturalism. This is not a false alarm we are sounding here. In the great majority of cases, multicultural events and activities in Canada are conducted only in English. Multiculturalism all too often means English unilingualism. The tendency to lump the francophone group together with other cultural minorities can only result in anglicization and therefore a loss of identity. Hence the necessity to clearly dissociate programs for official language groups from multiculturalism programs.

Bilingualism First, then Multiculturalism

French-Canadians are not opposed to multiculturalism in itself. They have fought for their own rights for too long to now deny them to others. They simply believe that the federal government does not give them enough assistance to build up their strength and ensure that peaceful co-existence will not come to mean assimilation.

The brief submitted by the *Fédération des Franco-Colombiens* to the Task Force on French-Language Minorities last October contained this statement:

> (TRANSLATION)
> Multiculturalism will not be achieved in Canada until bilingualism has come into its own. We should not delude ourselves — some provinces, particularly British Columbia, still do not accept the French fact. This intolerance of bilingualism has been concealed too often in the past several years under the guise of multiculturalism. This attitude counteracts any attempt to achieve national unity. Let us set multiculuralism aside and direct our efforts toward nation-wide bilingualism. When this objective is reached, new Canadians will be able to count on a culturally dynamic and flourishing French Canada to obtain respect for their languages and cultures.

Harmony

In short, although French-Canadians respect the rights of every Canadian, and although they appreciate the cultural contribution of the various Canadian ethnic groups, they do not want multiculturalism to be promoted at their expense and have no desire to once again become the losers in a worthy cause.

The Secretary of State Department seems to want to expend considerable effort to ensure harmony among ethnic groups in Canada. This is a praiseworthy intention. Unfortunately, French-Canadians too often get the impression that the burden of harmony has been placed almost solely on their shoulders. They also know the price in submissiveness, self-effacement and weakening they must pay for this harmony. Must contributing to the promotion of multiculturalism mean sacrificing their most cherished values?

The Franco-Canadians of Western Canada and Multiculturalism

by

Professor Robert Painchaud

The policy of multiculturalism put forward by the federal government in 1971 has not yet generated much enthusiasm in French Canada. Nor, it should be added, has it received much support from what may loosely be termed English Canada. My purpose here is to examine the attitudes of the French-speaking population *vis-à-vis* the program which resulted from the recommendations contained in Book IV of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. More specifically, this brief survey deals only with the French-speaking community of western Canada. Others far more knowledgeable of the relations between linguistic and cultural groups in Ontario, Quebec, and the Maritimes will, hopefully, examine the reaction of their French-speaking compatriots to multiculturalism.

In any event, it seems appropriate to isolate the Canadian West in a study of the relationships between the French-speaking and "ethnic" communities. Interestingly, bilingualism remains under attack in the West, while multiculturalism finds there some of its strongest advocates. My contention is that the sensitivity of the francophone communities across the Prairies and in British Columbia to continuing criticisms of a bilingual Canada explains their reluctance to support and promote multiculturalism. It should be said immediately that this does not suggest that other ethnocultural communities are blamed for the difficulties experienced by the promoters of bilingualism. It reveals instead the insecurity which permeates the French-speaking minorities in that region of Canada as well as their fear that somehow multiculturalism will undermine their position as one of the cornerstones of Canadian society.

The French Fact in Western Canada

Basic to an understanding of the French-speaking position on the contribution of other linguistic and cultural groups to the development of a Canadian identity is the troubled history of the francophone population in the Canadian West. The Manitoba Act of 1870 gave the first province to join

Confederation after 1867 a set of institutions which reflected the prevailing duality at Red River between the French-speaking (Catholic) and English-speaking (Protestant) populations. It appeared that both Quebec and Ontario would share equally in the development of the North-West. Yet, within a decade, the number of French-Canadian immigrants from Quebec or the New England states failed to keep pace with the large influx of Ontarians and other immigrant groups, with the result that Manitoba soon witnessed what Professor W. L. Morton characterizes as "the triumph of Ontario democracy."[1] Nonetheless, the French-speaking leadership in Western Canada maintained that this new region of Canada must continue to provide for the recognition of at least the two societies transplanted from central Canada. The protracted battles over schools in Manitoba and in what became Saskatchewan and Alberta reinforced that determination. Nor were they alone in advocating a pan-Canadian view of Canadian-*Canadien* society. Much of the French-Canadian élite from Quebec, among them Henri Bourassa, lent support to their cause. Thus, underlying the actions and posture of the French-speaking spokesmen of the West on linguistic and cultural questions was and is a strong belief in the basic duality of Canada itself.

There prevailed until quite recently a second opposing viewpoint which perceived the past and future of the country in different terms. To summarize the view briefly: Canada was essentially an English country, and as far as the West was concerned there was no place for the perpetuation of any form of duality in a region composed of many peoples of various backgrounds. What was required was the integration, if not the total assimilation, of incoming groups into what could only be an English-speaking community. One historian has concluded that Ontarians won the "struggle for cultural dominance" in the West and that the Canadianization "process" of other immigrant groups in the quarter century prior to the outbreak of World War I amounted to "an implicit slap at French Canada".[2] The objective was to favour the English language above all others, to promote British institutions over 'foreign' inventions, to replace group loyalties by individual attachment to a Canadian way of life, and to achieve these goals within one generation.

Interestingly enough, the French-speaking minorities of Western Canada, in their struggle to retain or recover what they believed to be entrenched rights for their language and institutions, found allies in the European groups of Catholic faith. Acting on the belief that language and faith were inextricably mixed, French-speaking leaders, especially the clergy, sought to create a community of interests between the francophone elements — Métis, French-Canadian, French, Belgian, and Swiss — and the arriving slavic and germanic peoples. The marked opposition of the 1880s to "foreign" immigration gave way in the 1890s and early 1900s to full encouragement of this type of immigration. While continuing, therefore, to press the federal government for measures and program that would either facilitate the repatriation of thousands of French-Canadians living in the United States or assist in the movement of significant numbers of European French-speaking to Western

34

Canada, lay and clerical leaders welcomed the growing number of German, Flemish, Polish, and Ruthenian settlers. Archbishop Adélard Langevin of St. Boniface, a dominant figure in the French and Catholic communities of Western Canada, told one of his more active colonization agents in 1898 that only by reinforcing their position could they expect to resolve the critical schools questions which were deemed fundamental for their development: "Immigration must be encouraged more than ever, especially French immigration, but I exclude no one, be he Galician, Russian or German. All Catholics are welcome but the French doubly so."[3]

Within a decade, partly as a result of the judicious exploitation of the "bilingual" clause contained in the 1897 Laurier-Greenway Agreement, the Franco-Manitoban *collectivité* became so identified with the "ethnic" groups in the province that they were seen as "just another ethnic group."[4] Consequently, when a new provincial administration moved during World War I to "Canadianize" the numerous nationalities within its borders by abolishing the controversial clause and by proclaiming English as the sole language of instruction in all public schools, no exception was made for the French-speaking population. The *Manitoba Free Press*, which at times recognized the special position occupied by the francophone group but also attacked the program of "balkanization" nurtured largely by a predominantly French-speaking clergy, concluded that the solution was to

> either stick to one language, or to go on not to bilingualism but to multilingualism. This country must be either English-speaking or polyglot. It is politically impossible to give special privileges by law to the French and deny them to other and more numerous non-English speaking races.[5]

And so, in 1916, following decisive legislation pushed through the Legislature by the Norris government, the Franco-Manitoban community suffered a serious blow both to its status as a charter group in the province and to its attempts to recover the rightful place of its language and culture at the official level. Needless to say, the francophone groups in the other western provinces found themselves in the same position.

It is worthwhile to pause here and consider the importance of these developments. The predicament that led the embattled French-speaking collectivities west of the Great Lakes to join with other minority groups in the pursuit of collective survival raises difficult questions. One is the cause of the failure on the part of the French-speaking leadership across Western Canada to attract settlers from Quebec and elsewhere in order to increase the number of settlements of French origin across the prairies. The second question relates to the image that other ethno-cultural groups have of the French-speaking community and to the debate over what distinguishes "culture" from "folklore."

Why did French Canada fail to assert itself more forcefully in Western Canada? Explanations range from its lack of a frontier mentality to considerations of larger economic issues.[6] There is also a *nationaliste* interpretation which attributes the small numbers of French-speaking migrants and immigrants to the

West to systematic opposition by an Anglo-Saxon majority determined to prevent the extension of the French fact west of Quebec.[7] This simplistic interpretation by contemporary *Québécois* historians, however, does not hold true. First, those who subscribe to it forget that francophone leaders in Western Canada accused not the Anglo-Saxons, but rather the political, journalistic, and clerical élites of Quebec for their own lack of interest in supporting the movement of French-Canadians towards the Canadian prairies. The absence, therefore, of strong French-speaking communities which could only extend the influence of Quebec says a great deal about their view of Canada and of French Canada in the half century following Confederation. Second, one suspects that these *nationalistes* are intent on dismissing the French-speaking minorities as "dead ducks" and on blaming others for it. Clearly, the object is to exclude the minorities from the Quebec-Canada confrontation over matters of sovereignty and independence.

The image of French speaking ethno-cultural groups developed by the other ethno-cultural groups was, according to Professor J. E. Rea, the result of the forced assimilation of these latter groups into an Ontario model of Canada. In his view, the persistence of French-Canadian culture in Western Canada is a "continuing reminder of the price these 'new Canadians' had to pay for acceptance" into the English-speaking whole. To which he adds that the B and B Commission "discovered the greatest resentment toward French Canada among those immigrant groups of the West whose own cultural heritage had been emasculated." He ends by asking what prospects there can be for a multicultural society in Western Canada if French Canada is ghettoized or if it loses its identity.[8] Thus, the strategy of inter-ethnic cooperation developed in the 1896-1916 period sought to reverse the trend towards that "melting-pot" ideal. Have leaders in the ethno-cultural communities sufficiently recognized that the French-speaking clergy especially offered its encouragement and extended generous assistance to Polish, German, Ukrainian, and Flemish groups desirous of retaining their language and culture?

Relations between the francophone and "ethnic" communities in Western Canada changed significantly in the years after 1920. A growing separation replaced the *rapprochement* of earlier years. In part this resulted from the organization of national churches and societies to give expression to the needs of the non-French groups. On the other hand, the French-speaking minorities disassociated themselves from "ethnic" issues, preferring instead to pursue their goals of linguistic and cultural survival independently. It is worthwhile recalling, however, that the private French radio stations organized in the prairie provinces after World War II made available their facilities to interested ethnocultural groups in the 1950s and 1960s. The outcry that followed the abandonment of this policy in recent years attests to the importance of that collaboration.

Briefly then, for better or for worse, the history of Western Canada reveals that the survival of the French fact — at least in the period before 1920 — is inextricably linked to that of other ethno-cultural groups. With that

in mind, we may now turn to an examination of the years since the start of the Quiet Revolution. There is no doubt that events in Quebec had an impact on the consciousness of English Canada and that they very much influenced the nature and the course of cultural developments on the rest of Canada.

The French Fact and Multiculturalism in the West

How did Franco-Canadians in Western Canada receive the announcement of the multiculturalism policy tabled by the Government of Canada in Parliament in October 1971?

Even before the Prime Minister's statement to the House of Commons, there were mixed feelings about the implications of the recommendations contained in Book IV of the B and B Report. Publication of the latter, following so closely upon the enactment of the Official Languages Act, prevented francophone leaders from devoting much time to reconciling the one with the other. They were almost completely immersed in working out the impact that the Official Languages Act could have on the French-speaking *collectivités*. It is not surprising, therefore, that they concentrated their energies on revitalizing and restructuring, and in some cases on abolishing, outmoded practices and institutions. There is no doubt that the long-awaited legislation, and especially its promise of direct federal support, injected a renewed sense of confidence in the future.

Nonetheless, some groups considered the links between francophone and ethno-cultural problems. Thus, in November 1970, the A.C.F.C. (*Association Culturelle Franco-Canadienne de la Saskatchewan*), in a brief to the joint Parliamentary Committee on the Constitution, rejected the "melting-pot" concept because it feared that cultural uniformity could lead to repression, prejudice, and the quenching of creativity. It favoured instead the freedom of cultural expression for all — Eskimos, native peoples, Ukrainians, Italians, French and English. Furthermore, it argued that each province should decide which language, or languages, would be made official. "Any language other than English or French should be allowed to be made official in any province of Canada, or in any city or political region under provincial jurisdiction."[9]

Finally, while proposing that French and English remain the only two official languages at the federal level, and that federal bilingual districts be established in each of the provincial capitals, the association's presentation adopted the following stance on the recognition of other cultures: Up to now, there has been a tendency in Canada to speak in terms of two cultural communities, anglophone and francophone, almost to the exclusion of other cultural communities such as groups speaking Indian and Métis, Eskimo, Italian, Ukrainian and so forth. If these realities of Canadian culture are not given positive encouragement in our constitution, we fear that their subjection to unconscious harmful suppression will continue, on the pretext that they do not come within the law. Any new constitution should not only recognize these cultural communities but also recommend the establishment of official "cultural regions." These regions would be entitled to various supplementary

federal services by way of emphasizing the importance of their contribution to the Canadian mosaic. Just as in the case of bilingual districts, these cultural regions would also be given official recognition by the provinces, and could have one or several "official" languages designated by them.

In short, we support the creation of bilingual districts for regions in which the English and French cultures predominate, and of cultural regions for areas in which cultures other than the English and French cultures deserve special recognition.[10] Thus, the Franco-Canadians of Saskatchewan drew a clear distinction between federal and provincial responsibilities in linguistic and cultural matters. Let the former, they suggested, concern itself with the basic duality of the country, and the latter attend to the needs and aspirations of "other" groups.

No such distinction emerged from the Manitoba Mosaic Congress held in Winnipeg in October 1970. Most of the French-speaking delegates stormed out of a plenary session dealing with the problem of defining and delimiting the extent of linguistic and cultural rights. They were protesting both against the failure of the Congress to support resolutions recognizing French and English as the official languages of Manitoba, and the attempt to give other languages recognition as Canadian languages with protection under the Official Languages Act.[11] The editor of *La Liberté et le Patriote*, the French weekly serving both the Manitoba and Saskatchewan communities, had anticipated difficulties before the opening of the Congress. He welcomed the beginning of a serious dialogue among the various "ethnic groups," as well as between them and "les autres" (presumably the French and Anglo-Saxon groups), on "the possibilities of working together to create a bilingual Canada in which each cultural identity will be able not only to survive, but also to flourish and enhance the general character of the country by making its own special contribution."[12] One concern was that

> ... in their efforts to maintain their ethnic or cultural identity, more often than not the majority of these groups attacked their problems alone, sometimes at the expense of others, in particular the French-Canadians, who are considered to be in a more privileged position than the other groups.[13]

Nonetheless, he invited the Franco-Manitobans to attend the Congress, while perhaps not involving themselves too much in the discussions, limiting themselves to a defense of the French fact in Canada and in Manitoba and to lending moral support to other groups desirous of obtaining some protection for their identity. He concluded the editorial by restating for the occasion the theme of the special mission that French-speaking minorities, and especially that of Manitoba, could play on the Canadian scene:

> Obviously, transplanted Quebeckers who have not adapted here are not going to hope that such a congress will be a success. They have not even succeeded in convincing new Canadian groups of the validity of their own goals, and seem to have lost any interest in doing so. It is up to francophones in the rest of the

> country to develop the potential for a bilingual, multicultural Canada. The next ten years will tell whether this was a pipe dream . . . Manitoba today, with its ethno-cultural complexity, is being invited to move still further ahead into the future. This cannot be accomplished without the participation of Franco-Manitobans . . .[14]

Little public discussion ensued, as even the weeklies turned their attention to the October Crisis and the accompanying debate. Unfortunately, no one thought later of returning to the unresolved cultural issues.

If the reaction to Book IV was varied, there was at least a response. Such was not the case late in 1971 when the Prime Minister made public his government's multiculturalism policy. The event went largely unnoticed in official circles and in the francophone press of Western Canada. None of the weeklies commented upon the principles or the programs contained in the Prime Minister's statement to the House of Commons. Yet they could have asked themselves what was meant by a policy of "multiculturalism within a bilingual framework." Was biculturalism laid to rest? What did the view that Canada could recognize no official culture or cultures signify for the French-speaking minorities? How might Franco-Canadians and their numerous associations contribute to a *rapprochement* between peoples of different languages or cultures? Their silence almost suggests disapproval.

One plausible explanation is that the French-speaking communities across the Prairies and in British Columbia were so involved in taking advantage of the new climate of opinion generated in most parts of the country in favour of the concept of a bilingual Canada that they failed to interest themselves in the concerns of other ethno-cultural groups. Never before, at least not since the late 19th century, had the French fact enjoyed so many advantages. The years after 1968 were golden years. Assisted by grants from the federal government, each of the provincial associations (the Franco-Manitoban Society, the French-Canadian Association of Alberta, and the Federation of Franco-Columbians) undertook programs of social animation aimed at revitalizing dispirited populations. There followed a reawakening that led to wider and greater participation in educational, social, cultural, and economic issues affecting the *collectivités*. Initiatives made possible by federal and/or provincial assistance included financing for cultural centres, teachers' colleges, tours by local and *Québécois* or *Acadian chansonniers*, cooperative ventures, festivals, and much more. The purchase by Radio-Canada of the three private radio stations operated for over 20 years by francophone groups in each of the prairie provinces added to federal participation in the field of public communications. French-language television programming reached more communities, although there remains room for improvements in this area. It appeared that a feeling of *épanouissement* (flowering) would replace the defensiveness of *la survivance* (survival).

In the midst of these developments, Franco-Canadians did not involve themselves much in inter-cultural activities. In Manitoba, they organized

a pavilion on one occasion for the very successful Folklarama held during the summer months, but have not participated in recent years. To the suggestion that the Franco-Manitobans reconsider their position, the French editor of the bilingual *St. Boniface Courier* objected that:

> . . . we are not ethnics. Incidentally, this editor firmly believes that we would find ourselves in a most pitiful situation if it weren't for the federal policy of bilingualism and biculturalism. After all, this is just about the only thing keeping us alive!
>
> We are not an ethnic group, but does that necessarily mean that France, the country of origin for all of us, should not make some effort to participate in Folklorama, the "festival of nations"?[15]

This rather strange commentary thus concludes that native-born francophones are somehow non-ethnic, while the French from Europe constitute an ethnic group. Let only the latter join "folkloric" festivals, while the former engage in "cultural" projects! French-speaking members of arts or folk councils often discovered that this type of attitude led francophone groups to decline invitations to join intercultural events.

Franco-Canadian spokesmen have ready explanations for what many Western Canadians view as a "ghetto" mentality. Apart from the oft-repeated argument that French-speaking people are not "just another ethnic group", they insist that English-Canadians (read Anglo-Saxons), whom they perceive as the other "founding race" of Canada, are never spoken of as "ethnics" either. They fail to see, therefore, why the French-speaking population should be included, at least in terms of Western Canada, in events or festivals celebrating "ethnic" traditions. Furthermore, they point to the multiplicity of cultural happenings offered by francophone groups and organizations, insisting that they are open to the public. In their view, they are bound to uphold the French fact in the West. Admittedly, the language barrier prevents many of their co-citizens from appreciating their programs, but they maintain that the latter emanate from the only community capable of giving life to Canada's other official language. How many multicultural activities, they ask, are presented in a bilingual (French-English) framework? Their answer to this question is that "ethnic" groups in Western Canada are part and parcel of anglophone culture. In effect, this amounts to the view that there are two majority cultures in Canada.

Over the years, these same francophone leaders maintained that once the French-speaking communities had recovered much lost ground, they would be open to greater interaction with other ethno-cultural groups. In the last 12 months, however, they have expressed concern over the permanence of federal and provincial support for the furtherance of the French fact in the West. The uneasiness over the future of programs until now administered by a separate section within the Secretary of State's department led to the appointment of a special task force — funded by that same Department — to inquire into the needs and problems of the francophone minorities six years after the implementation of the Official

Languages Act. The briefs submitted to this *Groupe de travail sur les minorités de langue française* embody revealing attitudes and positions on the relationships between bilingualism, biculturalism, and multiculturalism.

The briefs touching upon the wants of the *Fransaskois* and of the *Franco-Albertains* detail the achievements of recent years and plead for the maintenance of at least the support made available to them since 1968-69. The A.C.F.C. summarizes its position thusly:

> We believe that our work between 1968 and 1975 was extremely important both for its application to francophones and on the level of Canadian unity. Indeed, ever since our Association first received support from the Secretary of State Department, while there were many false starts, still there were stunning successes that could not otherwise have been accomplished. Armed with these early experiences, we are confident that in the future we will be able to step up our development program in order to permanently counteract the anglicization of our members.[16]

Neither this Saskatchewan *mémoire* nor that of Alberta's A.C.F.A. addresses itself to the multiculturalism policy; both associations admit to the heavy burdens placed on them in the pursuit of "bilingual" and "bicultural" goals.

The brief from *La Fédération des Franco-Colombiens* on the other hand emphatically states that the French fact and bilingualism are the only ways by which Canada can give itself a cultural identity distinct from that of the United States. Its authors then attack the deplorable status of the francophone minorities whose incapacity to develop themselves ". . . is certainly not the result of persecution and hypocrisy on the part of certain provincial governments with anglophone majorities and on the part of many individual anglophones."[17] It is in this context that the following paragraph on the place of multiculturalism should be read:

> . . . bilingualism and multiculturalism must not be confused. Multiculturalism in Canada will only be achieved when bilingualism finally flourishes. We must have no illusions since certain provinces, British Columbia in particular, still refuse to accept the French fact. This lack of tolerance toward bilingualism has all too often been disguised by the excuse of multiculturalism. Such an attitude thwarts any attempts to achieve the desired national unity. Let us abandon multiculturalism and strive to achieve bilingualism on a national scale. When this objection has been reached, new Canadians will have the support of strong and culturally flourishing francophones in their efforts to obtain respect for their languages and cultures.[18]

While admitting that the monies spent under terms of the bilingualism program are substantial, the *Fédération* argues that the French-speaking minorities actually receive *less* assistance than groups coming under the multiculturalism grants ($3,025,000.00 as compared to $10,000,000.00). They make the point that the bilingualism policy makes no sense unless there are bilingual people!

A somewhat more moderate, but nonetheless pointed, brief was submitted by *La Société Franco-Manitobaine*. It too stresses the importance of bilingualism as a *sine qua non* for the achievement of national unity.

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The S.F.M. believes that progressively the provincial governments should assume responsibility for the *épanouissement* of the francophone minorities, but since they cannot presently count on receiving solid and satisfactory support from them, it therefore remains essential that the federal government continue to cater to their needs. But after rendering an approving judgment on federal measures introduced over the last 10 years in favour of the francophone minorities, its authors speak out against two developments which threaten these same minorities. They claim, in the first instance, that federal authorities are losing interest in the French fact beyond the borders of Ontario in the west and of New Brunswick in the east. They attribute this to the pessimistic interpretations which *Québécois* presumably advance in Ottawa with respect to the value of the minorities in the assertion of the French fact in Canada generally. Studies based on the 1971 census data apparently draw negative conclusions on the future of the French-speaking minorities.[19]

The second development detrimental to the Franco-Manitobans and their compatriots in other provinces comes from Western Canada. The S.F.M.'s brief explains it this way:

> Another reaction from Western Canada, where the Liberal party has a great deal of difficulty getting solid support from the electorate, tends to view the francophone minority in the West as just another ethnic group. This has resulted in pressure to make the federal bilingualism policy evolve into a policy of multiculturalism whereby francophone minorities would have no right to special treatment as such. Hence there is pressure to make internal organization of the Secretary of State Department evolve in this direction. The S.F.M. feels that both these trends, which have opposite aims but similar effects, have not yet succeeded in seriously undermining the federal government's bilingualism policy. In our view, this would be a simplistic approach that would have disastrous middle and long-term effects on the nature of the Canadian confederation. It would present to French-Canadians in the East and West the image of English Canada as a dominant majority, along the lines of the American "melting pot," denying French any status outside Quebec, northern Ontario and New Brunswick. Certainly there can be no question of seriously offering the "ethnic" minorities in the West any more than limited support for cultural and folkloric survival. No French-speaking minority can be satisfied with such a situation.[20]

The message is clear: five or even ten years of federal and/or provincial concern do not atone for 60 years of neglect; bilingualism must take priority over multiculturalism; the federal government must continue to act as the guardian of the francophone community, because of its national status and because of the provincial government's "... considerable hesitation, delays and many refusals when Franco-Manitoban organizations request special grants to carry out educational socio-economic and cultural activities in French."[21]

The reluctance of the provincial government is asserting the "statut spécial" of the Franco-Manitoban community would be the result of "strong

pressure to make it move in the direction of the multicultural approach described above."[22] Clearly, the days of *l'épanouissement* have not arrived.

The final report of the task force submitted to the Secretary of State in November 1975 reflects the deep-felt anxieties of the French-speaking minorities across the country, beyond Quebec that is. *"C'est le temps ou JAMAIS . . ."* (It is now or NEVER) it proclaims from its title page. There follows a lengthy analysis of the development of the federal government's bilingualism policy and its assistance program for minority language communities, beginning with the 1963 appointment of a Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. It proceeds happily along through the enactment of the Official Languages Act which *". . . was meaningful only because there were francophone minorities outside Quebec and because these minorities had and should have a real future."*[23] The multiplier effect created by the legislation on improving relations between Canadians rested in part on the very existence of French-speaking minorities outside of Quebec which had maintained the French fact over many decades of often heroic struggles. Task force members conclude that the years between 1969 and 1972 testify to the realization of, or at least the promise of, a bilingual and bicultural Canada.

According to the authors of the report, the pattern was altered by the two federal elections held in 1972 and 1974, as well as by an anglophone "backlash" which forced a downgrading of the bilingual-bicultural program. Instead, they continue, *"multiculturalism* is now proposed as the solution to all problems, but for the French-speaking minorities it is the *death sentence of bilingualism."*[24]

The First Canadian Conference on Multiculturalism held in 1973, and the appointment of a Minister of State for multiculturalism, were followed by the imposition of a ceiling on grants intended for the official language minority groups. In their view, the francophone minorities had fulfilled their role in the Quebec-Canada confrontation by demonstrating that there could be a viable French fact in almost all regions of Canada. Having thus saved Confederation, the minorities were relegated to a position where their maintenance depended upon the tolerance or intolerance of the majority.[25]

This most important and revealing document goes on to say much more about the unique problems of the French-speaking minorities, all of which warrants close study by those concerned with such things. But its analysis of events and trends of recent years contains flaws. In the first place, it assumes that bilingualism and multiculturalism are competing and mutually exclusive policies. Furthermore, the chain of events does not bear the interpretation that the multiculturalism policy resulted from a "backlash" in English Canada (whatever that is) following the 1972 federal election or that it signified the end of a biculturalism policy adopted after 1969. Does this mean that the Cabinet favoured a biculturalism policy, while at the same time preparing a multiculturalism policy announced in October 1971, *one full year before* the general election? The members of

the *Groupe de travail* would have done better to consider the view that the multiculturalism policy was designed to bolster the Liberal party's support among ethno-cultural communities. Would not yet another interpretation suggest that the federal government sought to reconcile the interests of both the francophone and other ethno-cultural communities by proclaiming an Official Languages Act in 1969, followed by a cultural policy two years later which embodied the recognition of all cultures in the all-encompassing phrase of "multiculturalism within a bilingual framework"? An ambiguous statement that, which still leaves many unanswered questions while appealing to all. (The latter comment of course does not apply to those die-hards in Canada who oppose both bilingualism and multiculturalism.)

Relations today between Ottawa and the French-speaking minorities have not reached a breaking point; that is unlikely to happen. But this latest manifesto of what is often referred to as the *diaspora* reveals the degree of dependency on the federal government. One wonders how federal politicians will receive a report prepared by associations largely funded by federal departments and severely critical of Ottawa's policies in a related field. Will attacks on the multiculturalism program harm the cause of the francophone minorities? Will federal authorities appreciate the complex and deep-rooted anxieties which gave rise to their ethnocentrism? How will other ethno-cultural groups react to the apparent refusal of the francophone community to accept multiculturalism? The end result may be to supply the numerous critics of bilingualism and multiculturalism with evidence of the divisiveness of both policies.

No good will result from a condemnation of the francophone outlook on linguistic and cultural issues arising out of the recognition by the federal government of Canada's multicultural fabric. An understanding of the self-image of French-speaking minorities offers the best guarantee for a dialogue urgently needed. Before considering the prospects for a *rapprochement*, however, may we now turn to a brief examination of three major concerns to leaders of the Franco-Canadian communities in Western Canada on the eve of a period of decisions.

The Future of the French Fact in Western Canada

Paradoxically, the French-speaking communities in Western Canada experience life and death at the same time. On the one hand, unprecedented social and cultural developments in the 1960s and 1970s hold the promise of a bright future. To illustrate, *Le Cercle Molière*, currently celebrating its 50th anniversary while attracting growing audiences across the West, has developed into a semi-professional theatre group. In the last two seasons, its program included dramas and children's plays written by local playrights. In Saskatchewan, the community of Zénon Park is preparing for a direct television link-up with the town of Baie St-Paul in Quebec. Project SASKABEC – U.9. will bring together two distant francophone communities via Canada's latest Communications Technology Satellite (CTS). These

and many more programs reveal the vitality of the French fact on the Prairies and on the Pacific coast.

On the other hand, however, leaders in the francophone community as well as observers from without point to signs of disintegration which are slowly, but inevitably, strangling the Western *collectivités*. The now retired and former archbishop of Saint-Boniface, Msgr Maurice Baudoux, who devoted his life to the Church and to the survival of francophone culture in each of the three prairie provinces, told a Royal Society of Canada colloquium in June 1975 of the *"dépersonnalisation culturelle"* which increasingly alienates the younger generation from the legacy handed down by their fathers and forefathers.[26] His observations, added to those of others, focus on three subjects of major concern to Franco-Canadians: the census of 1971, immigration, and relations with Quebec.

Richard Arès, in a detailed study of the 1971 census, makes disturbing comments on the future of the French-speaking minorities, both in western Canada and elsewhere. A sample of his remarks attests to the seriousness of the situation. On Saskatchewan: "In Saskatchewan, French survival is turning into a tragedy!" On Alberta: "This is another province where French survival is turning into a tragedy!" On the West generally: "In the western provinces the situation of French is not rosy, in fact it is pitiful. It has continued to deteriorate from one decade to the next... The struggle for survival is becoming increasingly a matter of heroism, a surperhuman undertaking."[27]

For Arès, one composite Table (see below) summarizes the present state of these minorities. From it, he draws the following conclusions:

Overall situation of the French group in Western Canada in 1971

Province	*Ethnic origin*		*Mother tongue*		*Language usually spoken*	
Manitoba	86,515	8.8%	60,545	6.1%	39,600	3.9%
Saskatchewan	56,200	6.1	31,605	3.4	15,930	1.7
Alberta	94,665	5.8	46,500	2.8	22,700	1.4
British Columbia	96,550	4.4	38,035	1.8	11,505	0.5
Total	333,930	5.8%	176,685	3.1%	89,735	1.6%

This table says it all, showing the huge losses suffered by the group of French origin in its everyday struggle for survival. From ethnic origin to mother tongue the loss is 157,245, and from mother tongue to language usually spoken the loss is 86,950. Added together these two figures give a total loss of 244,200 in Western Canada. This is cultural and linguistic genocide!

French doubtless continues to survive in these areas, but only at the cost of a constant, exhausting struggle that is so costly as to be Pyrrhic in nature. More Canadians of French origin fall in the fight than survive [...].[28]

The University of Montreal demographer, Jacques Henripin, sounds a more ominous note in a research paper prepared as background for the Green Paper on Immigration. Assessing the future role of French-speaking minor-

ities outside Quebec in the equilibrium between francophone and anglophone populations in Canada, he comes to the following conclusion:

> In fact, it could be said that French-Canadians living outside Quebec contribute more to the English language than to French. No matter how much this group grows, its contribution will go to the English language. Thus francophone communities outside Quebec are gradually disappearing . . . The adoption of English by people of French origin is following a roughly geometric progression and in 1971 it was realized that almost half had lost their language of origin.
>
> That is one of the conclusions of my research. It seems to me that there is not much room for hope, in the light of what has happened, for the survival of francophone communities outside Quebec and for the areas bordering Quebec.[29]

Not surprisingly, francophone leaders in Western Canada do not share this almost fatalistic prediction. Nonetheless they admit that the data poses serious questions about the future viability of their communities, but they insist that it would be premature to dismiss the resiliency of proud and resourceful minorities.

The concern over the latest census figures became apparent last year during public discussion on the Green Paper dealing with Canada's immigration policies. In its brief, *La Société Franco-Manitobaine* argued that "the disproportion between the number of anglophone and francophone immigrants is a fundamental departure from the government's bilingualism policy, since it threatens to wipe out those of us who are trying to survive as a viable francophone community in Western Canada."[30] It asks how Canada could "give concrete support to 25 to 50 different cultures when one of its two cultures – or rather, one of its two forces – has had so much difficulty winning acceptance after having discovered and founded this country."[31] Its authors further insisted that there are opportunities in Western Canada for French-speaking immigrants intent on working and living in a francophone milieu, and called upon Ottawa to so inform prospective immigrants. Finally, the society indicated that it had reservations about renewed Quebec interest in immigration questions:

> We welcome, for example, the Quebec government's current interest in immigration, especially francophone immigration, an area which it has long neglected. On the other hand, we francophone minorities view with disfavour the Quebec government's tendency to proclaim itself *the* protector of French culture in Canada. We believe this role is equally the responsibility of the federal government and we would like to se it assume its responsibilities in this regard.[32]

This growing dependency on Ottawa causes concern because of the accompanying estrangement of the minorities *vis-à-vis* Quebec. Traditionally, the ties between the mother province of French Canada and the *diaspora* have been close. Franco-Canadian leaders from the West have argued since the entry of the North-West into confederation that their *collectivités* were the vanguard of the French fact beyond the Great Lakes. But even in the late 19th century, there were indications that all was not well between them. Lay and clerical leaders from the Prairies felt that their counterparts in

Quebec were not sufficiently concerned about extending the French fact in Western Canada. They said as much in private and in public exchanges. Typical was the biting comment of *L'Echo de Manitoba* in 1902 accusing the *Québécois* of direct responsibility for the unhappy schools questions:

> Over the past 30 years it would have been easy for you to send us a contingent of 2,000 immigrants each year, from among the masses rushing to the United States . . .
>
> Then we would never have had a school problem. It should be pointed out in passing that it is you and you alone in the province of Quebec who are responsible for what has happened to the Manitoban minority.[33]

Of course, the Western minorities could not subsist without assistance from Quebec. Indeed, during the 50 years that followed the loss of education rights in 1915, private and governmental assistance from Quebec greatly succored these distant communities. It was therefore natural for Premier Jean Lesage to pose as the champion of all French Canada in the 1960s.

That part of the *politique de grandeur* was shortlived as Quebec turned to more pressing priorities. Many francophones outside that province understood the need for the Quiet Revolution and remained confident that the new Quebec would one day resume the leadership of French Canada. But the debate between the proponents of a French Quebec and those of a French Canada soon alienated most francophones from outside Quebec. As the gulf developed, the latter turned more and more to Ottawa for the affirmation of the French fact across the country. The federal government readily assumed this function, thereby rediscovering a role it had played in confederation until the 1890s.

This development, of itself, did not cause concern within the ranks of the francophone minorities. What did, and still does, cause anxiety is the widespread feeling that Ottawa's interest in the minorities will wane as the independentist clamour in Quebec dies down.[34] At that point, and should the involvement of various Quebec ministries in extending various forms of aid to these same minorities also decrease, the isolation of highly vulnerable francophone communities would lead to a final and complete disintegration of their social fabric. In that they would resemble other ethnocultural groups similarly threatened.

What is the connection between these three areas of concern to the French-speaking minorities and the policy of multiculturalism? Concern about the apparent trends found in the 1971 census, concern about the possibility of adding more non-francophones to Canada's population, and concern about the implications of estrangement from Quebec and growing dependency on the federal government, help explain, in my view, the reluctance on the part of the francophone minorities to bless multiculturalism. They insist that high priority must be accorded to entrenching in law and especially in practice the policy of bilingualism. Also prompting their defense of bilingualism are the negative comments all too frequently heard from many quarters in Western Canada: bilingualism is described as an "attempt to force French down our throats," as "wasteful," "divisive," "disturbingly pushy," "useless," "shameful,"

or "retrograde." Regretably, rather than find allies and supporters for bilingualism among the other ethno-cultural groups who understand and appreciate the value and merits of linguistic and cultural diversity, too many francophone leaders tend to associate attacks on bilingualism with multiculturalism. Others believe that because of the key role of the French-speaking minorities in Confederation, and given their presently precarious existence in Western Canada, the federal government should pursue a vigorous policy of bilingualism *and* biculturalism. Their argument is that Western-Canadians generally should learn far more than they do at present about French Canada before receiving assistance to pursue other linguistic and cultural activities. Thus, biculturalism as a complement of bilingualism must precede any policy of multiculturalism.

To summarize, it is quite clear that the uncertain fate and future of the French fact in Western Canada explains the hesitation on the part of most francophones, and the outright opposition of others, to support the policy of multiculturalism.

Perspectives for the Future

What lies ahead? What are the prospects for a *rapprochement* between French-speaking and other ethno-cultural communities on multiculturalism?

Firstly, they must recognize that far more unites them than divides them. They share common concerns about assimilation forces operating against them. Education questions remain vital in their struggle to preserve and develop their languages and cultures. The so-called "ethnic" press and the French-speaking weeklies are similarly plagued by financial and distribution problems. Above all, perhaps, history reveals that they sought to impress upon Western Canada and Canada the marks of a distinctive society based on the wealth of their cultures. There is no doubt that this country benefited from the diversity they added to it. What separates them is fear, suspicion, and the lack of a dialogue.

Secondly, the Franco-Canadians of Western Canada must understand that bilingualism and multiculturalism are not adversary but complementary policies. Multiculturalism can only strengthen the existence of the French fact and can greatly assist the cause of bilingualism. There are spokesmen within the francophone communities who understand this, but it would be useful and important for each of the official associations (S.F.M., A.C.F.C., A.C.F.A., and the F.C.C.), to adopt resolutions in favour of the policy of multiculturalism. If the francophone collectivities fail to support programs designed to assist other ethno-cultural communities urgently in need of linguistic and cultural "recovery," they will one day find themselves isolated within western Canada. What is worse, they would then face a hostile and unyielding bloc of assimilated groups determined not to extend to the French-speaking element any special privileges. The francophone groups, which more than other groups appreciate the value of diversity as opposed to uniformity, must recognize that they have no monopoly either on culture or on the right

to cultural survival. And, while they do enjoy advantages in the area of linguistic rights, they must come to understand that other groups may wish to retain their language for cultural purposes. Ways must be found, therefore, to overcome the fear that multiculturalism will harm bilingualism.

Thirdly, non French-speaking ethno-cultural groups must be patient with the francophone communities. Let them distinguish clearly between bilingualism and multiculturalism. Are they prepared to assist their French-speaking co-citizens in seeking recognition of the existence of a French Canada *a mari usque ad mare?* Will they join with French-speaking parents who seek to obtain French-language schools in their area? Are they willing to accept that their children will have to acquire perhaps two official languages at the same time as undertaking the study of their cultural language? The burden on their shoulders is indeed a heavy one, and one that has not as yet received the recognition it deserves.

Fourthly, the federal and provincial governments must be more sensitive to both the francophone and other ethno-cultural communities. Why is it that some provincial governments in Western Canada refuse to recognize the French fact in their province? How prepared are governments generally to entrench the rights of French-Canadians in the West and in Canada on the one hand, and to legislate the rights of other linguistic and cultural groups on the other hand? Has the federal government abandoned the concept of biculturalism, or does it seek to promote multiculturalism as the expression of a cultural heritage within what could be termed loosely "French Canada" and "English Canada?" Is multiculturalism to be encouraged primarily in terms of "folklore?" Will Radio-Canada and the CBC continue — assuming of course that they have actually begun — to provide an outlet for multiculturalism only in the two official languages? These and many other questions are left unanswered. No dialogue between Canada's peoples and their governments can begin until these problems have been explored.

In the final analysis, however, the future of the French fact in Canada as well as the future of multiculturalism will depend on the willingness of Canadians to respect and cherish their diversity. Only then can there be unity.

NOTES

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3. *AASB* (Archives de l'Archevêché de Saint-Boniface), *Fonds Langevin*, St-Boniface, April 5, 1898, Langevin to Father Jean Gaire.
4. For a discussion of the objectives, strategy, and implications of this issue, see Gilbert Comeault, "Les rapports de Mgr L.-P.-A. Langevin avec les groupes ethniques minoritaires et leurs répercussions sur le statut de la langue française au Manitoba, 1895-1916." (To be published in *Sessions d'étude de la Société Canadienne d'Histoire de l'Eglise Catholique*).
5. Manitoba Free Press, 26 March 1916.

49

6. See Arthur Silver, "French Canada and the Prairie Frontier, 1870-1890", *Canadian Historical Review*, Vol. I (1969), pp. 11-36; also Albert Faucher, "L'émigration des Canadiens-français au XIXe siècle: position du problème et perspective", in Recherches Sociographiques, Vol. 3 (Sept.-Dec. 1964), pp. 277-318; and Gilles Paquet, "L'émigration des Canadiens-français vers la Nouvelle-Angleterre, 1870-1890; prises de vues quantitatives", in ibid., pp. 319-370.
7. For example, see Michel Brunet, *Québec-Canada Anglais* (Montreal: éditions HMH, 1969), pp. 215-216, 227.
8. See J. E. Rea, op. cit., pp. 53-54.
9. "L'Association Culturelle Franco-Canadienne de la Saskatchewan et la Constitution", La Liberté et le Patriote, January 27, 1971.
10. *Ibid.*
11. See Report of Manitoba Mosaic (Winnipeg, 1971).
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13. *Ibid.*
14. *Ibid.*
15. *L'éternelle question*", St. Boniface Courier, August 20, 1975. See my own response in the *St. Boniface Courier*, August 27 and September 3, 1975, also reprinted in *La Liberté*, September 3, 1975.
16. See "Mémoire de l'A.C.F.C. présenté au Groupe de travail sur les minorités de langue française", October 19, 1975. See also "Mémoire de l'Association Canadienne-Française de l'Alberta au Groupe de Travail sur les minorités de langue française", (1975).
17. "Mémoire de la Fédération des Franco-Colombiens présenté au Groupe de travail sur les minorités de langue française", Vancouver, September 26, 1975.
18. *Ibid.*
19. See below pp. 28-29.
20. "Mémoire de la Société Franco-Manitobaine présenté au Groupe de travail sur les minorités de langue française", September 30, 1975.
21. *Ibid.*
22. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
23. "Une hypothèque à long terme avec responsabilités conjointes", report submitted to the Secretary of State by the Task Force on French-Language Minorities, November 7, 1975, p. 12 (the original is italicized).
24. Ibid., p. 19. (The original is italicized).
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30. "Mémoire de La Société Franco-Manitobaine à la Commission parlementaire sur l'immigration", June 1975, p. 4.
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32. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
33. Quoted in *La Patrie* (Montréal), January 24, 1902.
34. See Richard Arès, *Qui fera l'avenir des minorités francophones au Canada* (Saint-Boniface, La Société Historique de Saint-Boniface, 1972, 23 pp.), pp. 11-15.

Multiculturalism: The Doubts of a Francophone

by

Professor Leslie Laczko
(for Professor Guy Rocher)

Canada continues to be a place where divergent, and sometimes contradictory, currents of opinion can circulate freely, more or less openly clash, and sometimes even be wholly unaware of each other. This is perhaps due to the size of the country, the self-contained nature of the regions that make it up, and the barrier between the two official languages. It may also be caused by the unique political consciousness which has long been a part of Canadian federalism, as a result of which attitudes existing at the provincial level are not necessarily consonant with those embodied in federal policy. The political logic of our Canadian federalism can at times only be understood from within, and even then, without resource to the ordinary rules of logic.

The decade of the sixties saw the emergence, among other things, of two schools of thought moving in different directions, though without necessarily coming into open conflict. These two divergent tendencies are the multicultural philosophy of the federal government and of a part of Canadian opinion, and the francophone quasi-nationalistic philosophy of part of the francophone population of Quebec. Even as French-Canadians in Quebec, who for over 100 years had clamoured for bilingualism, were beginning to dismiss the idea and to increasingly favour a francophone Quebec (which, contrary to popular belief outside Quebec, and even at times within Quebec, does not necessarily signify a preference for a politically independent Quebec), the Canadian government undertook a costly and relatively ineffective campaign to gain acceptance for the idea of a bilingual Canada. At a time when 90 percent of the ethnic minorities in Quebec are opting for the English language and anglophone culture, thereby constituting one of the most serious threats both politically and culturally to the francophone community of Quebec, the federal government has undertaken to define Canada as a multiculturalization. It is a characteristic of our country that these paradoxes can exist, and that many Canadians are even unaware of them.

I have already had occasion to refer, both in speech and in writing, to the equivocal and ambiguous aspects of multiculturalism, and the reasons why it is not likely to be acceptable to French-Canadians in Quebec. Nothing I have read or heard of Canadian multiculturalism subsequently has in any way altered my reaction. There is no doubt that from a *sociological* standpoint Canada may seem to have certain qualities of a multicultural nation: but I should hasten to add that it is not unique in this respect. Many other nations also have a sociologically multicultural makeup. It is a distinguishing feature of the largest nations in the world today, the United States, the Soviet Union and China. Each of these great countries contains a mosaic of regional, ethnic or religious cultures which make of them extremely complex entities. This is also true of most of the new African nations, which have generally been created from ethnic groups with quite different origins and histories. Most of the countries of South America are also composed of several groups of different ethnic backgrounds.

Not only is Canada not unique in having a multicultural makeup, it is not even one of the countries where multiculturalism is most noticeable. The sociological multiculturalism of Canada is a recent development, which has only assumed real importance since the Second World War. In other countries, such as the Soviet Union or India, it has existed for 1000 years, with its roots in history so distant that in some cases, India for example, the true origins are unknown.

My purpose in mentioning these facts is to place our Canadian multiculturalism in perspective. We must, in fact, recognize that multiculturalism is not a predominant reality in our society. It is particularly noticeable in certain large Canadian cities, such as Montreal and Toronto, and in certain regions of Canada; but there are large areas of the country in which multiculturalism remains an abstraction.

It is of course true that the number of ethnic groups making up the population of Canada has increased markedly in recent decades, and that ethnic groups in Canada have demonstrated a welcome cultural vitality. It is accordingly perfectly conceivable that this sociological multiculturalism in Canada should be recognized, and a policy formulated to help ethnic groups give this country the benefit of their cultural resources.

However, and it is here that ambiguity arises, while multiculturalism is a sociologically valid concept in Canada, it has no meaning politically. In my view it is clear that, from a political standpoint, Canada is a country defined by a twofold culture, anglophone and francophone, and it is the interplay of political forces between these two great "societies," to use the expression in the preliminary report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, that will determine the future of this country.

From the political standpoint, it is the existence of the two principle cultural and language communities, anglophone and francophone, and the give and take between these two communities which is, and will continue to be, the significant factor in the decisive events of Canadian politics.

To many francophones in Quebec, other ethnic minority groups in Canada are within the orbit of the anglophone community. Their linguistic identification is with the latter, as the great majority of them have adopted English as their main language; they see the anglophone community as the source of economic and political power, and it is or will be the means of upward mobility for their children. To the francophone Quebecker, therefore, multiculturalism appears as another way of referring to the Canadian anglophone community; to him, in other words, multiculturalism is an aspect of Canadian life which is associated primarily with the anglophone community.

Multiculturalism may thus be said to exist outside the Quebec francophone community. Worse, it is a threat to the survival and political power of the latter.

It is of course true that francophone minorities outside Quebec have found in multiculturalism a long-awaited opportunity to achieve cherished goals; but to the francophone Quebecker, this is merely a way of neutralizing the issue. In other words, French-Canadians outside Quebec are now acknowledged in so far as they cease to exist as a political problem, and continue only as a sociological entity.

I have already had occasion, in an earlier text, to express four reservations regarding multiculturalism. I feel it would be useful to repeat them here.

First of all, this new concept of Canadian society seriously jeopardizes the future of bilingualism. We know how costly bilingualism is, not only in terms of public funds but also in human energy and sacrifices of all kinds. Despite all this effort, bilingualism is making slow and difficult progress in the public service and the private sector. Moreover, it is far from certain that the principle of bilingualism, and especially its requirements, have been accepted by the people of Canada. In any case, bilingualism is meeting solid opposition in various anglophone quarters.

In my opinion, bilingualism was meaningful to the extent that it represented the marriage of the English-speaking and French-speaking communities within Canadian confederation. It was justified by the fact that it corresponded to the image of a country made up of two major cultural and language communities and translated this image into an official policy. Bilingualism was a logical and normal consequence of biculturalism, which was made visible and real through bilingualism. Bilingualism was a necessity and an obligation of a bicultural nation. However, this is no longer the case. Canadian society, as defined by the Trudeau government, is based on the premise that there is a distinction between language and culture. According to this view, bilingualism is no longer connected with biculturalism. The connection formerly thought necessary between the two has been broken. Official bilingualism now finds itself bereft of the cultural support it enjoyed in the past.

What, then, is now the basis of Canadian bilingualism? I would say that bilingualism is no longer based on reasons of necessity or obligation, but on what I would call reasons of convenience. There are two such reasons. The

first is historical — recognition of the role played by the English and French in founding and developing the country. Bilingualism is symbolic in nature because it recalls this past contribution to the history of Canada. But the image of Canada that it evokes already belongs to a past era, since the new definition of the country no longer confers the same political and cultural role on these two communities.

The second reason is one of practicality. Thirty percent of the population of Canada is French-speaking and the majority of this group speaks only French. These Canadians, wherever they live, must be able to deal with their government in their own language.

The first reason is a dangerously weak argument. Bilingualism becomes merely a vestige of the past, bearing no relation to the present. If it is costly and difficult to achieve, a purely symbolic bilingualism will soon be contested and rejected. It will be extremely difficult to defend much longer the maintenance of bilingualism that is so abstract and not firmly rooted in contemporary Canadian life.

The second argument is even more dangerous. It is based on the fact that some French-Canadians have no knowledge of English. The only guarantee of bilingualism's future is that a certain proportion of French-Canadians will never learn English. In this case the following argument could be advanced. Would it not be more practical and economical to have French-Canadians learn English, which they will always need in North America, than to have English-Canadians learn French, which they will seldom have occasion to use? Everyone would gain by this. French-Canadians would learn a language that it is essential to know on this continent and indeed all over the world, and the federal government could continue to be unilingually English outside Quebec, which would be simpler and less costly.

If the only basis for bilingualism is a pragmatic one, this type of very practical reasoning is acceptable. And in fact it is current in many English-Canadian circles, where French is not learned because it is not very necessary in North America, except in Quebec. They feel it is up to French-Canadians to learn English, the dominant language in North America, and, in the eyes of many, the international language of the twentieth century.

In a multicultural country in which the French-speaking community is in danger of becoming smaller, this troublesome Canadian bilingualism will be in jeopardy before long. There will be pressure either to return to unilingualism outside Quebec, or to recognize other official languages besides English and French. It can be predicted, following the logic of multiculturalism, that the Ukrainian community will step up its demands — and with reason — for recognition of its language as a third official language, at least in the West. It is foreseeable that a special kind of multilingualism will emerge, with English becoming the first official language from sea to sea, while French, Ukrainian and probably others would receive official recognition, at least in certain areas of the country.

54

Montreal is already familiar with the sort of bilingualism that multicultural policy threatens to produce. Among New Canadians, bilingualism means English and Greek, English and Italian, or English and German, while English-French bilingualism is practically non-existent. Needless to say, this is also the type of bilingualism prevalent in Toronto.

Without having to go back very far, we find the premises of multilingualism in the Trudeau government's statement of October 8, 1971. While proclaiming the distinction between language and culture, the government announced that it was taking measures to provide textbooks in non-official languages and that the learning of one's ancestral language is an important aspect in the development of cultural identity. This part of the government's statement is noteworthy from two standpoints. First, the government recognized the link between language and culture, after having denied such a link in the case of biculturalism and bilingualism. Secondly, the government announced that it will do more for non-official languages than it has ever done for French education outside Quebec. It can be seen how the logic of this policy leads to the rapid establishment of multilingualism in the place of bilingualism.

Under these circumstances my second reservation about a bilingual, multicultural Canada is that *bilingualism is losing its cultural connotation.* As long as it was associated with biculturalism, bilingualism was more than a means of communication — it permitted the two cultural and language communities to know each other better. Probably the idea of a completely bilingual Canada is utopian, but we can expect that a certain proportion of Canadians will learn French or English, as the case may be. For them knowledge of the second language is a stepping stone to better understanding of the other language group's culture — its literature, theatre, mentality and ideas.

Unfortunately, this is no longer what bilingualism means. It now has an *official* character, as the statement by the Trudeau government stresses. French and English are the two languages of the country only for the purpose of communication between the federal government and the people.

This is one of the most regrettable examples of distinguishing between language and culture, and one that is particularly detrimental to French-Canadians. The views held by English-speaking Canadians about the French spoken in Quebec are well known, as is their favourable attitude toward Parisian French. The new conception of a Canada that is at once bilingual and multicultural will inevitably strengthen this prejudice. At any rate it will not encourage Canadians to gain a deeper mutual insight than has been the case hitherto.

My third reservation has to do with multiculturalism itself. *I do not believe that nationhood can be founded on multiculturalism.* Canada, as the Trudeau government defines it, no longer has a clearly identifiable cultural nucleus. It is a kind of Grand Central Station for all the nations of the world, and regardless of their numerical importance they are all entitled to the recognition and financial support of the Canadian government. Canada could

55

probably have gained a great deal culturally if it had retained the idea of two central cultural communities serving as a focal point around which the other ethnic communities could group and find support. Instead the Trudeau government envisages a sort of nebula consisting of countless cultures which are expected to interact although no common denominator exists.

There is an admission of failure, it seems to me, in the Trudeau government's stance — the tacit recognition that there is no Canadian culture, whether English or French. Whereas a bicultural Canada implies a certain internal cultural structure, a multicultural Canada is the absence of a national culture. What kind of nation, I wonder, can really exist on such an weak and unprepossessing base. I, for one, know of no historical precedent for nationhood founded on the concept of a mini-United Nations, as the Trudeau government is proposing.

Perhaps Canada really is a multicultural nation. No one would deny the existence of ethnic communities and the active role they have played in Canadian life, especially since World War II. However, it is one thing to recognize this reality and even encourage it, as the Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism has done — and another thing to define Canadian nationhood on that basis. The sociological existence of all the ethnic groups that have emigrated to Canada must be recognized and respected, but that does not mean we should reduce the country's official image to one of cultural multiplicity.

My fourth and last reservation is that the *new multicultural policy represents a retrograde step,* as far as French-Canadians are concerned, although they have not yet realized it. French-Canadians have struggled for generations to have bilingualism accepted — bilingualism defined not simply as the acceptance of French as an official language in Canada but recognition of French-Canadians as partners with the English-speaking community in the country's sociological structure. By separating bilingualism from biculturalism, the Trudeau government is betraying all the hopes French-Canadians might have placed in bilingualism, as they conceived it — that is, clearly tied to its symbol and essential condition, biculturalism.

Of the two main cultural and language communities — anglophone and francophone — the latter will obviously be the more adversely affected, and therefore feel threatened, by this new multicultural policy. In short, this new way of looking at Canadian society will favour the English-speaking community. As this is the dominant community in all of Canada except Quebec, where it is nonetheless a force to be reckoned with, it will continue to exert an influence on all the other ethnic cultures. English will become the key official language, and anglophone culture will predominate across the length and breadth of the country. The francophone community, on the other hand, will suffer a relative decline. Since it is economically the less favoured community, even in Quebec, as was brought out in Vol. III of the Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, there is a strong probability

that its importance will decline steadily among the other cultures making up the new Canadian mosaic.

I would like, in conclusion, to put a French-speaking Quebecker's uneasiness regarding some of the recommendations of the Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism into more concrete terms. The Council's first annual report states that the federal government should make funds available to the provincial departments for the teaching of languages other than French or English in order to promote such teaching. It is well known that many French-Canadians outside Quebec have never been able to attend schools where their mother tongue was taught. However, in a supposedly bilingual country, every French-Canadian regardless of his province of origin or province of residence should have this fundamental right. Historically, education for the French-speaking minorities of Ontario, Manitoba, the western provinces, including British Columbia, and New Brunswick has been characterized by a long series of struggles and disappointments, with defeats outnumbering victories and rights lost outnumbering rights acquired. In view of events, past and present, the French-speaking Quebecker sees little to be gained from supporting the Consultative Council's recommendations on the conservation of language and culture. Even supposing (and it seems to me unthinkable) that these recommendations are eventually implemented, the fact that francophones outside Quebec finally are taught French and educated in French would be a source of gratification, but they would have obtained these concessions for the wrong reasons.

May I end these remarks by saying that, to a French-speaking Quebecker, Canada has been and remains an ambiguous country. Nor will the recently discovered multiculturalism make his place in the Canadian mosaic happier and more serene.

Special Presentation

by

Mrs. Suzanne Drouin

I am going to make a rather general statement on what has been said since the beginning of the Conference and what represents an enormous move of interesting aspects. We have had some very competent panelists and I am sure we could have discussed the questions at greater length but I particularly want to bring out the point of view of the province of Quebec with respect to what has been said here. It was repeated several times, and indeed the panelists said themselves, that Canada has been a pluralist state for some time. At present, we are in a rather tranquil state, but of course, multiculturalism has become a state policy. We have to talk about other reactions and certain other aspects of the problem.

To come back to the subject of bilingualism, this has been mentioned at great length and it is established officially in Canada. For the province of Quebec, it is a policy which is not official but which has existed for many years in the past because Quebec has had to be bilingual for economic and geographic reasons. It is not the first step.

In the primary schools, children in the province of Quebec start to learn English because they have had to learn English. So from the bilingual point of view, we don't have to feel any type of fear with respect to bilingualism because we have been living in a bilingual state for a long time. But we are interested in this being an official policy that is practised throughout Canada.

Now with respect to Quebec's attitude to multiculturalism, Quebec has always treated its minorities as justly as possible. We certainly hope that our compatriots in other provinces do the same, and we do hope that our French speakers in other provinces will receive the same just and fair treatment. I repeat, we do not want our French-speaking minorities in the province of Quebec to be put on the same footing as other ethnic groups. They must not lose what they have won through the past.

Our French-Canadians in the western part of Canada have to be true Canadians from all points of view in that they have to participate in the Canadianism that is carrying on in the western part of the country. It is on

the one hand a responsibility of the province of Quebec that should morally support, and indeed materially support, the minorities in the western part of Canada. We have to maintain French-speaking culture in Canada.

Canada must be a bilingual country with a French culture that will make it, if you like, different from the other North American countries. I am sure that if French were to disappear from our country, we would no longer represent the image that Canada has abroad: its democracy, its tolerance and indeed, its liberty. This would be an irrevocable loss for Canada.

There are other things that came up in the meeting. Quebec has always given a great deal of importance to the protection of its native people. This has been of importance of course in the province of Quebec, but also with respect to the other provinces in Canada. We have to preserve this for the entire world because if we let the native people's rights disappear, it is the entire world that will blame us for their loss.

Now, I should like to talk a little bit about what is happening in the province of Quebec right now with respect to ethnic groups. We have, in Montreal, a rather remarkable success where the school boards have been allowing hundreds of children to have premises where they can learn their mother tongue, where they can have ethno-cultural activities in facilities that are provided to them. In my own city, Quebec City, the school board has also been setting up audio-visual centres where ethnics can meet with fellow ethnics. They can speak to one another in their own language and their children can be educated in their mother tongue.

We realize, with respect to the welcome, the comprehension, and indeed the tolerance that has been shown by Quebeckers to other ethnic cultural groups that there is a very good situation there, but there is a problem. Indeed there is some sort of malaise in the province of Quebec. There is a lack of information and a lack of contact. Perhaps this stems from the fact that the federal government should have provided beforehand for the language situation in the province of Quebec. Perhaps we haven't created sufficient contact with the federal and Quebec provincial government with respect to multicultural policy and multicultural programs. Perhaps there should be a more favourable state of communication between the two levels of government which would lead to an improvement in the situation, both on the provincial and national levels.

I cannot finish without making a statement. Very often a lot of our difficulties arise from the fact that we don't know one another very well. We have to get to know one another better to be able to know one another better. We have to meet. We have to travel. We have to know that the ethnic groups in other parts of Canada will be able to meet with French-Canadians to better understand the French-Canadian needs, and the contrary. We will have to have the opportunity of crossing Canada, of visiting one another from one shore to the other shore. I should like to invite you all to visit the province of Quebec. We have many centres that would host you in the province of Quebec. I particularly direct my invitation to the young people here.

Some 10 years ago, we wouldn't have been able to meet at a convention as we have been doing for the past three days but now it is possible. Now we are able to get together to work together, to help the youth that are growing up around us, the youth that represents our future. We are meeting together to discuss the political mechanisms that will help us in the future. So I must encourage the young people to interest themselves in what is happening in the western part of Canada, and to make efforts to get to know their fellow Canadians in the other parts of Canada better.

Multiculturalism, if you like, is a type of basket, a fruit basket, that welcomes a variety of Canadians who are here in Canada and who are together as Canadians.

3

Multiculturalism – The Anglophone Viewpoint

Multiculturalism: An Anglo-Celtic View

by

Senator Eugene Forsey

As Charles Caccia has said, "We are all ethnics". People of Anglo-celtic origin are really four ethnic groups: English, Scotch, Irish and Welsh; and the Irish in turn are divided into the northern Irish, usually of English or Scotch ancestry and Protestant, and the southern Irish, native Irish, usually Roman Catholic. However, though each of these groups has its own identity, and its own traditions, in this country they are united, for certain purposes, by a common language, English, and certain common traditions, of which I shall have more to say in a moment.

I am delighted to consider myself an "ethnic," in my case an English ethnic. I am delighted by the way other ethnic groups are trying to maintain their identity and their traditions within a common Canadianism. I wish my own group were as zealous to maintain ours. That Canadianism is made the richer and stronger by such varied content. I hope all of us will listen with humility, with respect, with understanding, with appreciation, even with enthusiasm, to the various voices in our great Canadian multicultural choir. Most of the other voices will be full and strong, even *fortissimo*. I see no reason why the Anglo-celtic voice should be *pianissimo*.

For the Anglo-celtics are not only one of the largest and longest established of our ethnic groups. History and circumstance have made them also the group which has had, and will probably continue to have, the most decisive influence on Canadian culture and institutions.

From a person of almost wholly Anglo-celtic ancestry, that may sound like sheer prejudice, or collective egotism. But, as I shall try to prove, it is solid fact, though, I hasten to add, it does not in the least imply any superiority of Anglo-celtic culture or institutions, or any suggestion that people of other origins are second-class citizens. Nevertheless, certain facts seem to me inescapable and conclusive.

First, language. English is, and is likely to remain, the chief language of over two-thirds of our people, and the second language of many of the rest,

if only because of the overwhelming proximity of the United States. This means that most of our literature which is not in French will be in English.

It also means that English is, and will almost certainly remain, one of our two national official languages. Quebec is now trying to make French for most purposes the sole official language of that province, and it may succeed. If the Dene and Inuit peoples in the Territories succeed in setting up a province or provinces there, they may make one or more of the native languages official, but they are unlikely to jettison English. It is, I suppose, possible that one or more of the Western provinces might give some official status to some European language other than English or French; it is even conceivable, perhaps, that Nova Scotia might make Gaelic an official language (after all, in the early 1890's, a Scotch-Canadian Senator formally moved in the Senate that Gaelic should be made our third national official language!). But for the country as a whole, I see no prospect of any third official language, and certainly no prospect of the supersession of English.

First, then, language. Second, law.

Our public law, our written Constitution and the other laws regulating the working of our political system, is basically English, and likely to remain so. Our criminal law is basically English, and likely to remain so. Our civil law, except in Quebec, is basically English, and likely to remain so. (Note that I say "English," not "British" or "Anglo-celtic." Scots law, whether constitutional, criminal or civil, has had virtually no influence on ours.) This does not mean that our constitutional, criminal or (outside Quebec) civil law is a mere copy of the English. We have made all sorts of changes to meet our own needs; we are making changes every day. But the basic principles are unmistakably English, through and through, and, short of a revolution, I see no prospect of their being superseded by basic principles drawn from any other system: there will be no "reception" of the Roman Law here, nor of Scots law, or Roman-Dutch law, or any other non-English system.

Third, our political system: responsible Cabinet government: the "conventions," the customs, the usages, the practices, the habits, of our political life. These also are basically English, and, again short of a revolution, likely to remain so.

And their importance is almost incalculable. For they really determine the essential character of our political institutions. A foreigner reading the British North America Acts without any knowledge of how our system of government actually works would conclude that we live under a despotism. It is the Queen, or her representative the Governor-General, whom she appoints and can remove, who, in strict law, calls Parliament together: the Senate and the House of Commons are not equipped with a self-starter; they can meet only on the royal summons. It is the Queen, or her representative, who, in strict law, decides when a session of Parliament shall end, and when there shall be a fresh general election within the maximum five years of Parliament's duration. It is the Queen, or her representative, who, in strict law, appoints the Prime Minister and all other Ministers (not one of them, incidentally, is even men-

tioned in the British North America Acts), and who can dismiss any or all of them. It is the Queen who, in strict law, enact statutes, "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and House of Commons:" no Bill (proposed law, *projet de loi*, in French) becomes an Act (law) without the royal assent. It is the Queen's representative, the Governor-General, acting in the Queen's name, who, in strict law, appoints all the members of the Upper House of Parliament. It is the Queen's representative, the Governor General, who, in strict law, appoints all judges of our courts, Dominion and provincial, from county courts up (except the courts of probate in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick). It is the Queen's representative, the Governor-General, on the advice of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada (whose members he appoints and can dismiss), who, in strict law, appoints, instructs and can dismiss the Lieutenant-Governors of the provinces (two have been dismissed); and those Lieutenant-Governors can refuse assent to provincial bills (they have done so, 28 times, in five different provinces), or can "reserve" them for assent or refusal of assent by the Governor-General (70 provincial bills have been so "reserved," from every province except Newfoundland; only 14 received assent); and *must* send all provincial Acts to the Governor-General, who may then (again with the advice of the Privy Concil) "disallow" them, wipe them off the statute book, within one year (112 provincial Acts have been disallowed, from every province except Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland). To cap it all, it is the Queen, or her representative, who declares war, makes peace, appoints ambassadors, negotiates, signs and ratifies treaties.

Now we all know that in fact the Queen or her representative performs all these actions on the advice of the Prime Minister or the Cabinet, whose members must (but only by custom, not law) be members of one or the other House of Parliament, or become so within a "reasonable time" (a period defined only by custom), and who must have, or promptly get, a majority in the House of Commons, which is elected by the people. But all this, which transforms a legal despotism into a democracy, is pure "convention," custom, usage, practice, not law. None of it can be enforced by the courts. And all of it is basically English, taken over from England, where it slowly developed over a period of almost seven hundred years.

Much of it is a matter of "precedent:" how has this particular situation, or one like it, been dealt with when it arose in earlier years? And when there is no specific Canadian precedent, we turn to the experience of the United Kingdom, to the English precedents. Even in the rules and practices of our Canadian House of Commons, that House has explicitly provided that where there are no formal rules enacted by itself, and no established practice of its own, the rules and practices of the House of Commons of the United Kingdom (which are English, not Scotch or Irish or Welsh) shall apply; and members of our House of Commons regularly appeal to May, Redlich and other authorities on the procedure of the British House.

Once again, this emphatically does *not* mean that the "conventions," customs, usages, practices, habits of our Constitution are just copies of the British.

We have made many changes to meet our own needs: for example, regional and sectional representation in our Cabinets, something unknown to Britain. We are constantly making fresh changes. We shall doubtless make more. And we shall doubtless also borrow from various countries outside the Commonwealth, as we borrowed federalism from the United States (though our federalism is a revulsion from American rather than a copy of it), and as we have recently, in eight of the ten provinces, borrowed the institution of the Ombudsman from the Scandinavians. But, once again short of a violent revolution, our political institutions will almost certainly remain basically English. Short of a revolution, Canada is not likely to adopt French, German, American, Russian, Indian or Chinese political institutions.

Why? Because English political institutions are necessarily or inherently better than others? No; but because when our Canadian political institutions were being shaped they took the mould of the people who were here, who were overwhelmingly British and French, and more British than French (and the French-Canadians had taken to British political institutions like ducks to water). And our political institutions are likely to remain basically English because they *work*, and because we are used to them: we have naturalized them, Canadianized them.

A separate Quebec might adopt a wholly new set. If the Yukon and the Northwest Territories become provinces, with a mainly Dene and Inuit population, they might adopt a wholly new set. (There is room for considerable variety of forms of government in the provinces: George Brown wanted to have Ontario governed along municipal lines, not by responsible Cabinet government, and there is no constitutional obstacle to this). The rest of us almost certainly will go on adapting the old set of institutions to new needs. Our political system, like Britain's, will "slowly broaden down from precedent to precedent."

This is how one person of Anglo-celtic origin sees his ethnic group's contribution to the Canadian multicultural society: a contribution which he ventures to think has proved its worth, and is fundamental and inescapable, though too often unknown, or ignored, or misunderstood, or derided and despised. A fifth generation Canadian — my ancestors came to Newfoundland and Nova Scotia over two hundred years ago, and to Quebec well over a century ago — I have no apologies to offer for what we Anglo-celtics bring to the multicultural Canada to which we owe allegiance. In the words of Arthur Meighen, I am "conscious of our mighty heritage" of English speech, English law, English political institutions; I am "proud of the imperial fountain of our freedom;" I hope all of us may be "worthy of those ideals of British liberty and justice which have sent their light forth and their truth among all races of men," and not least across this Dominion, "from sea to sea, and from the river unto the end of the earth."

How the Descendants of English Speakers See the Speakers of Other Languages and Their Descendants

by

Professor Nathan Keyfitz

"What is an ethnic group?" asks Everett Hughes (1952, p. 156); and his definition starts at the opposite end from common sense:

> Almost anyone who uses the term would say that it is a group distinguishable from others by one, or some combination of the following: physical characteristics, language, religion, customs, institutions, or "cultural traits." This definition is, however, exactly wrong-end to. . . . An ethnic group is not one because of the degree of measurable or observable difference from other groups; it is an ethnic group, on the contrary, because the people in it and the people out of it know that it is one; because both the *ins* and the *outs* talk, feel and act as if it were a separate group. This is possible only if there are ways of telling who belongs to the group and who does not, and if a person learns early, deeply, and usually irrevocably to what group he belongs. If it is easy to resign from the group, it is not truly an ethnic group.

Thus the way the group is perceived constitutes the essence of ethnicity, and the particular physical, linguistic, or other distinguishing marks of the group are accidental. The reason this is the right way to look at the matter, for this afternoon's session or any other, is that the objective character of the group, its language or its having kinky hair, can easily remain constant over long periods of time, while its social relations alter drastically. If there were not drastic changes in the way those of non-English speech are regarded in Canada, and in the way they regard themselves, then we would not be having this conference.

Briefly summarized, those changes have passed through three phases, all within the period of one lifetime. In the first the ethnic groups were considered different from one another, intrinsically and irremediably different. Those not of English speech were inferior, not only at the moment, but along with their descendants to all generations. This is social Darwinism, and it had devoted followers in Canada up to World War II.

The second view, representing the liberalism of the interwar period, was that the several ethnic groups only looked different from one another and

from the majority English-Canadian group; they were really the same underneath; with helpfulness on the part of the dominant community they (or at least their children) would abandon their outlandish speech and customs and become indistinguishable from the English speakers. Total assimilation was the ideal.

This second view is no longer considered advanced; in recent times it has been rather poorly regarded and is being replaced by a third, the currently liberal view: those of non-English speech or ancestry are different indeed, and the difference is to be valued and encouraged; Canadian national life would be drab, and hardly distinguishable from that of the United States, if we all spoke English. Just as we must not bulldoze old churches and totem poles and Bonsecours Market to make way for shopping centers and parking lots, so we do not want to destroy the cultural antecedents that survive in the thinking, the languages, and the customs of Canadian citizens. Instead of the non-English cultures being seen by English speakers as expendable, they are now seen as all too fragile, requiring effort to preserve them, and worth the effort. A genuine cultural pluralism is the present ideal of most North Americans.

After describing these three ways of looking at the "foreign" ethnic groups, each of which in turn represented the advanced thinking of its day, I shall try to suggest reasons for the transition from the first to the second, and from the second to the third.

The Social Darwinist Phase

The first of the three periods reflected the belief that the speakers of the several languages of Europe and Asia were separate races, each with its own inherited characteristics. So they were presented in the Canadian census until 1941, and the official statements interpreting the data offer more than a hint that those of second-class stock from Eastern or Southern Europe were likely to outbreed and replace those of first-class stock from Western and Northern Europe. To read the work of M.C. MacLean and W. Burton Hurd today is to be plunged into a quaint past of social Darwinism, even though that writing was as recent as the 1930s.

From the first census, that of 1871, each resident of Canada was asked his "race," and the number of persons of each race were solemly counted and recorded and appear in cold print for 1871, 1881, ..., down to 1941. The results were analysed in the 1931 monographs on the racial origins of the Canadian people.

The census-takers and analysts were in tune with public thinking. John Porter (1965) graphically presents the now strange-seeming outlook that prevailed up to a time when many of us here were still in school. J. S. Woodsworth, the "saint of Canadian politics," as he has been called, drew up a taxonomy of the races and subraces that inhabited Canada, with evaluations. At or near the top were the Scandinavians, "clean-blooded, thrifty and ambitious," and certain to succeed. Bohemians "constitute no peculiar problems,"

but the Slovaks of northern Hungary were "distinctly a lower grade." Of the southern Italian, "his intelligence is not higher than one could imagine in the descendant of peasantry illiterate for generations." Robert England, writing in 1929, said that assimilation was impossible: "if we mean by assimilation a process that moulds racial stocks into something else we are flying in the face of what every stock-breeder knows. ... No melting pot can make a Slav, an Italian, or Frenchman an Anglo-Saxon. Racial qualities, vices and instincts will remain."

For Stephen Leacock, writing in 1930, the foreigner might seem to assimilate, but this was mere appearance (Porter, 1965, p. 67):

> Canada, especially in its north-west provinces, is badly damaged . . . as a result of the great foreign immigration before the war. From the point of view of the Russians and the Galicians, etc., this meant improvement for the north-west. Not so from ours. Learning English and living under the British flag may make a British subject in the legal sense, but not in the real sense, in the light of national history and continuity. . . . A little of them may even by variation do good, like a minute dose of poison in a medicine. . . . I am not saying that we should absolutely shut out and debar the European foreigner, as we should and do shut out the Oriental. But we should in no way facilitate his coming.

I attended Leacock's classes in the 1930s at McGill and can assure you that he was entirely serious in these statements.

The first of the Canadian "races," the French-Canadian, whose establishment of its own numbers had provided the impulse to the classification of all Canadian residents on this dimension, seemed to have a static character in those far-off times up to the 1930s. There were some who thought that the concept of "race" was related to the survival of the French in Canada, and they wanted the count maintained on this basis. But once French Canada began to move in the 1940s few wished to sustain the contention that they were a race. The idea of being a race had pleased those who favored a frozen society; it was wrong for the new generation, whether socialist, separatist, or neither, who initiated the vast social changes of the present generation in Quebec and elsewhere. French and English speakers alike could agree that if a French-Canadian child was brought up from birth in an English-Canadian home, it would be English-Canadian. The attempt to freeze their place in Canadian society by racial inheritance was seen as an illusion; it could not be done, and even if it had been possible it would be undesirable. French Canada was going to evolve into a powerful industrial community, a rich and autonomous center of the arts. The inspiration for these achievements would be contained in the future and not in the past. In the 1940s it thus occurred to some senior government officials that perhaps race was the wrong word, and that a certain naiveté was manifested in its use. The new outlook insofar as it related to census-taking was officially accepted with a change from "racial" to "ethnic" origin. Transmitted cultures and not inherited genes were what differentiated Canadians of diverse ancestry. In this the statistical authorities were again in tune with wider currents of Canadian thought.

Assimilation

When the Bureau of Statistics was instructed to drop the count of "racial origins" from the Canadian census, and substitute ethnic origin, everyone recognized that this was what it had been counting all along. The official definition now became the more or less objective one of what language the person's ancestor in the male line spoke on first crossing the ocean. The charge of sex bias in counting down the male line was answered by the explanation that differences would cancel out; this was patently not true in that more French men married Indian women than the reverse, but such errors were minor in relation to the larger difficulties. Some wanted to do away with the question altogether, and it has never been asked in the United States census. But the French all along, and other ethnic groups more recently, have wanted to see how they were doing in an epoch of differential birth rates on the one side and immigration that tended to assimilate to the English on the other.

The melting pot had its proponents in Canada, though they never became as explicit as in the United States. To quote Watson Thomson (in Porter, 1965, p. 70):

> British political wisdom, Jewish cosmopolitanism and realism, French lucidity of mind and expression, German emotional depth and capacity for work, Slavic spontaneity and verve — all these are there in the riches of our Canadian life and each set of qualities can be learned and assimilated by all.

For Carl Dawson (1935) assimilation was the successful outcome of processes involving first conflict and then (superficial) accommodation when different peoples come into contact (p. 306):

> When once distinct culture groups come to possess similar sentiments, interests, attitudes, and desires, whether the similarities are mutually recognized or not, the way is open for a sharing and fusing of their culture traits. This process of becoming culturally identical and indistinguishable is called *assimilation*.

But at no time did Canada have that severe determination to imprint English speech and culture on immigrants that was to prevail for at least a century in the United States. A Canadian who migrates to the United States is received with that combination of generous helpfulness, willingness to tell the immigrant how things are done in this country, how to spell the English language and how to pronounce it. The experience of receiving and imprinting more than 40 million people has left its mark. If the newcomer is receptive and changes his ways to the "right" ones he is helped further. If he stubbornly persists in wrong spelling, pronunciation, and eating preferences, or holds on to whatever cultural baggage he has brought with him instead of discarding it, then he is left severely alone. No penalty other than isolation is imposed on the newcomer who wants to retain the old ways of Europe or of Canada, but this is penalty enough to bring around the most intractable. In its capacity to remake the immigrant the United States is unique. Canada has always had a greater tolerance of the ways of the immigrant. The Argentine has had even more; people who have been there for several generations speak

of themselves as German or Italian, speak those languages at home, and send their children to German or Italian schools.

The move from social Darwinism to assimilation was a large one: instead of saying that people were not racially qualified to become Canadians or Americans, it said they *were* qualified, and the quicker they assimilated the better. In its more liberal manifestation it said that the assimilation would not necessarily be to a pre-existing culture, but to one that would include elements contributed by the immigrants themselves, as Watson Thomson expressed it in the words quoted above.

Canada had always been more tolerant of the polyglot immigrant population than the United States, and English-Canadians had their reasons for being especially tolerant. After all, the immigrants tended to assimilate to the English, and on an arrangement which some saw as providential, they would offset the relatively more numerous French-Canadian births. Ukrainians, Germans, and others could provide a kind of counterweight to the French-Canadians. Faced with claims and complaints by the French, English from western Canada could come back with "What about the Ukrainians?" More broadly and generally, the tension when two social groups compete within a polity seems likely to be reduced insofar as there are a number of groups.

Though milder than in the United States, this phase of assimilation and acculturation did have some play in Canada. The several foreign groups might be patronized on some restricted items of culture, especially food, but this was the limit of majority interest in the minority. Social concessions to the foreigner or to the French-Canadian on the part of the English-speaking elite were minimal. The thought that even the French, let alone new minority groups, would be allowed to make claims and exact privileges barely entered the minds of the majority. The Ukrainians of Manitoba, the Italians of Ontario, the Germans wherever they might be, would be able to attain all the privileges of Canadians, but only after they became fully Canadian. The English speakers never apologised for requiring assimilation, towards which the adoption of citizenship was a mere first stage; how can one expect to be treated as a full Canadian unless one is a full Canadian? Any defense of the immigrant press was in terms of its being a means to assimilation. It was said not to perpetuate the foreign culture on North American soil, but on the contrary to hasten that learning of how to be Canadian on the part of the foreign born that would ultimately cause its own demise.

Some of the dimensions of assimiliation are readily measurable. We can obtain statistics of intermarriage, and hence of amalgamation, in which the sub-nation is genuinely and permanently lost. The child who has parents of two different cultures can less easily identify with either of them; the grandchild who has three or four different cultures in his ancestral background could select one of them for identification only as a matter of whim.

Economic assimilation is a further dimension; we can find out to what extent Italians find jobs in Italian construction firms and under Italian foremen. At the other end of the occupational spectrum, we can find to what

extent the higher echelons of corporations, of universities, of the government, include the several ethnic groups.

We can look into the extent to which political life is ethnically structured. The extent to which the Irish vote, or the Ukrainian vote, is of importance is related both as cause and effect to whether there are Irish or Ukrainian politicians to cultivate these votes.

Of all the culture traits by which an ethnic group is identified and on the basis of which its degree of assimilation can be measured, language is the most concrete and most identifiable. An extensive study of language retention for the several ethnic groups is due to O'Bryan *et al.* (1975). They show the relation of retention to the several institutions of ethnic communities — schools, churches, press, etc. One would like to see such a study, ideally supplemented by actual tests of the individual respondents' knowledge of the language in question, taken at two points of time, so as to show in what direction ethnic affiliation is actually changing and by how much. As the authors say, their extensive study is only a beginning.

On the whole subnationhood has tended to decline. Intermarriage is increasing; job discrimination is less, and so is the power of a foreman to exploit his fellow-ethnics; ethnic political constituencies have by no means disappeared, but they are no stronger than they were.

Pluralism

Yet assimilation has gone out of fashion. We have not reverted to social Darwinism, but rather to something that is the opposite of both: the view that cultures are fragile and valuable and to be preserved. The point was suggested by writers in an issue of *Daedalus* (Spring, 1961) under the title "Assimilation in America: Theory and Reality." Nathan Glazer and Patrick Moynihan (1963) wrote their *Beyond the Melting Pot* on this theme, and it became a best-seller. For them the ethnic groups of New York were enduring political interest groups.

Perhaps the most currently active and literate proponent of ethnic pluralism is Father Andrew Greeley of the University of Chicago, and for him the ethnics are more than bases of political power; they are distinct cultural entities. Greeley's Center for the Study of American Pluralism has turned up some very pertinent material. By the use of survey tchniques he has found that the ethnic groups of the United States are not divisive for the country as a whole; they are not illiberal or reactionary, as tested on their attitudes towards a number of issues facing the country. He denies the trend, usually assumed, from particularistic to universalistic criteria in a one-directional march of progress. In an age of alienation, when the question "Whom am I?" is asked everywhere, at least a part of the answer comes to be, "I am an Irishman, an Armenian, or a Chinese" apart from being an American. It used to be thought that assimilation or separation were the alternatives; if immigrants did not assimilate, they country would break up. Pluralism is an alternative to both assimilation and separation.

When we return to the Canadian scene, this importance of ethnic diversity, of pluralism, is much less a new discovery. Oswald Hall in Ossenberg (1971, p. 94) notes that Canada has no word corresponding to "Americanization." S. D. Clark saw attachment to their British and European homelands as protecting Canadians from the temptation to become part of the United States. That was its good side. But for Porter there was also a less happy side (1965, pp. 71-72): "Segregation in social structure, to which the concept of the mosaic or multiculturalism must ultimately lead, can become an important aspect of social control by the charter group." And later (p. 73), "The control potential inherent in ethnic segregation can enhance the position of both ethnic leaders and leaders of the charter groups." Carstens, in Ossenberg (1971, p. 129) speaks of reservations as helping to maintain the dominance of the dominant Anglo-Saxons. While he is speaking of Indians, yet the implication is that any tendency of ethnics to segregate either residentially or occupationally would have the same effect. Beattie (1975) has studied empirically an important aspect of segregation in the Canadian public service. He finds that in the working together of French and English certain patterns persist. The French who come to Ottawa tend to be of lower social origin than the English; they look on their jobs as more a source of security than a challenge; they are less well paid on the whole.

As in some other matters, it once looked as though the United States was ahead of Canada. If we were all marching on the road to assimilation, and the United States had developed further the techniques for assimilating its immigrants, then the United States was ahead of Canada on that road. But now the whole procession has turned around; assimilation is no longer the obviously right thing; we are marching towards a polycultural goal. The Minister responsible for multiculturalism, under whose direction this conference is being held, symbolizes the change. And now that the procession has turned around, Canada is marching ahead of the United States.

The Old Immigration and the New

Some part of the change in viewpoint may be attributable to a major change in the social origins of the immigrants. The old immigration to Canada, like that to the United States, Brazil, and Argentina, did not come from the higher reaches of European society. Those who crossed the Atlantic to seek their fortunes were not landowners and successful bourgeois. They were most often peasants without education, slum dwellers from the crowded cities of Europe, refugees from persecution, from military service, or from famine. Having nowhere to go in their own societies, they left some stagnant corner of Europe, perhaps the Ukrainian or Italian countryside, to become unskilled day laborers in Canada. The Irish who came in the mid-nineteenth century did the heavy work of building canals on the St. Lawrence and the Grand Trunk Railway; Chinese laborers built the Canadian Pacific Railway. Construction of mines, roads, commercial buildings and houses require strong arms in those days, and such work constituted the "entrance status", as John

Porter calls it, of the bulk of the 19th-century immigrants. The sons of these laborers, born and educated in Canada, were the foremen and managers, in a sense pushed upward by a new wave of immigrants.

Though Lieberson (1970) shows that there are exceptions; some groups declined in position from the first to the second generation. It need surprise no one that immigrants went into the occupations that were calling for labor at the time of their arrival. The older immigrants, from western and northern Europe arrived when Ontario and the West were being opened up; they went into agriculture. Later immigrants became construction workers, not because they were Italians, say, but because those were the jobs available when the Italians arrived. The entry of Jews into the garment industry could be partly due to their having been tailors in Europe, partly to the start of mass-production of clothing in the late 19th century (Yancey *et al.*, 1976).

Among the exceptions to the rule that each new wave of immigrants came in at the bottom were the Scottish teachers and accountants who manned the schools and offices of Montreal in my boyhood. These were the output of an educational system developed far beyond the needs of Scottish industry and commerce, advance representatives of the new immigration, especially that since 1945. For a short time the countries of Europe, disorganized by war, could not use their trained people and sent them to Canada. Petersen (1955) describes the government organized Dutch emigration. Subsequently India has duplicated the Scottish enthusiasm for education along with the shortage of jobs for graduates. Indian doctors and statisticians, unlike most prior immigrants, enter at middle levels of the occupational ladder.

Heavy construction projects go forward in Canada on a larger scale than ever, but unskilled labor on them has been replaced by machines, a process undoubtedly accelerated by unionization and high wages. The centuries of immigration of the unskilled has diminished.

Social Structure and Private Prejudices

Some at least of the latent animosity among social classes expresses itself in terms of speech. In France and North America, with the advent of universal elementary education, "correct" (i.e. middle class) speech became universal also, and class prejudices could no longer be hung on the different ways people spoke.

That is, except as between native and non-native speakers of the dominant language. The villains of North American melodrama could not have the speech of an inferior class, as they could in Britain, but melodrama was readily built on the speech patterns of Italian, Greek, and other immigrants. People could not be put in their place by reminders of their lower-class speech, but they could be by the reminder of their foreign-ness. That was a stamp that all but the rare linguistically gifted immigrant would retain through life, and that would belie any attempt to assimilate in respect of clothing or residence.

Foreign sounding speech can be positive. In some of Conrad Veidt's early movies the hero spoke with a German accent; in the sequel to *Little*

Women, Jo refuses the patrician Laurie and marries a German professor; I have known Dutch and other academics whose accent seemed a badge of scholarly authority. One or a few Italian immigrants are heard as reminiscent of Neapolitan folksongs or grand opera. But the arrival of many Italians, especially if somehow they become a threat to the majority group, literally changes the hearing of the majority, so that it ceases to perceive a positive quality in the foreign speech.

No perfect congruence established itself between social and subjective elements. But we can say that while large numbers of immigrants entered to do the continent's dirty work, they were seen as useful provided they kept in their places. When the need for them fell off, because the major national construction work seemed to have been completed in the 1930s, they were transformed into a danger — either they would become a public danger or, worse yet, they would be effective competitors for the jobs the majority held.

How many foreigners it takes to constitute a threat depends on the division of labor. Where labor is short and most of the native-born have white-collar jobs, then there is a need even today for foreigners as garbage collectors and in some kinds of factory work, to say nothing of migrant farm workers. The foreigner, marked as such by his speech, ignorant of what it takes to gain middle-class employment, is appreciated as long as he has a strong pair of arms. The ethnic prejudice that individuals express by the distaste they feel for foreign speech, a prejudice and distaste that become the more intense the more the foreigner seems to be competing with them, could well be strongest in those who have most recently made it into the middle class.

Spatial Concentration

Breton (1964, p. 197) as well as Lieberson found that the localization of the migrants had much to do with their social organization; those that lived near one another tended to have ethnic contacts dominate their individual lives. Do they live near one another so they can participate in the old world culture, or do they participate in the old world culture through the accident of living near one another? Which is cause and which is effect, as between residence and contact, is not easily determined. Nor is it clear to what extent favorable or unfavorable attitudes of the dominant group depend on the segregation of the ethnics.

But none of these considerations help us to understand the rise of the ethnics in recent years. For with better transportation people can more readily disperse, and the dispersal to the suburbs from the central cities has presumably meant less ethnic concentration. Moreover with the further advance of industry and more education, both among the immigrants and in the Canadian population as a whole, there would seem to be less likelihood that an Italian straw boss can mobilize his friends and relatives on the job. Appointments are being made more and more on universalistic criteria, rather than on the particularistic basis of kinship and ethnicity. These considerations only make the current rise of the ethnics all the more puzzling.

The Division of Labor Provides Room for All

Ethnic and all other conflict is moderated by the division of labor. The more different things people do, and the more their activities complement rather than compete with one another's, the more they need one another and the more reason they find to accept one another. If North America has succeeded in achieving a generosity towards masses of foreigners that has no precedent anywhere else in the modern or the ancient world, it was just because plentiful resources provided farms and jobs for all, and later the industrial division of labor carried into thousands of distinct occupations (Potter, 1954).

No doctrine of tolerance, no Bible, no exemplary lives of prophets and saints can persuade us to put up with other social classes and those of alien speech so easily as coming to need them because their work complements ours, and ceasing to fear them because there is enough for all. Economic theories of increasing and universal prosperity, in a perspective of infinite growth, seem to be a firmer basis for tolerance than religion. So that paradoxically the selfishness to which bourgeois economic theory from Adam Smith onward has been anchored, insofar as it brings growth and the division of labor, serves better for inter-ethnic and other relations than does pious exhortation to altruism.

There is no need to detain you on this theme of the association of generosity to the foreign-born with growth capitalism. The suggestion comes not only from America but from post-war Europe as well; Germans and Frenchmen came to need Spaniards, Algerians, Italians, Greeks, and Turks. Millions of jobs opened up, and millions who would never have had a chance to go abroad came to the cities of western Europe. That many are sent home again in the present recession does not negate the fact that the meanness and narrowness that Europe showed at many points in its history disappeared at least temporarily in the sunlight of industrial prosperity.

Other Reasons why Attitudes have Changed

Many changes have occurred in Canada and abroad since social Darwinism was replaced by the ideal of assimilation, and that in turn by pluralism, and no one can say for sure to which of the changes the cause of the replacements can be imputed. Let us review some suggestions less tangible than the division of labor.

Some think that the rise and decline of nations in the outside world brings corresponding changes of status for the respective nationalities within Canada. This view would give the Dutch or the Germans in Canada a more solid position than the Ukrainians; the suppression of Ukrainian culture in Europe, the lack of books and newspapers in that language, deprives the Ukrainian Canadians of nourishment and tends to impoverish their culture in Canada. Jews feel that their position since the establishment of the state of Israel is more substantial than it was before. The French-Canadian culture

today is an original one, but stronger for its roots in international French culture.

Unfortunately this view does not explain why it is that those groups that have existed all along as nations in Europe or elsewhere — the Dutch, for instance — have fluctuated in the strength of their culture within Canada and in the respect of the English-speaking majority for that culture.

Can it be the increase of numbers? There have been some four million immigrants into Canada since World War II; is it the sheer mass of these that is making itself felt? The immigrant press had languished for most of 20 years, because there were few new immigrants for whom it could be the stepping stone to Canadian assimilation. Now it has revived, and with perhaps less the sense of transition than it had before the war. But in the end numbers cannot be the explanation, for earlier rates of immigrant entry were also high; over 400,000 came in 1913. Sheer numbers would tend to make the immigrant culture less rather than more attractive to the majority.

Does the rise of what may be called professional ethnics explain the phenomenon? Newspapermen of the ethnic press, teachers in schools catering to foreign-language speakers, pastors of ethnic congregations, doctors, lawyers, politicians, and undertakers develop a loyalty to the culture that they serve, and not only carry the torch themselves but stimulate others to do so. They encourage ethnic events — the annual picnic, the athletic competition — and reprimand the laggards whose attendance is irregular.

But perhaps neither numbers nor professionals are important, and the matter is one of generations. The original immigrants were more than willing to forget their own country; the repudiation of their fathers by the immigrants has seemed to some the key to North American history. Children of the immigrants, the second generation, looked down on or at best tolerated their parents not so much as the bearers of an inferior culture as because of their imperfect mastery of the American or Canadian culture. It was left to their children, the third generation, perhaps also on the principle of opposition to one's parents, to turn to the ancestral Baltic or Italian or German culture. They are not likely to go to school to learn the language, but they often develop a feeling for herring, or opera, or sauerkraut, as the case may be.

The New Humility of the Rulers

It can be argued, again, that the universal triumph of English as an international language makes English speakers more tolerant of what were once thought to be rivals. After all, Ukrainian is barely holding its own within the Soviet Union; it is hardly likely to threaten English internationally or in Canada. But the opposite has been argued more emphatically — that the English-speaking elites have lost their sense of authority, their capacity to rule, that the carriers of English culture have a lower degree of self-confidence than they had a century or even a generation ago.

On a world scale the determination, capacity, and power to rule, that for the century preceding World War II enabled the British, following the Spanish,

to create what was probably the last of the empires on which the sun never set, declined after the war. The admission that colonial peoples have the right to their own country has its reflection within Canada: other people have the right to as much of their own culture as they wish to retain.

Perhaps the tolerance of ethnicity starts from the ethnics themselves: perhaps they are not tolerated so much as determined to impose themselves. Perhaps the decline of authority in all institutions, from the family through the school to the firm, extends to the authority of the English speakers over the newcomers in Canada. People no longer subordinate themselves to the customs and the etiquette of those who yesterday were their social betters. Just as the hold of upper-class dress or manners on the lower classes has weakened, so also they no longer impose these and other cultural features on immigrant cultures.

Thus on the one side English has come to dominate in the world, and certainly English speakers in North America have abandoned foreign languages — with the exception that English-Canadians do learn French. On the other side is the sentiment that the others do not want to forget their own past in order to learn from us, and we do not have so much to teach them that we can ask them to abandon altogether their own world.

In the comfortable Canada that disappeared with World War II there was room for ethnic prejudice. The Anglo-Saxons were in charge; they looked after the social order; their ways of doing things were what others followed as soon as they could learn how. Thus the line of authority was clear, society was structured, and the cultural sequence was determinate. Ethnic prejudice was the reflection in the individual mind of that external authority and sequence. The individual English speaker may have thought he was being original in looking down on Lithuanians; we now see that his likes and dislikes were hardly original, but were rather an epiphenomenon stemming from, supporting, and justifying a certain social order.

Nationalism vis à vis the United States

Differences with the United States began with continental defense, an issue newly arisen in the missile age. As long as the Russian threat dominated the thinking of both countries their differences could hardly become severe. The ending of the Cold War has loosened the defense bond, and difficulties have arisen in more recent times over resources and trade. The "continental" concept of resource use is opposed to the Canadian concept. Limits set by Canada on export of oil from her booming but decidedly finite industry bother the United States. John Connally's clumsy (to put it charitably) handling of the 1971 devaluation gave Canadian nationalism something to feed on. Canadian politics is not unique in turning towards the foreigner when political problems at home seem intractable. In some countries it has taken a foreign war to heal domestic divisions; in Canada depriving *Time* and *Reader's Digest* of their tax status is as far as government wants to go. The accentuation of nationalism in the face of political and economic difficulties with a neighboring country

does not always lead to greater tolerance of divisions within the country, but in our case it seems associated with such tolerance.

A Crisis-Crossing of Lines of Interest and Opposition

Postwar affluence has complicated Canadian society. New interests and concerns have arisen and old ones intensified. These cut in many directions, and ethnic lines take their place in a scheme of national, regional, and class lines. Richard J. Ossenberg (1971, p. 104) protests the inclination to regard ethnic groups as homogeneous, to disregard class and other differences within each one. A long-run matter that has clearly softened Canadian attitudes towards the other ethnics is having two charter peoples. The special position of the French has a background of over three centuries of history, nothing the like of which can be claimed by other groups. Nonetheless other groups have echoed the claims of the French in the postwar period. Those whose ancestors arrived third, fourth, etc., claim concessions similar to those who got here first. The English in western Canada discovered their own ethnics as a means of offsetting French-Canadian claims. By defending their ethnics do they hope to make the French less unique?

A third source of tension in Canada has been the provinces, some of them hard pressed financially in relation to their ambitions; they want to get the most out of the sale of their raw materials. It would help Alberta if it could sell its oil abroad and at home at the highest possible prices; the benefit would go to the oil producers, the provincial government, and ultimately the Alberta taxpayers. This would have a market effect in Canada that would very soon appear in higher prices at the pump in Toronto; complaints about this would be directed to Ottawa. Ottawa can hold the provinces in line to some extent by saying that the alternative to us is the United States, but this is credible and soothing only within certain limits.

The main point that counts for us is that the criss-crossing of other oppositions, though still gentler in Canada than in most other countries, has tended to obliterate opposition between the ethnics and the charter peoples who speak French and English.

Prosperity

The Canadian manufacturing industry has flourished over this generation, but its extractive industry has flourished even more. Largely by virtue of price changes in world markets, Canadian income per capita is likely to rise from 80 per cent of the U.S. level to 100 per cent or more.

A raw materials-based prosperity can have different consequences from an industry-based prosperity. Insofar as the wealth is in the ground and it is merely necessary to take it out and sell it in order to live well, people need one another less than when industrial production is the source of wealth. The country that is in effect a *rentier*, living on the sales of the raw products of its land, hardly needs immigrants from abroad. In the extreme case these would merely divide up the pie without greatly affecting its size.

Some have charged that Canada has become a *rentier* state, drawing its wealth from the sale of raw materials, and dividing the wealth among its citizens by free health services, old age pensions, and other social security measures. Anyone who visits the busy cities and factories of Canada will see that real work is going on, and the words "*rentier*" and "producer" are to be taken relatively.

Insofar as the raw materials component increases, immigration is likely to decline. Will that have an effect on the way the majority group see the immigrants already here? Or the propensity of these immigrants to assimilate? Or their inclination to make claims for subnational "rights"?

Man's Imperfection Requires Pluralism

A controversial issue of the 18th century was whether man is perfectible or whether he is irremediably tainted with original sin. That issue is still unsettled, and it comes to the surface on a question such as ours. The perfectionists believe they know the one right way, and are sure enough that they would coerce those they cannot persuade. They are willing to risk polarizing the community, and do not fear the coincidence of class and cultural boundaries.

Those who believe that man is tainted aim at something less than perfection. They want to maintain many groups in viable competition, each with its own values. If a country is divided into two social classes, which are also political parties and also different religions, then as the examples of Ulster and Lebanon are showing each day, its viability is uncertain.

The solution to class or religious division is not exhortation to be friendly, and certainly not putting power in the hands of a leader, but quite the opposite — more divisions, more antagonisms, but always with different lines of cleavage. Canada is well endowed with lines of social cleavage, and they do not tend to coincide. If this liberal formula for the success of a polity is correct, then Canada's future is assured. She has the French and the English, plus the other ethnic groups, plus capital and labor, the countryside and the towns, the several regions and provinces. Superimposed on these internal sources of opposition is the unifying effect of resistance to continental policies of the United States.

Recognition of imperfection induces modesty with respect to one's culture and to oneself. If men are imperfect and their cultures are imperfect, then the last thing one wants is that they should all be the same. The most one can hope for is that in the competition of culture traits there will be a natural selection of good features.

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Reluctant Hosts: Anglo-Canadian Views of Multiculturalism in the Twentieth Century

by

Professor Howard Palmer

Introduction:

The way in which Anglo-Canadians have reacted to immigration during the twentieth century has not simply been a function of the numbers of immigrants or the state of the nation's economy. The immigration of significant numbers of non-British and non-French people raised fundamental questions about the type of society which would emerge in English-speaking Canada; hence, considerable public debate has always surrounded the issue of immigration in Canada. The questions which have repeatedly been raised include the following: Were the values and institutions of Anglo-Canadian society modelled exclusively on a British mold and should immigrants be compelled to conform to that mold? Or, would a distinctive identity emerge from the biological and cultural mingling of Anglo-Canadians with new immigrant groups? Would cultural pluralism itself give English-speaking Canada a distinctive identity? These three questions reflect the three theories of assimilation which have dominated the twentieth century debate over immigrant adjustment.

The assimilation theory which achieved early public acceptance was Anglo-conformity. This view demanded that immigrants renounce their ancestral culture and traditions in favour of the behaviour and values of Anglo-Canadians. Although predominant prior to World War II, Anglo-conformity fell into disrepute and was replaced in the popular mind by the "melting pot" theory of assimilation. This view envisaged a biological merging of settled communities with new immigrant groups and a blending of their cultures into a new Canadian type. Currently, a third theory of assimilation — "cultural pluralism" or "multiculturalism" — is vying for public acceptance. This view postulates the preservation of some aspects of immigrant culture and communal life within the context of Canadian citizenship and political and economic integration into Canadian society.[1]

All three of these views have been expressed throughout the twentieth

81

century debate over immigration; as has been suggested, however, the relative popularity or influence of each has varied throughout this long public debate. The term "multiculturalism" was coined during the days of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism as a reaction against what appeared to be the neglect of the "other ethnic groups" in the terms of reference and deliberations of the Royal Commission. Since multiculturalism is such a recent word, and since I am an historian, I do not intend to concentrate exclusively on Anglo-Canadian attitudes toward the multicultural movement or government multicultural policies. Rather, I will attempt to discuss the ways in which non-British and non-French immigrants and ethnic minorities have been viewed by Anglo-Canadians throughout the twentieth century.[2]

The pages that follow will explore the contours of the public controversy prompted by immigration and suggest how this controversy has been influenced by changing economic, political, social and intellectual conditions. The impact of issues which have, historically, been of national concern, will be assessed. For example, how have views toward immigration and assimilation been affected by Canadian nationalism and by English-French tensions? How have the ethnic minorities themselves — their class positions, their regional distributions, their proportionate numbers within the population as a whole — affected public opinion? What has been the impact of major catastrophic events such as economic depression and war? How have changing intellectual assumptions such as concepts of race, been translated into public opinion and policy?

Common sense suggests and recent studies confirm the close interrelationship of attitudes toward immigration and attitudes toward multiculturalism.[3] In discussing Anglo-Canadian attitudes toward ethnic pluralism, I have therefore been drawn into a discussion of immigration. Changing attitudes toward pluralism must be discussed against the backdrop of the three main waves of immigration which have come to Canada since the turn of the century. The first main wave occurred between 1896 and 1914; the second during the 1920's and the third during the post World War II period.[4] As well as dealing with specific time periods, I have also found it necessary to deal with the question of attitudes toward specific ethnic groups as well as attitudes toward immigration and ethnic pluralism in general, since general attitudes were usually expressed within the context of debate over admitting a particular immigrant group to the country and what role that particular group would play in Canadian life.

Throughout the paper, I have discussed the attitudes of Anglo-Canadians as revealed in government legislation in addition to opinions expressed in the usual avenues of public debate, such as political speeches, newspaper editorials or letters to the editor, scholarly articles, resolutions of pressure groups, and (for the more recent period) public opinion polls. An analysis of legislation at the provincial level concerning ethnic minorities would appear to be one of the most reliable gauges of public opinion, particularly

82

for the pre-World War II period, before the days of scientific public opinion polls. By including a discussion of federal policy toward immigration and ethnic minorities, I am not assuming that only Canadians of Anglo-celtic origin had an impact on these policies. However, except for the last 10 years, Anglo-Canadians have had the predominant role in determining these policies. This is made evident not only by analyzing Anglo-Canadian predominance in federal cabinets during most of the twentieth century, but also by observing that French-Canadians have been unhappy with federal immigration policy for most of this time.[5] Had they exercised more influence on federal policies, one assumes that they would not have been as critical. One other reason for the focus on federal policies is simply that in English-speaking Canada, immigration has been considered primarily a matter for federal concern and jurisdiction, and Anglo-Canadian attitudes have been expressed within the context of national debates over immigration policies.

Despite its apparent length to the contrary, this paper does not attempt to consider all aspects of Anglo-Canadian attitudes toward ethnic diversity. There is no attempt to discuss the accuracy of Anglo-Canadians' view of the assimilation process. In other words, I have not attempted to deal with the sociological reality of what happens to immigrant groups in English-speaking Canada and whether Canada can in fact be characterized as a melting pot, a mosaic, or something else.[6] I have only discussed the actual levels of assimilation among minority groups to the extent that it helps to explain Anglo-Canadians' views about what they think *should* happen to ethnic minorities. Nor have I attempted a full catalogue of the discriminatory legislation which has been enacted against the "other ethnic groups." I have only discussed pieces of discriminatory legislation to the extent that they reveal prevailing attitudes in a particular period.

I have not analyzed in any depth regional or class differences among Anglo-Canadians. There is, however, considerable evidence that people of lower socio-economic status have held the most negative attitudes toward immigration and ethnic minorities, both in terms of the past and present day.[7]

My research has also neglected attitudes toward immigration and ethnic minorities among Anglo-Canadians in Quebec and in the Maritimes. In Quebec, the question of French-English relations has of course been the primary group relations question for Anglo-Canadians. With the notable exception of Stephen Leacock, Anglo-Canadians in Quebec do not seem to have concerned themselves to any significant degree with the issue of immigration or the place of "other ethnic groups" in Canadian society. The views which have been expressed do not suggest any significant differences from Anglo-Canadian views in other parts of the country. There is certainly a need for more research on these questions. In the Maritimes the issues of immigration and multiculturalism have certainly not been as salient as in Ontario or the west. There is some research however on Maritimers' attitudes toward the blacks, the most visible and the most oppressed of the non-British, non-French, and non-native minorities in the Maritimes. The

research suggests that attitudes toward the "other ethnic groups" differ little from attitudes in other parts of English-speaking Canada. The blacks may have encountered slightly more discrimination in the Maritimes than in other parts of Canada,[8] but this stems from their concentration in relatively large numbers in certain parts of Nova Scotia. Levels of prejudice differed little in different regions,[9] — it was simply a question of which group served as the focal point of prejudice. Anti-Hutterite sentiment was strongest in Alberta and Manitoba; anti-eastern European sentiment was strongest in Saskatchewan, and anti-Oriental and anti-Doukhobor sentiment was strongest in British Columbia. In the latter part of the paper, I will return to the question of regional differences in attitudes toward multiculturalism.

In discussing their attitudes, I have also treated "Anglo-celts" as an undifferentiated group, at least in terms of their ethnic background. Canadians of English, Scots, Welsh or Irish descent did not always think of themselves as an undifferentiated group. They could and did have differences of opinion among themselves when it came to their own ethnic identity. But when it came to the other ethnic groups, the Anglo-celts closed ranks.[10]

There has been a recent burgeoning of historical and sociological research on Anglo-Canadian attitudes toward ethnic minorities. Much of this research contradicts the view which has been propagated during the last 10 years by Anglo-Canadian historians[11] and politicians that Anglo-Canadians have always adopted the "mosaic" as opposed to the American "melting pot" approach. Much of this rhetoric has simply been wishful thinking. Perhaps immigrant groups did not "melt" as much in Canada as in the United States, but this is not because Anglo-Canadians were more anxious to encourage the cultural survival of ethnic minorities. There has been a long history of racism and discrimination against ethnic minorities in English-speaking Canada, along with strong pressures for conformity to "WASP"[12] ways. In this paper I have attempted to summarize and synthesize much of this recent research. This is done not so much to beat the beleaguered "WASP" over the head; Anglo-Canadians have been no worse, and perhaps slightly better in their treatment of immigrant minorities than other major immigrant receiving countries such as the United States or Australia. I proceed rather from the assumption, as historians must, that if we are to understand current attitudes we need to understand their historical roots.

The "Settlement" Period and the Predominance of Anglo-conformity: 1867-1920

Among the several objectives of the architects of the Canadian confederation in 1867, none was more important than the effort to accommodate the needs of the two main cultural communities. There was virtually no recognition of ethnic diversity aside from the British-French duality. This is, of course, somewhat understandable since at the time of confederation, only eight percent of the population of three and one half million were of non-British[13] or non-French ethnic origin. There were, however, significant num-

bers of people of German and Dutch origin, well-established black and Jewish communities as well as a few adventurers and entrepreneurs from most European ethnic groups now in Canada.

The proportion of people of other than British, French, or native origin in Canada remained small until nearly the turn of the century; the United States proved more attractive for most European emigrants. In fact is was attractive for many Canadians as well, and the Dominion barely maintained its population. But with the closing of the American frontier which coincided with improving economic conditions in Canada and an active immigration promotion campaign by Wilfrid Laurier's Liberal government, many immigrants began to come to the newly opened land of western Canada in the late 1890's.[14] Immigration policy gave preference to farmers, and most non-British immigrants came to farm in western Canada. However, some immigrants ended up working in mines, laying railway track or drifting into the urban working class.[15] During this first main wave of immigration between 1896 and 1914, three million immigrants, including large numbers of British laborers, American farmers and eastern European peasants, came to Canada. Within the period of 1901 to 1911, Canada's population rocketed by 43 percent and the percentage of immigrants in the country as a whole topped 22 percent. In 1911, people of non-British and non-French origin formed 34 percent of the population of Manitoba, 40 percent of the population of Saskatchewan and 33 percent of the population of Alberta.

Throughout the period of this first large influx of non-British, non-French immigrants, (indeed up until World War II), anglo-conformity was the predominant ideology of assimilation in English-speaking Canada.[16] For better or for worse, there were few proponents of either the melting pot or of cultural pluralism (contrary to the flood of recent political speeches and scholarly articles on ethnicity in Canada which assume that the "mosaic" approach has always been predominant). Proponents of anglo-conformity argued that it was the obligation of new arrivals to conform to the values and institutions of Canadian society — which were already fixed. During this period when scarcely anyone questioned the verities of God, King, and country, there was virtually no thought given to the possibility that "WASP" values might not be the apex of civilization which all men should strive for.

Since at this time the British Empire was at its height, and the belief in "progress" and Anglo-Saxon and white superiority was taken for granted throughout the English-speaking world, a group's desirability as potential immigrants varied almost directly with its members physical and cultural distance from London, (England, not Ontario) and the degree to which their skin pigmentation conformed to Anglo-Saxon white. Anglo-Canadians regarded British and American immigrants as the most desirable.[27] Next came northern and western Europeans who were regarded as culturaliy similar and hence assimilable. They were followed by central and eastern Europeans, who in the eyes of Clifford Sifton and immigration agents, had a slight edge on Jews

and southern Europeans, because they were more inclined to go to and remain on the land. These groups were followed in the ethnic pecking order by the "strange" religious sects, the Hutterites, Mennonites, and Doukhobors, who were invariably lumped together by public officials and the general public despite significant religious and cultural differences between them. Last, but not least (certainly not least in the eyes of those British Columbians and their sympathizers elsewhere in the country who lay awake nights worrying about the "Asiatic" hordes) were the Asian immigrants — the Chinese, Japanese, and East Indians (the latter of whom were dubbed "Hindoos," despite the fact that most were Sikhs). Running somewhere close to last were black immigrants, who did not really arise as an issue because of the lack of aspiring candidates, except in 1911, when American blacks were turned back at the border by immigration officials because they allegedly could not adapt to the cold winters in Canada; a curious about face for a department which was reassuring other American immigrants that Canadian winters were relatively mild.[18]

As might be expected, prevailing assumptions about the relative assimilability of these different groups were quickly transformed into public debate over whether immigrants whose assimilability was problematic should be allowed into the country. During this first wave of immigration, considerable opposition developed to the entry of central, southern and eastern European immigrants, Orientals, and to the three pacifist sects. Opposition to these groups came from a variety of sources, for a variety of reasons. But one of the most pervasive fears of opinion leaders was that central, southern and eastern Europeans and Orientals would wash away Anglo-Saxon traditions of self-government in a sea of illiteracy and inexperience with "free institutions."[19] Many English-Canadian intellectuals, like many American writers at the time, thought that North America's greatness was ensured so long as its Anglo-Saxon character was preserved. Writers emphasized an Anglo-Saxon tradition of political freedom and self-government and the "white man's" mission to spread Anglo-Saxon blessings.[20] Many intellectuals and some politicians viewed Orientals and central southern and eastern European immigrants as a threat to this tradition and concluded that since they could not be assimilated they would have to be excluded. The introduction in Canada of a head tax on Chinese immigrants, a "gentlemen's agreement" with Japan which restricted the number of Japanese immigrants, the passing of orders-in-council which restricted immigration from India, the gradual introduction of restrictive immigration laws in 1906, 1910 and 1919 relative to European immigration and the tightening of naturalization laws was based in considerable part on the assumptions of anglo-conformity — immigrants who were culturally or racially inferior and incapable of being assimilated either culturally or biologically, would have to be excluded.[21] Those who rose to the immigrants' defence argued almost entirely from economic grounds: immigration from non-British sources was needed to aid in economic development, not because it might add anything to Canada's social or cultural life.

86

Although the trend toward restrictionism during the early 1900's seemed to indicate a government trend toward anglo-conformity in response to public pressure, for the most part between 1867 and 1945, there was no explicit federal government policy with regard to the role of non-British and non-French ethnic groups in Canadian society. It was generally assumed, however, that immigrants would eventually be assimilated into either English-Canadian or French-Canadian society. A recent careful study of Clifford Sifton's attitudes toward immigrant groups in Canadian society concludes Sifton assumed that central and eastern Europeans "... would be 'nationalized' in the long run through their experience on the land ...".[22] The federal government's concern was tied to the economic consequences of immigration, while schools, the primary agents of assimilation, were under provincial jurisdiction. The federal government had encouraged Mennonites and Icelanders to settle in blocks in Manitoba during the 1870's and had given them special concessions (including local autonomy for both and military exemptions for the Mennonites) to entice them to stay in Canada rather than move to the United States.[23] But this was not because of any conscious desire to make Canada a cultural mosaic, nor was it out of any belief in the value of cultural diversity (although politicians sometimes gave lip service to pluralism). Block settlements, by providing social and economic stability, were simply a way of getting immigrants to settle in the west and remain there.[34] The government policy was pragmatic and concerned primarily with economic growth and "nation building;" there was little rhetoric in immigration propaganda picturing Canada as a home for oppressed minorities who would be able to pursue their identities in Canada.

Provincial governments were faced with the problems of assimilation more directly than the federal government since the provinces maintained jurisdiction over the educational systems. The whole question of the varying attitudes of provincial authorities toward assimilation is much too complex to outline in this article; suffice it to say that with some notable exceptions (like the bilingual school system in Manitoba between 1896 and 1916, and the school system which was established for Hutterites in Alberta), anglo-conformity was the predominant aim of the public school system and was an underlying theme in the textbooks.

Anglo-conformity was most pronounced during World War I as nationalism precipitated insistent hostility to "hyphenated Canadianism" and demanded an unswerving loyalty. For many Anglo-Canadians during the war, loyalty and cultural and linguistic uniformity were synonymous. During the war, western provincial governments acted to abolish the bilingual schools which had previously been allowed.[25] The formation of the Union party of Conservatives and Liberals during the first World War was an attempt to create an Anglo-Saxon party, dedicated to "unhyphenated Canadianism" and the winning of the war; even if this meant trampling on the rights of immigrants through press censorship and the imposition of the War Time Elections Act which disfranchised "enemy aliens" who had become Canadian citizens

87

after March 21, 1902.[26] Various voluntary associations like the YMCA, IODE, National Council of Women, Canadian Girls in Training, Girl Guides, Big Brothers and Big Sisters Organizations and Frontier College, as well as the major protestant denominations also intensified their efforts to "Canadianize" the immigrants, particularly at the close of the war when immigrant support for radical organizations brought on anti-radical nativist fears of the "menace of the alien."[27] The pressures for conformity were certainly real, even if English-Canadians could not always agree completely on the exact nature of the norm to which immigrants were to be assimilated .

One could give innumerable quotes from newspaper editorials, political speeches, scholarly articles, or resolutions of patriotic, business, or labor groups to show the Anglo-Canadian belief in anglo-conformity in the pre-1920 period. Let me briefly cite one. Perhaps I should introduce the editorial reaction of Calgary's satirical journalist, Bob Edwards, to the arrival of the German-speaking pacifist Hutterites in Alberta in 1918 with the title "The Worst of Bob Edwards." In reacting to the arrival in Alberta of 1,000 Hutterites, out of a total number of 1,700 in the world, Edwards wrote "God knows how many are coming here from the States, but it is said the particular brotherhood which has been wished on Alberta has two million members ... who are coming to Canada."[28] In bold type the *Eye Opener* thundered, "BUT WHY SHOULD THEY WANT TO IMPOSE SUCH A BUNCH OF GERMAN CATTLE ON US? That gets our goat. WHY?"[29] Does one need to add that Edwards did not see the Hutterites as adding anything worthwhile to Canadian society?

All the major books on immigration prior to 1920, including J. S. Woodsworth's *Strangers Within Our Gates,* J. T. M. Anderson's *The Education of the new Canadian,* Ralph Connor's *The Foreigner,* Alfred Fitzpatrick's *Handbook for New Canadians,* C. A. Magrath's *Canada's Growth and Some Problems Affecting It,* C. B. Sissons, *Bilingual Schools in Canada,* and W. G. Smith, *A Study in Canadian Immigration,* were based on the assumptions of anglo-conformity. To lump all these books together is of course to oversimplify since they approached the question of immigration with varying degrees of nativism (or anti-foreign sentiment), and humanitarianism. Nor were all of the voluntary organizations' attempted "Canadianization" work among immigrants motivated solely by the fear that immigrants would undermine the cultural homogeneity of English-speaking Canada. Many of these writers and organizations saw their work with the immigrants as a means of fighting social problems and helping immigrants achieve a basic level of political, social, and economic integration into Canadian society. But it cannot be denied that their basic assumption was that of anglo-conformity. Cultural diversity was either positively dangerous, or was something that would disappear with time, and with the help of Anglo-Canadians.

Perhaps it should be emphasized that the individuals advocating anglo-conformity were not just the reactionaries of their day. Protestant Social Gospellers, (including J. S. Woodsworth, later one of the founders of the

88

CCF) who played such a prominent role in virtually all the reform movements of the pre-World War I period (including women's rights, temperance, and labor, farm, and penal reform) believed that immigrants needed to be assimilated to Anglo-Canadian Protestant values as part of the effort to establish a truly Christian society in English-speaking Canada.[30] Women's groups pushing for the franchise argued that certainly they deserved the vote if "ignorant foreigners" had it, and joined in the campaign to Canadianize the immigrants who "must be educated to high standards or our whole national life will be lowered by their presence among us."[31]

But there was a central contradiction in Anglo-Canadian attitudes toward ethnic minorities. Non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants were needed to open the west and to do the heavy jobs of industry. This meant not only the introduction of culturally distinctive groups, but groups which would occupy the lower rungs of the socio-economic system. The pre-1920 period was the period of the formation of, and the most acute expression of what was later called the "vertical mosaic." Anglo-Canadians were not used to the idea of cultural diversity, nor the degree of class stratification which developed during this period of rapid settlement and industrialization. The answer to all the problems of social diversity which the immigrants posed was assimilation. The difficulty however with achieving this goal of assimilation was not only the large numbers of immigrants, or the fact that not all (or even a majority) of them wanted to be assimilated. One of the major factors preventing assimilation was discrimination by the Anglo-Canadian majority.

The basic contradiction, then, of Anglo-Canadian attitudes as expressed through the "Canadianization" drives was the tension between the twin motives of humanitarianism and nativism — between the desire to include non-British immigrants within a community and eliminate cultural differences and the desire to stay as far away from them as possible because of their presumed "undesirability." This contradiction was graphically revealed at the national conference of the IODE in 1919. The women passed one resolution advocating a "Canadianization campaign" to "propogate British ideals and institutions", to "banish old world points of view, old world prejudices, old world rivalries and suspicion" and to make new Canadians "100 percent British in language, thought, feeling and impulse." Yet they also passed another resolution protesting "foreigners" taking British names.[32]

It does not appear that this was simply a case of the Anglo-Canadian majority being divided between those who wanted to pursue a strategy of assimilation, and those who wanted to pursue a strategy of subordination and segregation. Certainly there was some division along these lines, but as suggested by the IODE resolutions, discrimination and anglo-conformity were often simply two different sides of the same coin — the coin being the assumption of the inferiority of non-Anglo-Saxons.

What developed throughout English-speaking Canada during this period was a vicious circle of discrimination. Non-Anglo-Saxons were discriminated against because they were not assimilated, either culturally or socially, but

one of the reasons they were not assimilated was because of discrimination against them. As one researcher noted in a 1917 report on "Social Conditions in Rural Communities in the Prairie Provinces," the group "clannishness" of immigrants which was so widely deplored by the public was caused as much by the prejudice of the "English" as it was by the groups' desire to remain different.[33]

There is no need to catalogue here the extensive patterns of social, economic and political discrimination against non-Anglo-Saxons.[34] Patterns of discrimination parallelled preferences of immigrant sources with northern and western Europeans encountering relatively little discrimination, central and southern Europeans and Jews encountering more discrimination and non-whites encountering an all pervasive pattern of discrimination which extended to almost all aspects of their lives. Discrimination was one of the main factors which led to the transference (with only a few exceptions) of the same ethnic "pecking order" which existed in immigration policy to the place each group occupied in the "vertical mosaic," with the British (especially the Scots) on top, and so on down to the Chinese and blacks who occupied the most menial jobs.[35] Non-British and non-French groups not only had very little economic power; they also would not even significantly occupy the middle echelons of politics, education or the civil service until after World War II.

The ethnic stereotypes which developed for eastern European and Oriental groups emphasized their peasant origins. These stereotypes played a role in determining the job opportunities for new immigrants and functioned to disparage those who would climb out of their place. Opprobrious names such as "Wops," "Bohunks" and especially "foreigner" indicated class as well as ethnic origin and these terms were used as weapons in the struggle for status. The very word "ethnic" carried, for many people, such an aura of opprobrium that even recently there were attempts to expurgate the use of the word. Ethnic food and folklore were regarded by most Anglo-Canadians as not only "foreign," but "backward" and lower class. Folklorist Carole Henderson has aptly described the views of Anglo-Canadians toward folklore, (views which continue to the present day): "Except for members of some delimited regional and usually ethnic, subcultures such as Newfoundlanders or Nova Scotian Scots, most Anglo-Canadians simply fail to identify folklore with themselves, and tend to consider such materials to be the ... unimportant possessions of the strange, foreign or 'backward people in their midst'."[36]

The 1920s and the Emergence of "Melting Pot" Ideas

The 1920s brought the second main wave of non-British and non-French immigrants to Canada and saw the emergence of the second ideology of assimilation, the "melting pot." During the early 1920s both Canada and the United States had acted to further restrict immigration from southern, central and eastern Europe and from the Orient. Chinese were virtually excluded from Canada, and central, southern and eastern Europeans were

90

classified among the "non-preferred" and restricted category of immigrants. But by the mid-1920s several powerful sectors of Canadian society, including transportation companies, boards of trade, newspapers and politicians of various political persuasions, as well as ethnic groups, applied pressure on the King government to open the immigration doors.[37] These groups believed that only a limited immigration could be expected from the "preferred" countries and that probably only central and eastern Europeans would do the rugged work of clearing marginal land. The railways continued to seek immigrants to guarantee revenue for their steamship lines, traffic for their railways and settlers for their land. With improving economic conditions in the mid-twenties, the Federal government responded to this pressure and changed its policy with respect to immigrants from central and eastern Europe.

While continuing to emphasize its efforts to secure British immigrants, in September 1925, the Liberal government of MacKenzie King entered into the "Railways Agreement" with the CPR and CNR which brought an increased number of central and eastern Europeans. The Government authorized the railways to encourage potential immigrants of the "non-preferred" countries to emigrate to Canada and to settle as "agriculturalists, agricultural workers and domestic servants."[38]

Through this agreement, the railways brought to Canada 165,000 central and eastern Europeans and 20,000 Mennonites. They represented a variety of ethnic groups and a diversity of reasons for emigrating. Most of the Ukrainian immigrants were political refugees. Poles, Slovaks and Hungarians were escaping poor economic conditions. German-Russians and Mennonites were fleeing civil war, economic disaster, and the spectre of cultural annihilation in Russia.[39] Often they chose Canada since they could no longer get into the United States because of its quota system and the Canadian route was the only way they could get to North America. With this new wave of immigration, the proportion of the Canadian population that was not of British, French, or native origin, rose to more than 18 per cent by 1931.

In responding to this new wave of immigration, many opinion leaders held to an earlier belief that Canada should be patterned exclusively on the British model, and continued to advocate anglo-conformity. In national periodicals and newspapers during the 1920s, the emphasis which was placed on the need to attract British immigrants was related to this assumption that anglo-conformity was essential to the successful development of Canadian society. "Foreign" immigrants had to be assimilated and there needed to be enough Britishers to maintain "Anglo-Saxon" traditions.[40] R. B. Bennett, later to become the Conservative prime minister during the early 1930s, attacked melting pot ideas in the House of Commons and argued "These people [continental Europeans] have made excellent settlers: ... but it cannot be that we must draw upon them to shape our civilization. We must still maintain that measure of British civilization which will enable us to assimilate these people to British institutions, rather than assimilate our civilization to theirs ..."[41]

91

The influx of new immigrants from central and eastern Europe during the mid and late twenties also aroused protests from a number of nativist organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan, The Native Sons of Canada and The Orange Order who were convinced that Canada should "remain Anglo-Saxon."[42] Nativist sentiment in western Canada was most pronounced in Saskatchewan where one of its leading spokesman was George Exton Lloyd, an Anglican bishop and one of the founders of the Barr colony at Lloydminster.

In a torrent of newspaper articles and speeches, Lloyd repeated the warning that Canada was in danger of becoming a "mongrel" nation: "The essential question before Canadians today is this: Shall Canada develop as a British nation within the empire, or will she drift apart by the introduction of so much alien blood that her British instincts will be paralyzed?"[43] According to Lloyd, Canada had but two alternatives: it could either be a homogeneous nation or a heterogeneous one. The heterogeneous or "melting pot" idea had not worked in the United States (as evidenced by large numbers of unassimilated immigrants at the outbreak of World War I), and could not, he argued, work in Canada. With Lloyd, as with other individuals and organizations promoting anglo-conformity at this time, one gets the distinctive feeling that they were on the defensive. Like other English-speaking Canadians who had a strong attachment to Britain and the Empire, Lloyd saw a threat to Canada's "British" identity, not only in the increasing numbers of "continental" immigrants, but also in the declining status of things British as Canadians moved towards a North American based nationalism which did not include loyalty to the British Empire as its primary article of faith.[44]

During the late 1920s, a new view of assimilation, the melting pot, developed greater prominence. This view of assimilation, which arose partly as a means of defending immigrants against nativist attacks from people like Lloyd, envisioned a biological merging of Anglo-Canadians with immigrants and a blending of their cultures into a new Canadian type. Whereas Lloyd and other nativists argued that since immigrants could not conform to Anglo-Canadian ideals they should be excluded, a new generation of writers argued that assimilation was indeed occurring, but to a new Canadian type.[45] Since assimilation was occurring, nativist fears were unwarranted. Indeed, immigrants would make some valuable cultural contributions to Canada during the process of assimilation. Although these writers did not all use the "melting pot" symbol when discussing their view of assimilation, one can lump their ideas together under the rubric of the "melting pot" because they did envisage the emergence of a new society which would contain "contributions" from the various immigrant groups.

Most of these writers who defended "continental" European immigration did not seriously question the desirability of assimilation. Robert England, a writer and educator who worked for the CNR had read widely enough in anthropological sources to be influenced by the cultural relativism of Franz Boas and other anthropologists and did in his writing question the desirability of assimilation.[46] But most of these writers were concerned primarily with

92

attempting to promote tolerance toward ethnic minorities by encouraging their assimilation, and many became involved in programs to facilitate this assimilation.

Advocates of anglo-conformity and the melting pot both believed that uniformity was ultimately necessary for unity, but they differed on what should provide the basis of that uniformity. Advocates of the melting pot, unlike the promoters of anglo-conformity, saw assimilation as a relatively slow process, and saw some cultural advantages in the mixing that would occur.

There was not, however, always a clear distinction between anglo-conformity and the melting pot. Rhetoric indicating that immigrants might have something more to offer Canada than their physical labor was sometimes only a thinly veiled version of anglo-conformity; the melting pot often turned out to be an Anglo-Saxon melting pot. For example John Blue, a prominent Edmonton promoter and historian, wrote in his history of Alberta in 1924 that the fears about foreign immigration destroying Canadian laws and institutions had proved groundless. "There is enough Anglo-Saxon blood in Alberta to dilute the foreign blood and complete the process of assimilation to the mutual advantage of both elements."[47]

There were a variety of reasons for the development of melting pot ideas during the 1920s.[48] The growth during the 1920s of an autonomous Canadian nationalism helped the spread of melting pot ideas. Some English-Canadian opinion leaders began to discuss the need for conformity to an exclusively Canadian norm rather than a "British" norm. One of the arguments that John W. Dafoe, the influential editor of the *Winnipeg Free Press* and J. S. Ewart, a constitutional lawyer, used in support of their view of Canadian nationalism was that non-British immigrants could not be expected to feel loyalty to the British Empire.[49]

Melting pot advocates tended to be people who had some personal experience with immigrants, and recognized both the intense pride that immigrants had in their cultural backgrounds as well as the rich cultural sources of those traditions. But they also lived in a time when recognition of ethnicity meant mostly "WASP" use of ethnicity as a basis of discrimination or exploitation. It was also a time when some ethnic groups were still close enough to their rural peasant roots that ethnic solidarity was often not conducive to upward mobility. The view of most melting pot advocates that the disappearance of ethnicity as a basis of social organization would increase the mobility opportunities of the second generation was based on a sound grasp of the realities of the day. The life-long campaign of John Diefenbaker for "unhyphenated Canadianism" and "one Canada" grew out of this experience with ethnicity as something that could be used to hinder opportunities, and was consistent with his emphasis on human rights, rather than group rights.[50] Perhaps the greater acceptance in Canada during the 1920s of melting pot ideas may have been part of the growing popularity of American ideas and influences. This suggestion must be made tentatively since in the United States during the 1920s, there was widespread criticism of melting pot ideas.[51]

93

The 1930s

Although immigration was severely cut back during the depression of the 1930s, the role of ethnic minorities in English-speaking Canada continued to be a major public concern. Paradoxically, although the depression witnessed the high point of discrimination against non-Anglo-Saxons, it was also during the 1930s that the first major advocates of cultural pluralism in English-speaking Canada began to be heard.

The depression affected non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants more than most other groups in the society. These immigrants because of their language problems and lack of specialized skills, were concentrated in the most insecure and therefore most vulnerable segments of the economy. Since immigrants were the last hired and the first fired, a large proportion were forced onto relief. Government officials were gravely concerned about the way immigrants seemed to complicate the relief problem. Calls by some officials for deportation as the solution to the relief problem were heeded by the federal government; sections 40 and 41 of the Immigration Act (still essentially the same act as the one which existed in 1919) provided for deportation of non-Canadian citizens on relief and government officials took advantage of the law to reduce their relief rolls.

While there was some continuing concern over the assimilation of non-British and non-French immigrants during the 1930s, most Anglo-Canadians were more concerned about protecting their jobs.[52]

Prior to the depression, most Anglo-Saxons were content to have the "foreigners" do all the heavy work of construction, and the dirty work of the janitors and street sweepers. But as the economy slowed down, these jobs became attractive. Whereas the pre-depression attitude was "let the foreigners do the dirty work," the depression attitude became "how come these foreigners have all of our jobs?" The 1930s also saw the high point of anti-semitism in English-speaking Canada, as the patterns of discrimination which had hindered the desires of second generation Jews for entry into the professions, were extended into a vicious and virulent anti-semitism by fascist groups.[53]

Barry Broadfoot's book *Ten Lost Years* also makes it very clear that discrimination and prejudice flourished during the depression. In the transcripts of his interviews with the "survivors" of the depression, one is struck by the all-pervasiveness of derogatory ethnic epithets in interviewees' recollections of their contact with immigrants. One does not read of Italians, Chinese or Poles. One reads of "Dagos," "Wops," "Chinks," "Polacks," "Hunyaks."[54] One "survivor" of the depression, waxing philosophical, gives explicit expression to the prevailing attitudes of the time. He compares how the depression effected people from R. B. Bennett down to "the lowest of the low," "some bohunk smelling of garlic and not knowing a word of English. . . ."[55] Another "survivor" recalls that her boy had great difficulty finding work during the depression, and went berserk because of the blow to his self-esteem when the only job he could find was "working with a bunch of Chinks . . ."[56]

The vicious circle of discrimination became perhaps even more vicious

94

during the 1930s as non-Anglo-Saxons' political response to the depression further poisoned attitudes toward them. The discrimination and unemployment which non-Anglo-Saxons faced was an important factor in promoting the support of many for radical political solutions to the depression, in either communist or fascist movements. Indeed the vast majority of the support for the communists throughout Canada, and for the fascists in western Canada came from non-Anglo-Saxons.[57] Ethnic support for these two movements, and the conflict between left and right within most central and eastern European groups and the Finns was seen as further evidence of the undesirability of non-Anglo-Saxons. The existence of fascist and communist movements in Canada was not of course due simply to the presence of immigrants bringing "old world" ideas. The leaders in both movements were predominantly of British origin,[58] and their "ethnic" support came more from immigrants reacting to depression conditions than from immigrants bringing to Canada "old world" ideas. But the depression gave further support to the notion of non-Anglo-Saxons being unstable politically; one more proof along with immigrant drinking, garlic eating and the legendary violence at Slavic weddings, that non-Anglo-Saxons were in dire need of baptism by assimilation. Deporting immigrant radicals was seen as one alternative to assimilation and the federal government did not hesitate to use this weapon.[59]

The relationship in the public mind between ethnicity, lower social class origins and political "unsoundness" explains why during the late 1920s so many second generation non-Anglo-Saxons who were anxious to improve their lot economically made deliberate attempts to hide their ethnic background, such as changing their names. Ethnic ties were clearly disadvantageous for those non-Anglo-Saxons seeking economic security or social acceptance. The experience of the second generation in English-speaking Canada was similar to the second generation experience as described by a historian writing about ethnic groups in the United States. "Culturally estranged from their parents by their American education, and wanting nothing so much as to become and to be accepted as Americans, many second generation immigrants made deliberate efforts to rid themselves of their heritage. The adoption of American clothes, speech, and interests, often accompanied by the shedding of an exotic surname, were all part of a process whereby antecedents were repudiated as a means of improving status."[60]

Despite the continuing dominance of the old stereotypes concerning non-Anglo-Saxons and the continuing dominance of assimilationist assumptions, the 1930s also saw the emergence of the first full blown pluralist ideas in somewhat ambiguous form in John Murray Gibbon's book, *The Canadian Mosaic* and in the writings of Watson Kirkconnell, then an English professor at the University of Manitoba. These writers were much more familiar than earlier writers with the historical backgrounds of the ethnic groups coming to Canada, and they were influenced by a liberalism which rejected the assumptions of Anglo-Saxon superiority. Gibbon, a publicity agent for the Canadian Pacific Railway, wrote his book as an expansion of a series of CBC radio

95

talks on the different ethnic groups of Canada. He traced the history of each group and related their "contributions" to Canadian society. Although he was concerned with the preservation of folk arts and music, he also went out of his way to alleviate fears of unassimilability by discussing individuals' assimilation as well as the "cement" of common institutions which bound the Canadian mosaic together. Perhaps from our perspective we would raise questions about the depth of Gibbon's pluralism; however his book was certainly a departure from the earlier books like *Strangers Within Our Gates,* which took as their starting point the assumption of Anglo-Saxon superiority. Although Gibbon was not the first writer to use the mosaic symbol, he was the first to attempt to explore its meaning in any significant way.

Kirkconnell was an essayist, poet, and prolific translator of European verse from a number of European languages. His writing on ethnic groups was based on a different approach than Gibbon's. He tried to promote tolerance toward "European Canadians" by sympathetically portraying the cultural background of the countries where the immigrants originated and by demonstrating the cultural creativity of European immigrants in Canada through translating and publishing their creative writing.[61] In his writing he attacked the assumptions of anglo-conformity, and advocated a multicultural society which would allow immigrants to maintain pride in their past.

> ". . . it would be tragic if there should be a clumsy stripping-away of all those spiritual associations with the past that help to give depth and beauty to life . . . If . . . we accept with Wilhelm von Humboldt 'the absolute and essential importance of human development in its richest diversity,' then we shall welcome every opportunity to save for our country every previous element of individuality that is available."[62]

Kirkconnell was not advocating complete separation of ethnic groups so that they might be preserved. He believed that assimilation needed to occur in the realm of political and economic values and institutions but he hoped that some of the conservative values and folk-culture of immigrants could be preserved.

Kirkconnell did not ignore the political differences within ethnic groups. Indeed, with the outbreak of World War II he wrote a book in which he attempted to expose and combat both fascist and communist elements in different ethnic groups.[63] But he was also active in attempts to bring various other factions of eastern European groups together in order to alleviate public criticism of divisions within ethnic groups.[64]

These advocates of pluralism believed that ethnic diversity was not incompatible with national unity. Unity need not mean uniformity. They believed that recognition of the cultural contributions of non-Anglo-Saxon groups would heighten the groups' feeling that they belonged to Canada and thus strengthen Canadian unity. But Gibbon and Kirkconnell were voices crying in the wilderness — a wilderness of discrimination and racism.

The Second World War and Post-War Immigration: 1940-1960

The war period and early post-war period was a transitional time with respect to attitudes toward immigration and ethnicity. Although the war

96

brought renewed hostility toward enemy aliens, a number of developments during the war eventually worked to undermine ethnic prejudice. During the arrival of the third wave of immigration in the late 1940s and 1950s, many pre-war prejudices lingered, and ethnic minorities encountered considerable pressures for conformity. But economic prosperity and changing intellectual and social assumptions diminished nativism and prejudice, and helped pave the way for a growing acceptance of pluralism by the 1960s.

The war period itself hardly seemed conducive to ethnic tolerance or pluralism. Patriotic groups mushroomed and many turned their concerned attention to the loyalty of "enemy aliens." Germans, Italians and the three pacifist sects — Hutterites, Mennonites and Doukhobors — all encountered a great deal of discrimination.[65] The Japanese, however, encountered the most hostility. The irrational build up of hostility toward the Japanese in British Columbia and their forced relocation to other parts of Canada[66] indicated Anglo-Canadians' continuing racism, their complete ignorance of a group long established in Canada, and a continued willingness on the part of government to respond to public bigotry and violate the civil rights of ethnic minorities who were regarded as second class citizens.[67]

Nevertheless, a number of developments during the war period worked to undermine nativism in the long run. Groups like the Chinese and Ukrainians who had previously encountered serious problems in social acceptance, won a new respectability by their support for the war cause. The channels for mobility which the army provided and the involvement of all levels of society in war time industries undermined certain social barriers.[68] Some ethnic prejudices were overcome by the experience many young English-speaking Canadians had of widening their parochial outlooks by exposure to European conditions. The revulsion against Hitler and Nazism also eventually extended to a revulsion against Hitler's concept of a superior race and any public expression of anti-semitism. The heightened sense of Canadian nationalism which the war helped produce stimulated hostility toward "enemy aliens," but it also helped undermine the definition of English-speaking Canada as "British." This helped undermine anglo-conformity and cleared the way for a less rigid definition in the post-war era of what it meant to be a Canadian. This shifting focus of national identity was symbolized in the introduction of the new Canadian citizenship act of 1946. Economic development during the war also laid the basis for the post-war prosperity which helped ease ethnic tensions.

The outbreak of World War II also found the federal government beginning to concern itself with the adjustment and acceptance of Canada's ethnic minorities. The Nationalities Branch of the Department of National War Services was established in 1942 to encourage and assure "ethnic" participation in the war effort. By helping to establish national "umbrella" organizations for groups like the Ukrainians and Poles, the branch was able to alleviate some of the public criticism about factionalism within ethnic groups, and some of the concern about "ethnic" support for the war.

97

The third main wave of immigration commenced after the second World War with the influx of refugees from war-torn Europe and thousands of German, Dutch and British immigrants seeking better economic opportunities. The 1950s and 1960s also brought a growing number of immigrants from Mediterranean countries — Portugal, Greece, and particularly Italy. Between 1945 and 1961, 2,100,000 immigrants came to Canada, helping to increase the proportion of people of "other ethnic groups" origin to 25 percent by 1961.

The immigrants who were involved in this wave of immigration were still predominantly European. This reflected the continuing assimilationist and racist basis of post-war immigration policy which included a discriminatory clause giving preference to those of British and French origin and virtually excluding Asians and West-Indians (although laws restricting the entry of relatives of Chinese in Canada were relaxed). Prime Minister Mackenzie King probably spoke for the majority of Anglo-Canadians in his 1947 speech outlining the federal government's post-war immigration policy when he stated that immigration should be limited to those groups that could be "absorbed."[69] As he stated, "There will, I am sure, be general agreement with the view that the people of Canada do not wish, as a result of mass immigration, to make a fundamental alteration in the character of our population."[70] While King's statement was concerned primarily with justifying the exclusion of non-whites, it is clear from his emphasis on immigrant absorption that he continued to underline the importance of "assimilability" in immigration policy. He was no more interested in having a multicultural society than he was in having a multiracial society.[71]

Despite King's assurances that post-war immigration would not change the character of Canada's population, the size of the post-war influx to the expanding industrial centers of Ontario, particularly to Toronto, brought significant changes in the society of urban Ontario. Although between 1941 and 1961 the proportion of people of other than British or French origin in the prairie provinces increased by only four or five percentage points, and did not increase in British Columbia at all, the proportion in Ontario increased by 12 percent from 18 percent in 1941 to 30 percent in 1961.[72] All of these changes were, of course, accompanied by a decline in the proportion of the population of British origin. While H. Troper and R. Harney have shown us the relative degree of diversity which existed in pre-World War II Toronto in their book *Immigrants*, the observations by W. L. Morton on the impact of post-war immigrants on Toronto are not far wrong. "Toronto was transformed from a staid and complacent British city, essentially sober and provincial, into a varied and vivacious cosmopolitan metropolis, on many of whose streets the flat Canadian English accent is lost in the lively rhythms of other less inhibited tongues."[73]

For a variety of reasons, much less nativist opposition developed to this third wave of immigration than to the previous waves of central and eastern European immigration. The majority of English-speaking Canadians were

favorable to immigration:[74] earlier arrivals had accustomed English-Canadians to diversity, the war had enabled some previously unaccepted groups to prove their loyalty, and the tie between immigration and economic growth was firmly cemented in the public mind.[75] Another important factor in the acceptance of this wave of immigrants was the large proportion of educated and skilled among the post-war immigrants.[76] In a break with pre-war immigration policy, Canada began to seek out skilled industrial and urban-oriented immigrants capable of assisting Canada's industrial expansion and capable of "integrating" more rapidly than rural immigrants. The settler "in a sheepskin coat" destined for the land, was replaced by the immigrant with a slide-rule, bound for the city. There were also, of course, many city bound immigrants who came with the proverbial strong backs, and who occupied the lower rungs of the socio-economic system, but urban residential concentrations of Italians, Portuguese or Greeks did not arouse the same degree of Anglo-Canadian concern as the rural block settlements had in western Canada.[77] Although both the early rural settlements of central and eastern Europeans, and the post-war urban concentrations of southern Europeans were characterized by occupational concentration, residential segregation, strong kinship ties, a multiplicity of ethnic organizations, and a strong church presence, urban immigrants were simply unable to achieve the same degree of isolation, self-sufficiency or "institutional completeness" as earlier rural immigrants in "bloc settlements" on the prairies had done.

The 1950s and 1960s were marked not only by a greater acceptance of immigrants than in the pre-war period, but also by a growing tolerance toward established minority groups in English-speaking Canada.[78] Probably the most important factor in accounting for the relative tolerance of the post-war era was the undermining of the intellectual assumptions and social respectability of Anglo-Saxon racism. This resulted from a variety of factors, including not only the post-war revulsion against racism in the aftermath of Hitler's treatment of the Jews, but the decline of Great Britain as a world power, and the cultural relativism taught by modern sociology and anthropology. Canadian awareness of the problems arising from racial discrimination was also stimulated by exposure to the civil rights movement in the United States. The growing concern with human rights throughout North American was encouraged by both the federal and provincial governments and by various voluntary organizations.

The prosperity of the post-war years also contributed to more relaxed inter-ethnic attitudes. Relatively high wages and economic security in urban areas removed the fear of competition. Prosperity also laid the basis for rising educational levels, which would have a great impact on the level of tolerance in urban areas. The striking upward socio-economic mobility of the second and third generation non-Anglo-Saxons in both the professions and business was facilitated by prosperity, thus helping to break down the earlier fairly rigid relationship between class and ethnicity.

However, growing tolerance was still dependent on whether or not particular groups conformed to prevailing middle-class behaviour. The greater

99

acceptance of post-war central and eastern Europeans as compared to pre-war immigrants from this area was partly related to the fact that they were more highly educated and not as culturally distinctive as the earlier immigrants. The declining proportion of "foreign-born" in the prairie provinces also lessened the visibility of non-Anglo-Saxons. The growing acceptance of Mennonites, central and eastern Europeans and Japanese was dependent on their conformity to middle-class norms.[79]

Although the symbol of the "mosaic" came increasingly to be used in English-speaking Canada to express Canada's diversity, and despite the growing interest in ethnic food and folklore, one must conclude that general attitudes in English-speaking Canada were closer to the melting pot than to pluralism. After-dinner speakers and politicians may have paid lip-service to the mosaic, but it was like praising an elderly relative who was quietly passing away.

Despite the fact that old assumptions regarding conformity remained, the 1950s saw the breakdown of the vicious circles of discrimination which had developed prior to the war. Economic, social and political mobility of non-Anglo-Saxons[80] and, (at least in the prairie provinces), growing assimilation worked together to break down traditional stereotypes and undermine previous rationalizations for discrimination.

World War II and the immediate post-war period served, then, as a watershed in terms of Canadian attitudes toward ethnic diversity. A variety of social, intellectual and economic factors worked to break down ethnic prejudices, leading eventually to a more liberalized immigration policy and an increased acceptance of cultural diversity. The third wave of immigration led in turn to a greater proportion of people of non-British, non-French origin in the population, whose presence (both physically and politically) was increasingly felt, and who brought to Canada a number of immigrant intellectuals who could articulate the values of cultural pluralism. This period also brought greater government intervention in social policy, and the federal government began to play a substantial role in shaping attitudes toward ethnic diversity.

The Debate over Multiculturalism: 1960-1975

Multiculturalism as an idea, a movement, and a government policy developed during the 1960s and early 1970s in response to a variety of social, political and intellectual currents and pressures, both national and international. As might be expected, given the prevailing assumptions about conformity during the 1950s as well as Anglo-Canadians' long history of racism, multiculturalism has not met with universal acceptance in English-speaking Canada. Melting pot advocates have rallied to oppose it for a variety of reasons, and some Anglo-Canadian advocates of a bicultural Canada have joined French-Canadian opponents of multiculturalism. Even among Anglo-Canadian supporters of cultural pluralism, there is a good deal of debate over the meaning of multiculturalism. Aside from the opinion leaders who have been publicly debating multiculturalism, what do recent sociological studies

100

reveal about general Anglo-Canadian attitudes toward it? And what does the debate over the Green Paper on Immigration reveal about contemporary attitudes toward non-white ethnic minorities and multiculturalism?

Unlike the 1920s or the post-World War II period, changes in immigration policy were not among the most important factors in determining changes in attitudes toward ethnic diversity among Anglo-Canadians. International pressures for ethnic tolerance and human rights and the continuing need for skilled workers at a time when immigration from Europe was declining led in 1962 and 1967 to the introduction of new immigration regulations which eliminated the old racial biases in immigration laws and made it possible for significant numbers of non-whites from the "third world" (particularly from Hong Kong, India and the West Indies) to enter Canada. These changes in immigration laws were not made in response to pressure from Anglo-Canadians for more liberalized laws; public opinion polls in 1959 and 1971 indicated that if anything, they were becoming more negative in their view of the desirability of immigration than they had been in the immediate post-war period.[81] Whether or not the new influx of immigrants from the "third world" would eventually have an impact on Anglo-Canadians' attitudes toward ethnic diversity is a question to which we shall return shortly.

The growing acceptance of pluralist ideas during the 1960s in English-speaking Canada did not stem from changes in immigration policy. It developed rather from the impact of French-Canadian nationalism and the Pearson government's setting up of a Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, the increased awareness of the way in which ethnicity could provide a basis for personal identity in an impersonal mass society which was unsure of its own values, the increased awareness of the value of cultural diversity in a technological and affluent society, and the upsurge of English-Canadian nationalism with its need to distinguish Canada from the United States by asserting the existence of a Canadian "mosaic" in opposition to the American melting pot.

The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism of the 1960s did much to convince English-speaking Canadians that full-fledged recognition of French-Canadian cultural and linguistic rights was desirable, but it also paved the way for multiculturalism.[82] The Royal Commission proved significant impetus to the development of multiculturalism because of the "ethnic" backlash against the Commission, whose terms of reference seemed to place non-British and non-French groups into the category of second class citizens. The term "multiculturalism" itself arose as a response to the attempt by the Royal Commission to define Canada as "bicultural." French-Canadian nationalism also served as a spur to the development of "ethnic" consciousness and ethnic pressure group mobilization, and the hearings of the Royal Commission provided a forum for ethnic minorities to articulate their place in Canadian society.

The Commission hearings were not particularly conducive to convincing Anglo-Canadians that multiculturalism was desirable. But they were instruc-

101

tive for Anglo-Canadian politicians since they made plain that many non-Anglo-Saxons (whose economic and political power was growing) were not willing to let themselves be defined out of existence by "biculturalism." The public debate surrounding the work of the Royal Commission also necessarily raised the question: if it is valuable for French-Canadians to maintain their distinctive culture and identity, why not other groups? Just as in the past, there were some Anglo-Canadians who argued against granting any additional status to the French language and culture since it would lead to demands by other groups, but the argument was just as often turned in a pluralist direction. Book IV of the Royal Commission's Report on the "other ethnic groups," which was commissioned as something of an afterthought by the commission, made a persuasive case for the value of ethnic minorities maintaining their identity, although it did so within the framework of biculturalism: ethnic minorities maintaining their cultural identity within the context of two dominant societies, anglophone and francophone.

In response to Book IV of the Royal Commission, in October, 1971, the federal government announced its multicultural policy, which has continued to provoke considerable debate to the present day. It is impossible at this time to attempt to assess the role of Anglo-Canadians in the introduction of this policy. But the introduction of a multicultural policy by the federal government (and by the provinces of Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta) has provided a forum for debate on the value and meaning of multiculturalism. This debate gives us a fairly good idea of how some influential Anglo-Canadian opinion leaders view multiculturalism.

What we now have in English-speaking Canada is a debate between proponents of assimilation vs. proponents of multiculturalism, between proponents of biculturalism and multiculturalism, and between different proponents of multiculturalism. The debate between assimilationist and pluralists occurs on a variety of levels. Assimilationists such as sociologist John Porter, one of the most vocal critics of multiculturalism, argue that the policy will only serve to perpetuate the "vertical mosaic" in which class lines coincide with ethnic lines by preserving conservative values which are detrimental to the social and economic mobility of individuals from minority ethnic groups and diverting energy from economic advancement to group maintenance.[83] Pluralists argue, on the contrary, that multiculturalism, if successful, will raise the self-concept of low status groups, break down discriminatory attitudes and hence facilitate the mobility of the "other ethnic groups."

Assimilationists are also concerned about the stress that some pluralists place on group maintenance and belonging as opposed to individual self-development,[84] while the latter often argue that ethnicity can provide a liberating rather than a constricting context for identity.[85] One variation of the assimilationists' concern for individualism is the view that multiculturalism will foster the alleged authoritarian values of ethnic minorities. This view served as the point of departure for Douglas Fisher and others who were interviewed on a 1974 "Up Canada" CBC program,[86] and is the basis for

102

one definition of multiculturalism which I have heard, "Fascists dancing in their church basements."

Assimilationists like Charles Lynch argue that multiculturalism will perpetuate old world hatreds,[87] while pluralists argue that the public recognition of Canada's ethnic minorities will heighten their feeling that they belong in Canada. Some assimilationists, (continuing in the path well-trodden by the anti-Japanese bigots of the Second World War period), seem to believe that one cannot make a distinction between national loyalties and attachment to cultural traditions, while pluralists generally argue that such a distinction is possible.[88] Perhaps the assimilationists' basic fear is, then, that multiculturalism will lead to a fragmentation of Canadian society. Pluralists are also concerned about Canadian identity and unity, but see pluralism as the essence of Canadian identity, and believe that positive action is necessary to preserve cultural pluralism since throughout the world it is being eroded by the impact of technology, mass communications and urbanization. Some of these assimilationist arguments have a familiar ring from the past, with their emphasis on the need for cultural uniformity and the need to enlighten the poor backward ethnic and bring them "progress."

The differences of opinion between assimilationists and pluralists are profound and are perhaps even more extensive than indicated here. They are partly differences which can and should be subject to objective research, but they are also partly differences of philosophy and values. John Higham has so aptly described the same difference of opinion in the United States, "Integration [assimilation] in its modern form expresses the universalism of the enlightenment. Pluralism rests on the premises of romantic thought. From this fundamental distinction others flow. In the United States both integrationists and pluralists claim to be the true champions of democracy; but democracy means different things to them. ... The democracy of integration is an equality of individuals; pluralist democracy is an equality of groups."[89]

The second major group of critics of multiculturalism in English-speaking Canada have been those who have argued that multiculturalism threatens to undo the work of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism.[90] They oppose multiculturalism for both sociological and political reasons. Joining with French-Canadian critics of multiculturalism like Claude Ryan and Guy Rocher, they argue that multiculturalism is a distortion of the realities of Canadian life, because there are two main cultures, tied to the two main language groups. In their opinion, it is contradictory to have a policy of official bilingualism along with multiculturalism, because language and culture are inseparable. Multiculturalism is viewed as being not only sociologically mistaken, but politically dangerous, since it detracts from the status of French-Canadians. These fears that multiculturalism will endanger the status of French-Canada may not be justified,[91] but they are nonetheless real. According to a lead editorial in the *Journal of Canadian Studies* in 1971 multiculturalism is "dangerous" because it will endanger the achievements of biculturalism, and lead only to increased demands by the proponents of "One

193

Canada" for conformity by everyone, including French-Canadians.[92] Some of these critics of multiculturalism, like Gertrude Laing, a former Royal Commissioner for the B&B Commission, and now chairman of the Canada Council, do not oppose or they even support ethnic groups maintaining their own cultural identity and language if they so desire, but they do not feel it either realistic or desirable that such a policy be labelled "multiculturalism."

A third debate is now in progress among pluralists over the meaning of multiculturalism. Does an emphasis on cultural preservation reinforce conservative images and alienate ethnic youth, or is an emphasis on tradition necessary to serve as the basis of ethnic solidarity, and to provide that sense of deep historical roots which we need in a technological age? Does multiculturalism, with its emphasis on cultural preservation, have anything to offer new immigrant groups who are concerned primarily with economic and social adjustment?

Another crucial question is to what extent should government be involved in promoting pluralism? Does government involvement in providing funds for groups accentuate competition and friction both within and between groups, or will it bring different groups together in common projects working for common goals, knowing that the larger Canadian public is interested in their cultural life? Will a government emphasis on "sharing" of cultures, make it more difficult for groups to maintain their cultures and hence have less to share? Is the federal multicultural policy serious about attempting to overcome social and economic inequalities between ethnic groups and make the Canadian mosaic less vertical, or is multiculturalism simply a means of "containing" the demands of ethnic minorities without envisaging basic changes in the power structure of Canadian society?[93] Given a set of desirable pluralist goals, to what extent can government action have a significant impact on the maintenance of cultural and linguistic diversity and the overcoming of social and economic inequalities?

Another contentious issue among supporters of pluralism is the degree to which language maintenance is necessary to have a viable multicultural policy. Some supporters of multiculturalism accept the arguments of the B&B Commission that language and culture are inseparable but pursue the argument to conclude that if Canada is to be a multicultural society it must also in some ways be a multilingual society. Others see language maintenance as less essential for the survival of ethnic groups.

Perhaps the most perceptive analyst in English-speaking Canada of multiculturalism is Toronto sociologist Jean Burnet, formerly a researcher for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. Her analysis is too complex and sophisticated to classify her as an opponent or defender of multiculturalism.[94] She agrees with many of those critics of multiculturalism who were involved with the B&B Commission, that multiculturalism is a misleading term. But she has also given persuasive rebuttals to critics of multiculturalism like John Porter and Guy Rocher. According to Professor Burnet, the term "multiculturalism" is inaccurate since most ethnic minorities do not

104

preserve complete cultures; what they preserve is a sense of identity. Folk-dance, handicrafts, even language are symbols of group identity rather than elements of a complete culture. The support advocated for the languages and arts of "other ethnic groups" will facilitate their retention as symbols of ethnic identity but not as parts of living, complete cultures. Therefore, a distinction should be made between cultural and ethnic group, since it can be argued that while cultural differences have been waning, there has been no diminution and perhaps even an accentuation of ethnic awareness. Federal government policy is aimed at supporting ethnic *groups*, not cultures. According to her view, Canada is multi-ethnic rather than multicultural.

In her view the question of whether or not multiculturalism is a viable policy depends on how one defines multiculturalism.

> "Multiculturalism within a bilingual framework can work, if it is interpreted as is intended – that is, as encouraging those members of ethnic groups who want to do so to maintain a proud sense of the contribution of their own group to Canadian society. Interpreted in this way, it becomes something very North American: voluntary marginal differentiation among peoples who are equal participants in the society. If it is interpreted in a second way – as enabling various peoples to transfer foreign cultures and language as living wholes into a new place and time – multiculturalism is doomed."[95]

Aside from the scholars and journalists, how does the "average" Anglo-Canadian feel about multiculturalism? A recent sociological survey, based on a national sample, conducted by a team of social psychologists in the summer of 1974, gives us some indication of contemporary attitudes in English-speaking Canada toward multiculturalism. The first conclusion of the study was that knowledge of the federal multicultural policy was minimal. In the country as a whole only 19.3 percent of the population knew about the policy, and only 16.9 percent of people of Anglo-celtic background knew about it. This general ignorance about the multicultural policy was mitigated however by the fact that 89 percent of the Anglo-celts believed that assimilation was not the official government policy.[96] The general perception was that cultural diversity was permitted, but not encouraged by the government.

The authors of the study asked a series of quesitons like "Canada would be a better place if members of ethnic groups would keep their own way of life alive," in order to elicit attitudes toward the general idea of multiculturalism. From the response to the questions, the authors concluded: "A multicultural ideology is not rejected by the sample as a whole; rather there is a fair degree of uncertainty about such an ideology with a mild acceptance being apparent."[97]

Acceptance of multiculturalism also varied in different parts of the country, with the greatest acceptance of multiculturalism in Ontario and the prairies, and the least acceptance in Quebec. The regional responses are not surprising, since they show that multiculturalism as an idea is most accepted were multiculturalism is a reality.[98] These findings are parallelled by regional differences in evaluating six specific ethnic groups. The study found that in

105

general, with the exception of attitudes toward Indians, minority groups were given the most positive evaluation in areas where they were most concentrated. Ukrainians and Germans were regarded most favorably on the prairies, and Italians and Jews were viewed most positively in Ontario. The Chinese proved a minor exception — Chinese were rated highest in the prairies followed closely by British Columbia.[99] Immigrants "in general" received their most favorable evaluations in British Columbia and Ontario, the two regions with the highest concentrations of immigrants. All groups with the exception of Indians, received their most negative evaluations in the Maritimes and Quebec.

In terms of ethnic background, the authors found the greatest acceptance of multiculturalism among people of Anglo-celtic background, followed by people of non-British or non-French background, with the least acceptance among French-Canadians. The finding that people of Anglo-celtic background are the most favorable of the three groups toward multiculturalism is intriguing and requires some explanation. Comparing their attitudes with French-Canadians it is apparent that Anglo-Canadians, unlike French-Canadians, do not feel that their own culture is under any serious threat so are less concerned about the consequences of pluralism.[100] The fact that Anglo-celts are more positive toward multiculturalism than "ethnics" themselves is a rather surprising finding. The differences between the two groups are not great however,[101] so too much should not be made of them. The findings concerning the attitudes of ethnic minorities themselves are not however consistent with the findings of the recent Non-Official Languages Study which was also commissioned by the Department of the Secretary of State. The NOL Study (which deserves more public exposure and discussion) found that for 10 ethnic groups in five of Canada's major urban areas, there was a fairly strong degree of support for the maintenance of ethnic identity and non-official languages.[102] Perhaps the differences stem from the way the sample was drawn. The Non-Official Languages Study included only some of the largest ethnic groups in the major metropolitan centers, and interviews were conducted in the non-official languages as well as in English or French. The Majority Attitudes Study included a representative sample from across the country, and interviews were conducted only in English and French. This suggests, not surprisingly, that people from smaller ethnic groups, in non-metropolitan areas, who are not fluent in an official language, are not as positive in their attitudes toward multiculturalism as those included in the NOL study.

Questions were also asked in the Majority Attitudes Study concerning attitudes toward specific federal multicultural programs. The authors concluded "overall, although extant programs are reacted to with some moderate degree of favor, those items concerned with the public use of third languages were clearly unacceptable, particularly in public schools and on public broadcasting."[103]

In order to tap respondents' degree of commitment to multiculturalism, they were asked whether they would vote for a political candidate who supported multiculturalism, try to convince other people that the program was

a good one, and be willing to pay taxes to support such a program." The authors concluded in this area, attitudes "... are considerably less positive than for previous issues, with means for all groups falling below the mid-point of the scale. In particular, those behaviors involving the greatest commitment [convincing others, paying taxes] are least positive."[104]

What we find then among Anglo-Canadians is somewhat limited support for multiculturalism. Unlike any previous period in the past, there is no widespread fear that multiculturalism would destroy "our Canadian way of life"[105] and there is a positive feeling that multiculturalism will make Canada "richer in culture." Anglo-Canadians are not sure however that "social harmony will improve in Canada" with a multicultural policy.[106] Support for multiculturalism includes support for the maintenance of ethnic groups in Canadian society, the encouragement of ethnic folklore, and an increased public awareness of Canada's diversity, but it does not in general include approval for the public support of non-official languages. This study, as well as others[107] suggests a continuing hostility to the languages of "other ethnic groups" and the feeling that people who use non-official languages in public are not really "Canadian". There is no widespread public understanding of the importance of language maintenance to many ethnic groups.

Given the general lack of awareness of the federal multicultural policy, the luke-warm support for multiculturalism as an idea, and the unwillingness to take any positive action in support of multiculturalism, one must conclude that the prevailing Anglo-Canadian attitude toward it is one of indifference. The majority of respondents agreed to the statement "if members of ethnic groups want to keep their own culture, they should keep it to themselves and not bother other people in this country." Unfortunately it would appear that the prevailing attitude toward multiculturalism in English-speaking Canada is the one outlined by sociologist Jim Frideres in his summary of the findings of the research presented at a recent conference on "Multiculturalism and Third World Immigrants":

> "Those of 'English' group membership adhere to the policy of multiculturalism but only to the extent that the 'different' ethnic groups nominally display their ethnicity. This means that these ... groups should speak English in public and accept the anglo way of life in all respects when in public. However, in the private confines of one's house and on holidays, these groups can speak their native language, wear their 'traditional' clothes and paint their Easter eggs."[108]

It is difficult to say whether these findings are consistent with the seemingly positive response to events such as Metro Caravan in Toronto and similar happenings in other cities. Certainly there are many Anglo-Canadians who (given the growing appreciation of the values of community and folk traditions) respect the folk traditions and close-knit solidarity among some ethnic minorities. Indeed, some may even be envious of these traditions. I have been told several times recently of classroom discussions of ethnicity in which student rather reluctantly reported that their ethnic origin was "just British."

While it is not surprising, one of the disturbing findings of the Majority Attitudes Study (confirming a number of other recent studies)[109] is that the ethnic pecking order, which has had such a long history in Canada's immigration policy and class system, is still part of the mental framework of many Anglo-Canadians. Anglo-Canadians evaluated themselves as being more "important," "clean," "likeable," "wealthy," and "interesting" than other minority ethnic groups. (Although they were willing to concede that some other groups were more "hardworking.")[110] Anglo-Canadians also had more favorable attitudes toward northern European groups than toward southern Europeans or non-whites. This pecking order also continues to be reflected in patterns of social and economic discrimination with northern Europeans encountering the least amount of discrimination and non-whites encountering the most.[111]

What does the Green Paper on Immigration and the debate surrounding it reveal about contemporary Anglo-celtic attitudes? Has there been a recent growth or re-emergence of racist sentiments in English-speaking Canada in response to the influx of non-white immigrants? Did the Green Paper debate, by focusing attention on the growing number of non-whites, contribute to the development of racist sentiments among Anglo-Canadians?[112] Has the Green Paper debate made immigrants scapegoats for the government's inability to solve Canada's social and economic problems? Was the Green Paper itself racist, and was it an attempt to respond to the political pressures of racist groups? Are the fears that are expressed about non-white immigrants based primarily on racist assumptions about their physical or cultural undesirability? Are they based on assimilationist fears that the new immigrants will congregate together, speaking their own language and remaining outside the mainstream of Canadian life? Or are they based on simple ethnocentric reactions to cultural differences? Does the growing restrictionist mood toward immigration in English-speaking Canada[113] indicate the development of racist ideas, or does it indicate instead changing attitudes towards population growth in Canada and a belief that Canada no longer needs as many immigrants, whatever their color?[114]

It is difficult to provide answers to these questions since research is scanty, research findings are somewhat contradictory,[115] and we are still too close to the events to see overall patterns. However, one fact is clear. Although the Green Paper debate has revealed the persistence of racist sentiments in English-speaking Canada, it has also indicated that these racist sentiments are not as powerful as in the past. During the public hearings on the Green Paper, for the first time in any major national public debate on immigration policy, racists were clearly on the defensive. Groups wanting to restrict non-whites had to answer not only to noisy left-wing groups, but more significantly to a parliamentary committee which included two non-whites, as well as several members for whom any hint of racism was anathema. Groups who opposed the entry into Canada of immigrants

108

who would not immediately assimilate also had to contend with the father of Canada's multicultural movement, Senator Paul Yuzyk.

If the Green Paper debate has revealed the persistence of racist ideas in English-speaking Canada, what implications does this have for multiculturalism, and for a federal multicultural policy? Does it suggest that Anglo-Canadians are willing to tolerate a multicultural society, as long as it is not also a multiracial society? The debate over the Green Paper has raised serious questions in the minds of leaders of Third World groups, as well as political leaders concerned with multiculturalism, over whether at this point in time, an emphasis on cultural maintenance by non-white groups might increase their visibility and hence make them more likely targets for racist attacks. Should the emphasis at present be on human rights and overcoming discrimination as opposed to cultural maintenance, or is one of the best ways to overcome prejudice the "sharing of cultures" approach? One thing is certain. The Green Paper debate has made it painfully clear that we need a federal human rights initiative and a multicultural policy which will move as quickly as possible to introduce measures to help improve Anglo-Canadians' understanding of Canada's ethnic minorities and their aspirations, with particular emphasis on our "visible" minorities.

CONCLUSION

The interpretation which one places on these findings and developments depends in part on whether one is an optimist or a pessimist, whether, to use a metaphor, one sees the glass as being half full, or half empty. There are strong strains of racism in Canada today; indeed there are many Anglo-Canadians who do not even like the idea of a multicultural society, let alone a multiracial society. But the strains of racism, discrimination and the pressures toward conformity for non-British and non-French groups are certainly less powerful then they were even 20 years ago, to say nothing of what they were 75 years ago.

The ethnic "hierarchy of desirably" or pecking order still exists in the preferred social relationships of most Anglo-Canadians. But it has been abolished (at least *de jour*) from our immigration laws, it is more difficult to maintain in our class system because discrimination in jobs and housing has been made illegal by human rights legislation, and even in personal relationships, the "hierarchy" is not as rigidly held as in the past.[116] The Anglo-Canadian may not be willing to have a black or Asian marry his daughter, but whereas his father did not want Chinese in the country, he would not be unwilling to have someone of Chinese descent next door. Legal discrimination against ethnic minorities, such as the laws which prevented Orientals, Doukhobors, Hutterites, Mennonites and "enemy aliens" from voting at different periods of time, or the laws restricting to landholding by Orientals and Hutterites, or the access of Orientals to professions, has been abolished.

109

The vertical mosaic still exists in the class system. But it has been breaking down — one could cite numerous striking examples of "ethnics" in the media, the civil service, the professions, and especially politics to provide evidence of the fact. While non-Anglo-Saxons may not have broken into the Canadian economic establishment in any significant way,[117] entry into the "establishment" is becoming increasingly based on merit rather than family connections. It strikes me as significant that it is a post-war immigrant, Peter Newman, who is describing and interpreting the "establishment" to English-speaking Canada.

One could cite many other examples of major changes in attitudes. Political parties no longer strain to see who can be most anti-Oriental as a way of getting votes; they vie instead for that elusive commodity, the "ethnic vote." Social workers who are involved in helping immigrants adjust to Canadian society and scholars studying immigrants and ethnic minorities no longer assume assimilation as the inevitable and desirable goal for Canadian society; most operate instead from pluralist assumptions. Prominent Anglican bishops no longer rail against the evils of "dirty, ignorant, garlic-smelling foreigners."[118] We no longer try to deport immigrants who are unemployed. While the use of ethnic slurs has not disappeared, it is not accepted as a matter of course. (Indeed, one of the few ethnics slurs still acceptable is the acronym "WASP".) Most Anglo-Canadians now look back with regret and guilt on the relocation of Japanese-Canadians. Canada has in the post-war period, established an international reputation for its liberal treatment of refugees. In the last eight years, we have had a significant influx of non-white immigrants without serious racial confrontation. Last, but not least, we have a government supported multicultural policy which has garnered the support of many Anglo-Canadians, and the support of politicians of all political parties. The policy has not always met our expectations and a great deal remains to be done. But perhaps we should not be too harsh in our judgment of a policy which is so new, and which is working against one of the oldest and most persistent of human vices: ethnic and racial prejudice.

110

NOTES

1. For a discussion of these three ideologies of assimilation in the United States, see Milton Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life* (New York, 1964).

2. Some might object that this view of multiculturalism coincides too closely with the pragmatic political view that multiculturalism is a short-term policy intended to pacify, or if you will, "respond" to the needs of "immigrant" groups and has little to do with the place in confederation of Canadians of Anglo-celtic, French or native origin. The question as to whether or not Anglo-Canadians, French-Canadians and native peoples should or should not be considered part of a national multicultural policy has long been hotly debated. In not including Anglo-Canadian attitudes toward French-Canadians or native peoples, I am not attempting to give credence to the view that multiculturalism does not, or was not intended to deal with them. Government policy aside, Canada is a multicultural country and Anglo-Canadians, French-Canadians and native peoples, as well as the "other ethnic groups" form very important parts. However, the attitudes of Anglo-Canadians toward French-Canadians and native groups are simply too complex and, for the historian cover too great a time span, to deal with in a paper of this length. I have, however, where possible, attempted to discuss how Anglo-Canadian attitudes toward French-Canadians influenced their attitudes toward the "other ethnic groups." This view of multiculturalism as a question concerned primarily with the role of "other ethnic groups" in Canadian society, is I believe, the prevailing view among Anglo-Canadians themselves (with the exception perhaps of some Scots). See below p. 21.

3. G. S. Paul, "Immigrant Composition and Multiculturalism: An Empirical Analysis," Paper presented at conference on Multiculturalism and Third World Immigrants in Canada, Edmonton, September, 1975. By selecting certain types of immigrants, immigration policy has also determined to a considerable degree the class position, regional concentration and ethnic composition of the immigrants who have come to Canada. These three factors — place in the class system, regional distribution and ethnic composition, have all played very important roles in determining Anglo-Canadian attitudes toward multiculturalism.

4. Some might argue that the post 1967 influx of third world immigrants constitutes a fourth wave of immigration, but I have rather arbitrarily included the whole post-World War II period as the third wave of immigration.

5. William Peterson, *Planned Migration* (Berkeley, 1955), pp. 127-137; Claudette Begin-Wolff, "L'Opinion Publique Québécoise Face à l'Immigration, 1906-1913," M.A. Université de Montréal, 1970.

6. For a discussion of these issues, see H. Palmer, *Land of the Second Chance* (Lethbridge, 1972), pp. 257-259.

7. John Berry et al. "Majority Attitudes Study; The Acceptance of Multiculturalism in Canada," Department of the Secretary of State, 1975 p. 74; Nancy Tienhaara, "Canadian Views on Immigration and Population," (Ottawa, 1974), pp. 26-27. H. Palmer, "Nativism and Ethnic Tolerance in Alberta: 1920-1972", Unpublished Ph.D., York University, 1973, p. 367.

8. Robin Winks, *The Blacks in Canada* (New Haven, 1971); Frances Henry, *Forgotten Canadians:* The Blacks of Nova Scotia (Don Mills, Ontario, 1973).

9. This statement is based on a comparison of attitudes as portrayed in the following sources in addition to other studies cited in this paper. C. H. Young, H. Reid and W. A. Carrothers, *Japanese Canadians* (Toronto, 1938); Patricia Roy, "The Oriental 'Menace' in British Columbia," in Susan Trofimenkoff, ed., *The Twenties in Western*

Canada, (Ottawa, 1972), pp. 243-258; John Norris, *Strangers Entertained*, (Vancouver, 1971);W. E. Calderwood, "The Rise and Fall of the Ku Klux Klan in Saskatchewan," unpublished M.A. University of Saskatchewan, Morris Mott, "Nativism in Winnipeg, 1916-1922," unpublished M.A. University of Manitoba, 1970; T. Peterson, "Ethnic and Class Politics in Manitoba," in Martin Robin, ed., *Canadian Provincial Politics*, (Scarborough, Ontario, 1972), pp. 69-115; John Bennett, *Hutterian Brethren* (Stanford, California, 1967); Victor Peters, *All Things Common* (Minneapolis, 1965) G. Woodcock and I. Avakumovic, *The Doukhobors*, (Toronto, 1968) Paul Yuzyk, *The Ukrainians in Manitoba* (Toronto, 1953), Victor Turek, *Poles in Manitoba*, Toronto, 1961).

10. I can find little evidence for the hypothesis that the minority groups from the British Isles — the Irish, Scots, and Welsh, had any more sympathy than people of English origin for the aspirations of the "other ethnic groups." One wonders however if perhaps Anglo-Canadian Catholics have been more sympathetic than Anglo-Canadian Protestants to the aspirations of the Catholic minorities from central and southern Europe. These questions require further research. When it came to their attitudes towards the immigration of central, southern and eastern Europeans and Orientals, Anglo-Canadians were as often as not joined by Canadians of German and Scandinavian origin. When it came to their attitudes toward multiculturalism generally, Anglo-celts were again joined by these same two groups in promoting the assimilation of all ethnic minorities. Ken O'Bryan et al. "Non-Official Languages: A Study in Canadian Multiculturalism," Department of the Secretary of State, 1975; J. T. Torson, *Wanted: A Single Canada*, (Toronto, 1972); Jorgen Dahlie, "Scandinavian Experiences on the Prairie, 1890-1920," Western Canadian Studies Conference, March, 1975.

11. L. G. Thomas, "The Umbrella and the Mosaic: The French-English Presence and the Settlement of the Canadian Prairie West: in J. A. Carroll ed., *Reflections of Western Historians*, (Tuscon, Arizona, 1969) pp. 135-52; Allan Smith, "Metaphor and Nationality in North America," *Canadian Historical Review*, Vol. 51 #3, September, 1970.

12 "WASP" stands of course for white, Anglo-Saxon Protestant. Since it is more familiar, I have used it in preference to the more accurate "WACP" — white Anglo-celtic Protestant.

13. The Canadian census has consistently classed the Irish as part of the "British" group.

14. Howard Palmer, *Land of the Second Chance: A History of Ethnic Groups in Southern Alberta*, Lethbridge, 1972; Norman Macdonald, *Canada Immigration and Colonization, 1841-1903*, Toronto, 1967; Harold Troper *Only Farmers Need Apply*, Toronto, 1972.

15. Donald Avery, "Canadian Immigration Policy and the Foreign Navvy", *Canadian Historical Association Reports*, 1972; Edmund Bradwin, *Bunkhouse Man*, New York, 1928, H. Troper and R. Harney, *Immigrants*, Toronto, 1975.

16. Donald Avery, "Canadian Immigration Policy, 1896-1919: The Anglo-Canadian Perspective." Unpublished Ph.D., University of Western Ontario, 1973. Cornelius Jaenan, "Federal Policy Vis-à-Vis Ethnic Groups", unpublished paper, Ottawa, 1971; Howard Palmer, "Nativism and Ethnic Tolerance in Alberta, 1880-1920", unpublished M.A., University of Alberta, 1971; "Nativism and Ethnic Tolerance in Alberta, 1920-1972, unpublished Ph.D., York University, 1973.

17. H. Palmer, "Nativism and Ethnic Tolerance in Alberta, 1880-1920", unpublished M.A. University of Alberta, 1971, Chapters 1 and 2; H. Troper *Only Farmers Need Apply* (Toronto, 1972); D. J. Hall, "Clifford Sifton: Immigration and Settlement Policy, 1896-1905". Unpublished Paper delivered to western Canadian studies conference, 1975.

18. H. Troper, "The Creek Negroes of Oklahoma and Canadian Immigration, 1909-11". *Canadian Historical Review*, September, 1972, p. 272-288.

19. Rev. George Bryce, "Past and Future of Our Race", *Proceedings*, Canadian Club of Toronto, 1911, p. 6-7; C. A. Magrath, *Canada's Growth and Problems Affecting It*, (Ottawa, 1910); Goldwin Smith in *Weekly Sun*, Feb. 1, 1899, Sept. 17, 1902, Sept. 23, 1903, May 18, 1904, Aug. 16, 1905; W. A. Griesbach, *I Remember*, Toronto, 1946, pp. 214-217, 220-221.

20. Carl Berger, *Sense of Power*, Toronto, 1970, p. 117-188.

21. Morton, *In A Sea of Sterile Mountains*, Vancouver, 1974; W. P. Ward, "The Oriental Immigrant and Canada's Protestant Clergy, 1858-1925", *B.C. Studies*, Summer, 1974 p. 40-55; Ted Ferguson, *A White Man's Country*, Toronto, 1975.

22. D. J. Hall, "Clifford Sifton: Immigration and Settlement Policy: 1896-1905". Unpublished paper delivered to Western Canadian Studies Conference, 1975, p. 35.

23. W. L. Morton, *Manitoba*, A History, Toronto, 1957, p. 161, 162.

24. J. B. Hedges, *Building the Canadian West*, New York, 1939; Frank Epp, *Mennonites in Canada*, 1786-1920, Toronto, 1974.

25. Cornelius J. Jaenen, "Ruthenian Schools in Western Canada 1897-1919", *Paedagogica Historica*, Intrnational Journal of the History of Education, X. 3; 1970, pp. 517-541. Donald Avery, "Canadian Immigration Policy", pp. 374-420.

26. Avery, Ibid. p. 408.

27. Kate Foster, *Our Canadian Mosaic*, Toronto, 1926; J. T. M. Anderson, *The Education of the New Canadian*, Toronto, 1918; C. B. Sissons, *Bi-Lingual Schools in Canada*, Toronto, 1917; W. G. Smith, *Building the Nation*, Toronto, 1922. For a discussion of some of the concrete activities involved in these "Canadianization" programs, see R. Harney and H. Troper, *Immigrants* Chapter 4.

28. *Calgary Eye-Opener*, Oct. 5, 1918.

29. Ibid.

30. J. S. Woodsworth, *Strangers Within our Gates*, Winnipeg, 1909; Marilyn Barber, "Nationalism, Nativism and the Social Gospel: The Protestant Church Response to Foreign Immigrants in Western Canada, 1897-1914" in Richard Allen ed. *The Social Gospel in Canada*, Ottawa, 1975, pp. 186-226.

31. Quoted in Barbara Nicholson, "Feminism in the Prairie Provinces to 1916", unpublished M.A. University of Calgary, 1974, p. 71. For the views of womens' groups on immigration and the role of immigrants in Canada society, see Ibid. p. 83-85, 86, 114, 121, 133, 165-169, 186-187.

32. Reported in *Lethbridge Herald* May 29, 1919.

33. J. S. Woodsworth, "Social Conditions in Rural Communities in the Prairie Provinces", Winnipeg, 1917, p. 38.

34. For a fairly extensive chronicling of patterns of discrimination against a number of minority groups see Morris Davis and J. F. Krauter, *The Other Canadians*, Toronto, 1971.

35. For an analysis of the various causes of ethnic stratification (settlement patterns, time of arrival, immigrant and ethnic occupations, ethnic values, language barriers and discrimination and exploitation) see Book IV. *Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism*, Ottawa, 1969, Chapter 2.

36. Carole Henderson, "The Ethnicity Factor in Anglo-Canadian Folkloristics", *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, Vol. VII No. 2, forthcoming.

37. *Canadian Annual Review*, 1923, p. 264-265; 1924-25, p. 190-192.

38. *Canada Year Book*, 1941, p. 733.

39. Olha Woycenko, *The Ukrainians in Canada* (Winnipeg, 1967); Victor Turek, *Poles in Manitoba* (Toronto, 1967), p. 43; J. M. Kirschbaum, *Slovaks in Canada* (Toronto, 1967), p. 101; Edmund Heier, "A Study of German Lutheran and Catholic Immigrants in Canada formerly residing in Czarist and Soviet Russia", unpublished M.A. (University of British Columbia, 1955) Chapter 3.

40. R. B. Bennett, House of Commons *Debates*, June 7, 1929, p. 3925-7.

41. Ibid.

42. H. Palmer, "Nativism in Alberta," 1925-1930. *Canadian Historical Assoc. Reports*, 1974. pp. 191-199.

43. G. E. Lloyd, "National Building", *Banff Crag and Canyon*, Aug. 17, 1928.

44. A. R. M. Lower, *Canadians in the Making*, Don Mills Ontario, 1958. Chapter 22, 27.

45. J. S. Woodsworth, "Nation Building," *University Magazine*, 1917 pp. 85-99. F. W. Baumgartner, "Central European Immigration", *Queen's Quarterly* (Winter, 1930,) p. 183-192; Walter Murray, "Continental Europeans in Western Canada", *Queen's Quarterly*, 1931; P. M. Bryce, *The Value of the Continental Immigrant to Canada* (Ottawa, 1928), E. L. Chicanot, "Homesteading the Citizen; Canadian Festivals Promote Cultural Exchange", *Commonwealth*, May, 1929, p. 94-95; E. K. Chicanot, Moulding a Nation", *Dalhousie Review*, July, 1929. pp. 232-237. J. H. Haslam, "Canadianization of the Immigrant Settler", *Annals*, May, 1923, pp. 45-49; E. H. Oliver, "The Settlement of Saskatchewan to 1914", *Transactions of the Royal Society*, 1926, pp. 63-87; Agnes Laut, "Comparing the Canadian and American Melting Pots", *Current Opinion*, Vol. 70, April, 1921, pp. 458-462; Kate Foster *Our Canadian Mosaic* (Toronto, 1926). Robert England, "Continental Europeans in Western Canada", *Queen's Quarterly*, 1931.

46. Robert England, *The Central European Immigrent in Canada* (Toronto, 1929).

47. John Blue, *Alberta Past and Present* (Chicago, 1924) p. 210.

48. There were some advocates of the melting pot prior to 1920, but did not gain widespread acceptance until the 1920's. See H. Palmer, "Nativism in Alberta, 1880-1920" Chapter 1. Marilyn Barber, "Nationalism, Nativism, and the Social Gospel".

49. Douglas Cole, "John S. Ewart and Canadian Nationalism", *Canadian Historical Association Report*, 1969, p. 66.

50. John Diefenbaker, *One Canada*, Toronto, 1975, p. 140, 141, 218-19, 274.

51. John Higham, *Strangers in the Land*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1967) Chapters 10, 11.

52. H. Palmer, "Nativism in Alberta, 1920-1972" Chapter 3.

53. James Gray, *The Roar of the Twenties*, (Toronto, 1975) Chapter 11; Lita-Rose Betcherman, *The Swastika and the Maple Leaf*, (Don Mills, Ontario) 1975.

54. Barry Broadfoot, *Ten Lost Years*, p. 25, 70, 76, 132, 156-164, 186, 279.

55. Ibid p. 132.

56. Ibid p. 186.

57. Ivan Avakumovic, *The Communist Party in Canada: A History*, (Toronto, 1975) p. 66-67: Lita Rose Betcherman, *The Swastika and the Maple Leaf*, Chapter 5.

58. Ibid.

59. H. Palmer, "Nativism in Alberta, 1920-1972" Chapter 3.

60. M. A. Jones, *American Immigration*, (Chicago, 1960) p. 298. For fictional treatments of the second generations' repudiation of the ethnic past in an attempt to become accepted see John Marlyn, *Under the Ribs of Death*, (Toronto, 1951) and Magdalena Eggleston, *Mountain Shadows*, (New York, 1955) p. 122. See also *Change of Name*, Toronto: Canadian Institute of Cultural Research, 1965.

61. Watson Kirkconnell, *The European Heritage, A Synopsis of European Cultural Achievement*, London, 1930; *Canadian Overtones*, Winnipeg, 1935. For a complete listing of Kirkconnell's work, see the list in his memoirs, *A Slice of Canada* (Toronto, 1967) p. 374-375. For an assessment of his work see J. R. C. Perkin ed. *The Undoing of Babel*. (Toronto, 1975).

62. W. Kirkconnell, Trans., *Canadian Overtones*, preface.

63. Watson Kirkconnell, *Canada Europe and Hitler*, (Toronto, 1939).

64. W. Kirkconnell, *A Slice of Canada*.

65. H. Palmer, *Land of the Second Chance* (Lethbridge, 1972) p. 43-48; 99, 207. A. Spada, *The Italians in Canada*, Montreal 1969, Chapter 8.

66. Forrest Laviolette, *Canadian Japanese and World War II*, (Toronto, 1948).

67. J. W. Pickersgill and D. F. Forster, *The Mackenzie King Record:* Vol. 4, 1947-48, (Toronto, 1970), pp. 234-35.

68. See Robin Winks, *Blacks in Canada*, (New Haven, 1971) p. 423 for discussion of how World War II was instrumental in improving the status of blacks in Canada.

69. W. L. Mackenzie King, House of Commons *Debates*, May 1, 1947 pp. 2644-6.

70. W. L. Mackenzie King, House of Commons *Debates*, May 1, 1947 pp. 2644-6.

71. Although immigration policy and prevailing Anglo-Canadian attitudes emphasized the need for "assimilable" immigrants, the federal government's policy concerning the role of immigrants and ethnic groups in Canadian society was not strictly assimilationist during the 1950's. The Citizenship Branch, the post-war successor to the Nationalities Branch of the Department of National War Services, concerned itself with the linguistic, social and cultural adjustment of immigrants to life in Canada and their acceptance by Canadians. The branch defined its objective as that of achieving the "integration" of immigrants and ethnic groups. This could mean either the melting pot or cultural pluralist approach, depending on which government was in power or which civil servant was interpreting the policy. Most often, however, "integration" approached the cultural pluralist ideal; it envisioned the retention of the immigrants' cultural identity, coupled with full participation at all levels of Canadian economic and political life. H. Palmer, "Nativism in Alberta: 1920-1972" p. 288-292.

72. Between 1941 and 1961, the proportion of people of non-British, non-French origin showed the following increases: Manitoba – from 43 to 48%; Saskatchewan – from 45 to 50%; Alberta — from 44 to 49%. British Columbia remained at 37%. Census of Canada, 1941, 1961.

73. W. L. Morton "The Historical Phenomenon of Minorities: The Canadian Experience," International Congress of Historical Sciences, August, 1975. p. 26.

74. Nancy Tienhaara, *Canadian Views on Immigration and Population*, (Ottawa, 1975) p. 19.

    Several qualifications should be made however to this picture of the growing acceptance of immigrants in the post-war period. Attitudes toward immigration varied in different regions of English-speaking Canada in the post-war period (though no region was consistently more favorable or unfavorable in its attitudes.) Attitudes varied by age and sex with women generally more negative toward immigration. Education played a very important factor in determining attitudes with more highly educated people more favorable toward immigration. Occupation was also important in determining attitudes with unskilled labor and the unemployed more negative in their attitude toward immigration. Attitudes also became slightly more restrictive during the 1950's than they had been in the immediate post-war period. Tienhaara, Ibid p. 20-36.

75. William Petersen, *Planned Migration: The Social Determinants of the Dutch-Canadian Movement*, (Berkeley, 1955). For a full discussion of post-war immigration policy see Freda Hawkins, *Canada and Immigration* (Montreal, 1972).

76. Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Book IV, *The Cultural Contribution of the Other Ethnic Groups*, Ottawa, 1970, p. 29.

77. Anthony Richmond, *Ethnic Residential Segregation in Metropolitan Toronto*, Toronto, Institute for Behavioural Research, York University.

78. H. Palmer, "Nativism in Alberta, 1920-1972" Chapters 5-6.

79. H. Palmer, *Land of the Second Chance*, Chapters 6, 7, 8.

80. H. Palmer, *"Nativism and Ethnic Tolerance in Alberta"*, Chapter 5.

81. Tienhaara, *"Canadian Views on Immigration and Population"*, Chapter 2.

82. For a detailed discussion and documentation of the impact of the Royal Commission on the development of pluralist ideas see H. Palmer, *"Nativism in Alberta"*, Chapter 6.

83. John Porter, "Dilemmas and Contradictions of a Multi-Ethnic Society", *Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada*, Vol. 10 #4, 1972, pp. 193-205.
In his article, "Ethnic Pluralism in Canadian Perspective" in *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience*, edited by Nathan Glazer and D. P. Moynihan, (Cambridge, Mass. 1975) p. 267-304, Porter gives a comprehensive statement of his opposition to multiculturalism which he sees as "regressive," and attempts to refute some of the arguments for multiculturalism.

84. Porter, *Ibid*

85. For recent discussion on these issues within an American context see Murray Friedman, ed., *Overcoming Middle-Class Rage*, (Philadelphia, 1971); Michael Novak, *The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics*, (Macmillan 1972); Andrew M. Greeley, "The Rediscovery of Diversity", *Antioch Review*, Fall, 1971, p. 343-365; Harold R. Issacs, "The New Pluralists", *Commentary*, March, 1972, pp. 68-73, and the articles by John Highman, Michael Novak, and Gunnar Myrdal in *Center* magazine, July/August, 1974.

86. An informal analysis which I conducted of grants given under the multicultural program suggests that left-wing ethnic groups have not been excluded from the grants program, although some extreme right wing ethnic groups have.

87. *Montreal Gazette*, Oct. 9, 1971.

88. Federal Government's Response to Book IV of the "Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism," Oct. 1971, p. 3.

89. John Higham "Integration vs. Pluralism: Another American Dilemma", *Center Magazine*, Oct./Nov. 1974, pp. 67-68. W. L. Morton also points to the dilemma of individual vs. group rights in his discussion of minorities in Canadian society. W. L. Morton, "The Historical Phenomenon of Minorities: The Canadian Experience" p. 44.

90. *Toronto Star*, Oct. 16, 1971; June 13, 1972.

91. For one point of view, see H. Palmer "Canada: Bicultural or Multicultural?" *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, June, 1971, pp. 113-114.

92. R. R. H., "In the Bosom of a Single State", *Journal of Canadian Studies*, November, 1971, pp. 1-2, 63-64.

93. A. K. Davis, "The Politics of Multiculturalism and Third-World Communities in Canada: A Dialectical View", paper presented to Conference on Multiculturalism and Third World Immigrants, Edmonton, September, 1975.

116

94. Jean Burnet, "Ethnic Relations and Ethnic Policies in Canadian Society", paper delivered at the IX International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences, Chicago, 1973: "The Policy of Multiculturalism within a Bilingual Framework: An Interpretation", in A. Wolfgang *The Education of Immigrant Children* (Toronto, 1975); "Multiculturalism, immigration and racism: a comment on the Canadian Immigration and Population Study", *Canadian Ethnic Studies* Vol. 7 #1, 1975; "The Definition of Multiculturalism in a Bilingual Framework" Paper presented at Conference on Multiculturalism and Third World Immigrants, Edmonton, September, 1975.

95. Jean Burnet, "The Policy of Multiculturalism within a Bilingual Framework". It seems to me her view that sociologically speaking Canada is multi-ethnic rather than multicultural is basically accurate, although perhaps it does not adequately take into account the rural subcultures of Hutterites, Ukrainians, and Doukhobors, nor the urban subcultures of the new immigrants from China, Italy, Portugal, and Greece. It must also be realized that in calling Canada multicultural, the federal government, and various provincial governments, are not trying to make a definitive sociological analysis of Canadian society. Politicians are operating within a historical framework of a political and constitutional dialogue about Canada. Once Canada had been defined as bicultural, its redefinition as multicultural was inevitable, if the "other ethnic groups" were to be given recognition.

96. John Berry et al., "Majority Attitudes Study," Interim Report January, 1975. Chapter 8.

97. Ibid. p. 87.

98. Two other studies, done in Edmonton and Toronto indicate a fairly strong support for multiculturalism in these cities. The Toronto study conducted in 1970 found that 68% of the total population and 62% of those of British origin favored a multicultural society while a 1974 Edmonton study found that 61% of the total population supported multiculturalism. Anthony Richmond, *Ethnic Residential Segregation in Metropolitan Toronto* Table IV.7; Gurbachan Paul, "Immigrant Composition and Multiculturalism: An Empirical Analysis".

99. Berry, Chapter 5.

100. For a detailed analysis of French-Canadian attitudes, see Ibid. pp. 94-96.

101. On a scale of 7 with 7 being the most positive toward multiculturalism, the Anglo-celtic score was 4.68, English-speaking ethnic minorities scored 4.62, French-speaking ethnic minorities scored 4.31, and French-Canadians 3.98. Ibid. p. 74.

102. Ken O'Bryan et al., "Non-Official Languages: A Study in Canadian Multiculturalism," Ottawa, Department of the Secretary of State, 1975.

103. Berry et al., p. 80.

104. Ibid. p. 87.

105. Quotes in this paragraph taken from questions used in the survey.

106. Ibid. p. 76.

107. J. S. Frideres, "Prejudice and Discrimination in Western Canada: First and Third World immigrants," paper presented to conference on Multiculturalism and Third World Immigrants, Edmonton, September, 1975.

108. J. S. Frideres, "Multiculturalism and Third World Immigrants: A Report on a National Conference", *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, forthcoming.

109. Marlene Mackie, "Ethnic Stereotypes and Prejudice: Alberta Indians, Hutterites and Ukrainians", *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, Vol. 6, 1974, p. 48. Leo Driedger and Jacob Peters, "Ethnic Identity and Social Distance: A Comparison of Ethnic Groups" Table 1; Paper presented to 1974 meetings of the Canadian Association of Sociology and Anthropology, Toronto, August, 1974.

110. "Majority Attitudes Study," Chapter 5.

111. Anthony Richmond, *Ethnic Residential Segregation in Metropolitan Toronto*. Jim Frideres, "Prejudice and Discrimination in Western Canada." Jim Frideres, Discrimination in Western Canada," *Race* XXV, 2(1973) pp. 213-222.

112. A. Richmond, "The Green Paper: Reflections on the Canadian Immigration and Population Study" and Warren Kalbach, "The National Conference on Canadian Immigration and the Green Paper in Retrospect" in *Canadian Ethnic Studies* Vol. 7, #1.

113. Tienhaara, "Canadian Views on Immigration and Population," Chapter 2.

114. Certainly not all current opposition to immigration stems from racist motives. See for examples the articles, Lorna Marsden, "Population Issues in the Immigration Debate" and C. F. Bently, "Immigration Increases Food Costs" in *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, Vol. 7, #1.

115. The Majority Attitudes Study suggests relatively little concern about non-white immigration, while studies by Paul and Frideres suggest a good deal of concern. Gurbachan Paul, "Immigrant Composition and Multiculturalism;" James Frideres, "Prejudice and Discrimination in Western Canada."

116. Jim Frideres, "Prejudice and Discrimination in Western Canada," Table 4; Anthony Richmond, "Black and Asian Immigrants in Britain and Canada: Experiences of Prejudice and Discrimination," paper presented at a conference on Multiculturalism and Third World Immigrants in Canada, Edmonton, September, 1975, Table 8. Palmer, "Nativism in Alberta: 1920-1972," pp. 360-372.

117. Peter Newman, *The Canadian Establishment* (Toronto, 1975); Merrijoy Kelner, "Ethnic Penetration into Toronto's Elite Structure. *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology*, Vol. 7, pp. 128-137. Wallace Clement, *The Canadian Corporate Elite: An Analysis of Economic Power*, Toronto, 1975, pp. 237-238.

118. Bishop G. E. Lloyd, quoted in *Manitoba Free Press*, July 18, 1928.

Address delivered

by

The Honourable John Munro

Minister Responsible for Multiculturalism

Pluralism is nothing new in Canada. This is a huge, diverse country. From the very beginning, its very nature has demanded a recognition of this diversity. The influences shaping life on the prairies were very different from the factors affecting the lives of the fishermen on the coast of Newfoundland.

This fact of Canadian life was reflected in our choice of a federal system of government. By choosing a confederated system which gave considerable leeway to its various parts. Canadians recognized that to be a nation they must be sufficiently flexible to respond to the differing needs of Canadians throughout the country.

Cultural pluralism is also no stranger to Canada. The history and development of this country is very much the story of successive immigrations and the interaction of these groups with the existing society. How they adapted their way of life to the Canadian context has been and will continue to be one of the determining forces in establishing a Canadian identity.

Adapting to Canadian way of life and its pressures, however, has not meant a loss of identity. Rather it has meant a drawing on and sharing of experiences and values. Native Indians, for example, retained their way of life even in the face of massive English and French immigration. The English and French often drew upon the native culture for success as well as survival. In turn each successive wave of immigration drew from the emerging Canadian culture and added to it at the same time.

In spite of time; in spite of change; in spite of social pressures Canadians of all heritages have retained their churches, their long houses, their clubs, their community halls, their songs and to some degree their language. In short, they have retained their cultures.

This cultural retention is dynamic. It not only reflects the roots of various groups, but it often reflects contemporary Canadian experience. You have only to look at William Kurelek's paintings of his boyhood on the prairies to realize how Canadian, for example, Ukrainian-Canadian culture really is.

Any discussion of the future of Canadian society cannot be conducted realistically without involving the very significant number of Canadians whose heritage is other than French or English. This goes to the very roots of what we mean by democracy in Canada. Do we mean a democracy where only numbers count? Or is the democracy of which we boast a participatory system which recognizes an obligation to see that all its citizens have a chance to grow and fulfil their needs in the society? Does democracy mean small voices are ignored because they are small? Or is Canadian democracy sufficiently elastic to accommodate the small voices as well as the large?

At the same time this discussion must include the French and English cultural and linguistic facts. These have been enduring and high profile constants in the development of this nation. In another age these were the chief factors that entrenched the institutional framework of this country. They remain powerful factors in Canadian life today and will remain so in the future.

In short, then, any discussion of Canadian cultural policy cannot be a dialogue. It must be a many sided affair. We must not only talk to each other. We must listen to one another as well.

Yesterday and today, I think, have been constructive in this way. There have been many viewpoints expressed. Some have been supportive of multiculturalism as a policy and a concept; others have not.

Frankly, I hope this conference will stimulate renewed awareness of Canada's cultural diversity. I hope it sparks an active exploration of the common ground that exists among all Canadian cultural groups.

I mean this. Because if we don't, I think the bold goals we have for this country as a nation will suffer serious harm.

My own purpose in speaking tonight is to outline how I, as the Minister responsible, see this policy as an instrument for building unity in this country. Here and now I reaffirm the government's commitment to multiculturalism both as an active government policy and a fundamental cornerstone of the society we are trying to build in Canada.

I do not want to minimize the difficulties in reconciling the different perspectives that have been presented here. I believe this can be done. It will only be done, however, if Canadians understand the basic tenets and reasoning behind the adoption of the concept as official government policy in 1971.

As I pointed out earlier, cultural diversity is not new in Canada. It has existed for generations.

In the course of the last decade it became evident, however, that a sort of benign neglect of cultural policy was no longer sufficient. The tremendous pace of social, political and economic change brought to the forefront some longstanding deeply-held aspirations of Canadians.

These aspirations of the French-Canadian population on the one hand, and members of ethnic minorities on the other, demanded some concrete positive government recognition and action. These aspirations were legitimate. They conformed to longstanding realities in Canada.

Two policies were adopted to give concrete recognition and government support to their realization. Bilingualism and multiculturalism were a recognition of the fact that a democracy such as ours has an obligation to assist its citizens to full participation in the national life of their country. If a Canadian identity is worth fostering and protecting against powerful outside influences; if a Canadian identity is a prerequisite of national unity, then it is equally important that the individual parts that form that identity also be encouraged and buffered against powerful forces which they are hard-pressed to resist unaided.

Both policies were seen as fundamental pillars on which to build national unity.

In the case of multiculturalism, the Prime Minister outlines the policy this way: I quote.

> "National unity, if it is to mean anything in a deeply personal sense, must be founded on confidence in one's own individual identity; out of this can grow respect for others and a willingness to share ideas, attitudes and assumptions."

In other words, multiculturalism was seen as a fundamental way of building a more tolerant and compassionate Canadian community, a community in which all cultures are respected; a community with which all Canadians can identify.

The Prime Minister went on to outline four objectives for the policy: Let me repeat them in full.

> "First, resources permitting, the government will seek to assist all Canadian cultural groups that have demonstrated a desire and effort to continue to develop, a capacity to grow and contribute to Canada, a clear need for assistance, the small and weak groups no less than the strong and highly organized."
>
> "Second, the government will assist members of all cultural groups to overcome cultural barriers to full participation in Canadian society."
>
> "Third, the government will promote creative encounters and interchange among all Canadian cultural groups in the interest of national unity."
>
> "Fourth" — and this is a longstanding function of government — "the government will continue to assist immigrants to acquire at least one of Canada's official languages in order to become full participants in Canadian society."

This was the policy then. It is the policy now. As far as the government is concerned, support for multiculturalism which was endorsed by all political parties in the House of Commons remains as strong now as it was in 1971.

At this point, I would like to turn my attention to some of the misconceptions that have swirled around this policy since its inception. Some of them have been raised here this weekend. I am not surprised that misconceptions exist. The policy is, after all, relatively young. It is important for anyone interested in strengthening this concept, however, to set the record straight, and keep it straight.

Some people have called multiculturalism a "cheap political bone" thrown to so-called "professional ethnics." They have said it is a bone which

Canadians of non-British and non-French descent neither need nor want. Other critics perceive the policy as an English plot to subvert official bilingualism and to deny French-Canadians their due voice in the political system. Still others have viewed this as an exercise in political tokenism designed to camouflage an actual policy of biculturalism. They have charged that it, in effect, makes second-class citizens of Canadians of non-British and non-French origin.

None of these contradictory conceptions is correct. They do not correspond to the reality. They distort the intentions and practice of this government.

In the first place, the policy as enunciated by the Prime Minister in 1971, was and is intended for ALL Canadians — not just for ethnic minority groups.

This was made quite explicit when the Prime Minister said: Again I quote:

> "There cannot be a cultural policy for Canadians of British and French origin, another for the original peoples and yet a third for all others."

He went on to say:

> "For although there are two official languages, there is no official culture, nor does any ethnic group take precedence over any other. No citizen nor group of citizens is other than Canadian, and all should be treated fairly."

Multiculturalism as an official policy within a framework of official bilingualism was the government's response to a widespread desire of Canadians for fundamental equality. It was a statement that all citizens should enjoy all the benefits of Canadian society irrespective of their ethno-cultural background. It is an equality and unity that can only be found in a partnership of all Canadians. And partnerships, to be meaningful, must be based on reciprocity and respect for each other's individuality.

This is why the government considers the policies of multiculturalism and official bilingualism as complementary and mutually supportive. This is why it views these two policies as logical and consistent applications of fundamental principles to the realm of linguistic and cultural expression.

There cannot be multiculturalism in Canada without bilingualism, and vice-versa. Those who support the one and oppose the other are undermining the rationale of their own position. Denial of equality between the French and English languages is a denial of the historic, demographic and political French fact that has shaped Canada's identity. Similarly, denial of multiculturalism — to insist on the assimilation of minority groups, even if it were possible — would decisively tilt the demographic balance in favour of the English-speaking majority. I think it's fair to say that those who would renounce their own heritage would be the most vociferous opponents of a bilingual and bicultural policy.

Much is made of the semantic separation of language and culture. There is no doubt in my mind that the two are tied closely together. Indeed, I believe it is possible to argue that francophone aspirations both in terms of language and cultural development across Canada can be served by an alliance

with ethnic minorities whose aspirations are similar. It would not be a new or unprecedented development in Canada for these two elements to band together to preserve their identity against the strong cultural influences towards a North American conformity.

What about general attitudes towards the concept? The very recent Majority Attitudes Study shows that the majority of Canadians are still unaware of this policy. Those who are, generally perceive it in terms of government allowing immigrants to maintain their customs.

The study, which is a welcome addition to a badly neglected area of research, found a fairly positive climate for the promotion of the policy in Canada. I also note, however, there is a perceptible decline in acceptance as one moves from moral to concrete support.

I take some modest encouragement from this result — considering the general lack of knowledge of government policies and the short existence of the policy.

Having said that, these initial findings do little to reassure me that multiculturalism is solidly entrenched or to convince me that multiculturalism is impregnable to a reversal in the general climate of acceptance. My concerns in this regard are strengthened when I read in the summary of this report that, quote:

> "It may be that Canadians think that the idea of multiculturalism is good, that some of the programs are fun, but they do not want to get involved."

I am concerned when I see that there is reluctance to allow qualified, highly skilled immigrants to fully use their abilities; it concerns but doesn't surprise me to find that preferences are still defined along racial and cultural lines. This tends to confirm what many members of minority groups have told me; what Rosemary Brown made so passionately clear last night. There are still cultural barriers to upward mobility in Canada.

I think these things should concern you, multiculturalism, you know, does not and cannot exist in isolation. It cannot escape the crosscurrents that are racing through society. It is affected by the communications explosion, by events beyond our borders, by the economic climate and many other things.

It disturbs me to see serious university researchers suggest that multicultural activities are seen as fun for others. To me, that is a patronizing view. It is demeaning. It works against everything that cultural groups have struggled to achieve in Canada.

You know it's no secret that, in times of economic restraint such as we are now undergoing, there is a tendency to look critically at other members of society to see they are not getting something extra.

Minority ethno-cultural groups deserve every penny that is put into multiculturalism and more. However, that is not going to be the reaction if the policy is viewed as a playground for ethnic groups.

This distorted conception of culture and multiculturalism must be corrected. It must be made clear that multiculturalism is Canada's cultural policy; that everyone, French and English included, has a stake in it.

CS1 124

To achieve this means addressing the broader question of attitudes that give rise to patronizing conceptions of the policy and the role ethnic groups play and have played in Canada. Understanding and respect are achieved by exposure; by contact; by the sharing of attitudes and values that the Prime Minister spoke of in 1971.

In short, the application of the policy should concentrate on those activities which expose the culture of various groups in all its aspects to Canadians generally. The programs should emphasize those projects that will expose in a concrete way the cultural richness and contribution members of minority cultural groups have made and are making to Canada.

These things can be done within the objectives of the policy laid down in 1971. Let me repeat them briefly: first, to support all cultural groups; second, to break down cultural barriers; third, to promote creative encounters; and fourth, to teach immigrants an official language.

By moving more forcefully to meet the second and third objectives — the breaking down of cultural barriers and the promotion of cultural exchanges, I think we can make some meaningful headway on some basic concerns of cultural groups in this country.

Let me outline some of the things I would like to see happen.

There are a number of ethnic histories being developed under our programs now. Some of them are ready for printing, but they are scholarly works which will have limited readerships. I'd like to see them popularized as quickly as possible. I'd like to see them in schools where they could right some of the lopsided views presented as history to our children.

I'd like to see a strong, vital ethnic press both for the general cultural richness it provides and the diversity of opinion it offers a country in which media ownership is concentrated in all too few hands.

I see language retention as a vital factor in cultural and intellectual development. I'd like to do more in this area — through the development of teaching aids — through both direct and indirect assistance to cultural communities themselves.

I'd like to see the CBC and agencies like the National Film Board, which already receive funds specifically for multiculturalism, allocate more of their resources to multicultural projects and goals.

To put more money and time and effort into these areas means there will be less available for elsewhere. Not less money for multiculturalism, but less for other areas of the program. It will mean an adjustment of priorities.

Folkloric activities is an area where we could be more selective in our grants. Too often multiculturalism is seen solely in this context. Folkloric activities are a fundamental aspect of culture. They are only one aspect, however. Some groups have shown for generations that they can and will support many of these activities on their own. If we were more selective in the folkloric activities we fund — if we gave fewer small grants which, frankly, often have an insignificant impact on the wealthier communities —

125

and indeed leave them open to criticism — I believe some meaningful work could be accomplished in the other areas I mentioned.

These are areas which could have substantial impact on public perception of multiculturalism as well as meeting some deeply felt needs of ethno-cultural minorities themselves.

At the opening of this conference you heard this policy called "ethnicing." Rosemary Brown, one of the most eloquent and impassioned defenders of minorities in this country, warned against a cynical exploitation of multiculturalism that will isolate cultural minorities; Monique Bégin spoke of cultural mediocrity, of allowing this policy to be captured by exclusive cultural elites. You have heard that and a great deal more from columnists and noted academics about how this policy and ethno-cultural groups are perceived in this country today.

You may disagree with these perceptions but you cannot ignore them. They are the perceptions of articulate, thoughtful and, above all, influential people in our society. They, and the people they speak for and to, are people you and I and the government must impress if multiculturalism as a state policy is to earn the recognition it deserves and needs to grow and flourish.

It is all very well to demand more money. But if a large segment of this country is at best "indifferent" to this policy, they will not pay. The hard cold facts are that there is tremendous pressure on government to pare spending right now.

As Charles Lynch, one of the more widely read columnists in this country, said: many people in and out of government view multiculturalism as only one issue in Canada right now — and a low priority one at that. Inflation, separatism, regionalism, peace and security are all more urgent. Don't forget either, that these are issues that deeply affect every Canadian. When the government confronts inflation, it is working for ethno-cultural minorities as well as the majority groups.

I said it tonight. I have said it over and over again in the past. The financial resources devoted to multiculturalism are not being cut.

I am the Minister responsible for multiculturalism because I care about this concept. I will not be the Minister who allows this policy to do the very thing it was adopted to combat. I will not see this policy set up cultural barriers. I will not see ethno-cultural groups isolated, patronized or used. I will not see these groups or this policy exposed to attacks on the grounds that multiculturalism is becoming a playground for ethnic elites. Canadians of non-French and non-English origin have come too far and fought too hard for the deserved recognition this policy embraces to permit that.

The dangers were outlined very clearly this weekend. I think they are real as long as the focus of this policy is narrowly perceived; as long as it is seen in the context of scattering scores of small grants around for limited purposes.

I am asking delegates at this conference to be realistic in their demands; be sure what you ask for is what you really want; take a second look at your

communities; take a second look at some of the assistance you have been getting — not all of it — but some of it. Did it have a meaningful impact on the grass-roots of your community? Could it have been used to greater effect?

Multiculturalism presents a challenge to Canadians. It is a rare government policy in a world in which ethnic divisions are often pronounced. It is a policy that prizes understanding and respect for others. It should be a vital, dynamic instrument with which to build a unified nation.

If Canadians succeed in making it work, they will have achieved something lasting — both in a personal and national sense. If they can or will not, not only Canada but all Canadians will be the losers.

5

Non-Official Languages Study

A Review of the Principle Results

by

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The Non-Official Languages Survey was conducted to examine the main patterns of non-official language knowledge and use in Canada, and to ascertain whether there is a real desire to support the retention of such languages as a viable source of cultural identity and preservation, among members of groups whose ancestral language is other than English or French. The survey accomplished this objective, and at the same time has created a very rich and unique data bank on Canadian ethnic groups.

In the report on Non-Official Languages it was possible only to touch on the most salient issues around which the study was planned and we included as many tables and analyses summaries as possible to better illustrate the breadth, depth and complexity of the information. We were at the time, concerned mainly with providing government officials with information on which to base policy decisions and to offer statistical information in the general field of multiculturalism. We have available all marginal data and all coded data on tape and these can be easily and readily accessed to provide additional analyses on request. In this paper we will not again present data tables, which appear in the report itself. We will concentrate instead on attempting to assess the results in terms of their reflection of some part of the reality of language retention in multiculturalism.

In assessing and interpreting the results of the study, it is important to remember that it dealt only with large metropolitan samples and the reader should bear in mind that the other segments of each group, small-urban and rural, may differ perhaps markedly.

Overall, we found that substantial group-by-group differences exist on nearly all variables included in the study. Moreover, the group differences did not always follow the same pattern. Quite clearly, it is erroneous to speak of Canada's residents of other than French or English ancestry as though they are a homogeneous "group." They certainly have in common the fact that

their origins are different from those of the French or English, but it does not follow that they all stand in the same attitudinal and functional relation to the French and the English. Some have become assimilated and seem to have lost or discarded altogether the heritage of their ancestry. Others are vigorously aware of their origin. Therefore, total group data is often without meaning until it is broken down on a group-by-group basis. Indeed, the total group data cannot be taken to reflect accurately each specific group's points of view, nor level of knowledge, use or support for the language.

Therefore, we believe that policymaking and research would be ill-founded if based on a pre-supposition that the non-official language groups constitute a homogeneous entity. Nevertheless, it is clear that for *many groups,* ethnic heritage survival, and especially language survival, is a key concern which has very substantial social and emotional impact. This was very well illustrated in the data that we collected and analysed, and it leads us to conclude that both the principle and practice of multiculturalism are most valid and desirable when they are applied in the recognition of specific ethnic group aspirations. These aspirations are often powerfully expressed and illustrate the degree to which some groups in various ways view themselves as representatives of Canadians whose origins are other than English or French. But, it is clear in our data that some members of Canada's "cultural mosaic" seek to reflect their cultural origins more brightly than do others.

Non-Official Language Knowledge

The extent of current knowledge of the non-official languages is basic to an assessment of group support of language retention in relation to multiculturalism. Since, we were unable to administer any actual tests of language knowledge, our findings are based entirely on self report and are, consequently, liable to some error. Nevertheless, self-reported fluency is itself a valid variable and our results very clearly indicate that there currently exists quite extensive knowledge of non-official languages in Canada. This can be considered an immense cultural resource. It is however, almost lost in a single generation. In a number of groups fluency may be lost even more quickly. Indeed, only seven in ten immigrants overall reported retention of full fluency. Some of this loss may be attributable to a "never was" condition since reading and writing skills were included in our fluency criteria. In any case, fluency was reported by only one in ten in the second generation, and had disappeared entirely in third and subsequent generations. Its fading was accompanied by a general loss of even partial knowledge of the language.

Some group differences in generation-specific rates of language retention were found, but these were actually rather minor differences. As matters now stand, the generational transition is a powerful force in language loss, even among those groups possessing the higher retention rates. We were able to present clear evidence that by the third generation the question is not one of retention but of reacquisition and primary acquisition. Despite the vast reservoir of language knowledge held in Canada by first generation settlers,

without direct and possibly substantial assistance, the non-official language skills will accentuate quickly in their children, and their grandchildren will know little if anything of their linguistic heritage. It becomes obvious, from the data obtained on this variable, that under current conditions, language knowledge is not generally transmitted from immigrant parent to Canadian-born child in a fully fluent and permanent form and is inevitably lost to almost all in the natural order of generational succession.

Language knowledge is greater in the two larger of the five cities. One reason for this is the tendency of new immigrants to gather and settle in the bigger metropolitan areas. Another possible explanation may be related to the facilities available for language exercise such as ethnic newspapers, movies and radio programs. Higher concentrations of people in predominately unitary ethnic areas such as is the case with Greeks, Chinese and Italians are also likely to contribute to the quite substantial differentials found between the larger and smaller cities. Again, language knowledge is highly related to certain specific groups. As a result, where large concentrations of Greeks, Chinese, Italians and — in some cases — Ukrainians are present, overall language knowledge is greater. Toronto and Montreal do possess high concentrations of these groups and they also reflect a higher reported fluency rate. By contrast, the Scandinavians and the Dutch consistently tended to depress the overall city statistic on language fluency wherever they were concentrated.

From previous studies it had been expected that education and income differences might be significantly, and negatively, related to current levels of knowledge of language. However, there seems to be only a slight relationship between income and language retention in any of the generational classifications, suggesting that economic success, on a whole group basis, is important neither as a cause nor a consequence of language retention.

The picture is somewhat different when education is considered. Fluency is less among better educated respondents who are, in the most part, of the second and third generation, and who would, on the data, be expected to have such deficits in retention occurring. But even within generational groups, there is some tendency for respondents having more formal education to have lost knowledge of their ancestral language. The reason is evidently unrelated to the greater economic success of well-educated persons, since income was not related to language knowledge. Perhaps those who know the ethnic language seek job opportunities which are not tied to education. There is also the possibility that persons with different educational experiences may use different criteria to assess their own language knowledge. The more well-educated may apply a more rigorous standard and give themselves a lower rating as a result.

Education in Canadian schools may itself tend to militate against language acquisition. The time, and energy, and social experience required to proceed to a university degree may divert attention away from the family and the ethnic community, and may undermine opportunities to retain language fluency. The educational institutions themselves currently make only

minor attempts to develop and support interest in ethnic attachments. Lack of opportunity to study and use the language during the high school and university years when the child is further removed from parental contact may reduce interest in the ethnic language and motivation to retain it.

The evidence of a negative relation between education and language retention needs to be considered when policy or research questions are asked, since it implies that those possessing greater communication skills or, perhaps, social and political awareness, are likely to be less conversant with the language of origin than the less formally educated persons in the same ethnic groups. This may, in some groups, lead to a greater degree of negativism towards language retention from those potentially best able to express their point of view. On the other hand, it should be noted that expressed *support* for language retention tended to decline as years of education increased in some groups, while a reverse relation existed in others. Moreover, in the second and third generations, which may be more important in the long-term perspective, education is sometimes positively associated with *support* for language retention.

Non-Official Language Use

Of those who know their ancestral language at least to some degree, more than half use the language at least once every day, and less than one in ten rarely or never use the language. This clearly substantiates the view that the languages in question are in active and viable usage in Canadian cities. Nevertheless, language use falls off in the second and third generations even more rapidly than does language knowledge. It would seem that opportunity and motivation, as usual in most human endeavour are critical to continued ancestral language use.

Non-official languages are used every day or often by more than three-quarters of Montreal respondents and by nearly as many of Toronto's sample. By contrast, less than half the respondents in the other cities regularly make use of their ancestral language. That the question is more complex than the effect of size of the city is obvious and such variables as generational status, group characteristics, opportunity for use of the language, family, religious and attitudinal patterns, and access to media are, again, involved.

The city-by-city differences found and reported in the study indicate the importance of provision of opportunities for language use and for active language instruction if the language is to survive the natural erosion accompanying the generational transition.

We devoted considerable attention to the social context of non-official language use because such contexts were believed to help define the domains of ethnic salience, as well as the part played by the languages in Canadian life. We found that almost all of the fluent respondents use the ancestral language in whole or in large part in communication with their families, while almost exactly three-quarters used it regularly among close friends. Nearly half of the respondents made *exclusive* use of the ethnic tongue with at least one

member of the family, while more than a third did so with close friends from the same ethnic origin. Language use falls off rapidly as one moves away from the informal and relatively intimate context of family and friends.

The significant exception to the general pattern for some ethnic groups is the use of the language in the context of religion. Overall, more than half spoke with clergy in the ancestral tongue, and the ethnic language is used exclusively with clergy by four out of every ten fluent respondents. This proportion is very similar to the exclusive use figures for family members and it illustrates the importance of religion in language use and retention.

Use of the ancestral tongue in other contexts is less frequent but approximately one-quarter of the fluent respondents made some use of the language among classmates or in their dealing with their tradesmen or professionals. The use of the non-official language outside the family is, of course, dependent upon the availability of people with whom it may be used, and might be expected to increase should there be greater opportunity and support, both financial and moral, for such use.

Among respondents possessing only some knowledge of the language, a substantially similar pattern of language use occurred but with considerably lower frequencies across all variables.

There is good reason to suppose that reduced opportunities to use the language would seriously affect its rate of retention. Where there are strong ethnic communities with a high number of first generation residents, and in which there are professional, trades and religious personnel able to use the non-official language, it can be expected that frequency of retention rates will be high and that essential viability of the language will be maintained. If language use is primarily in the home, as our data tend to indicate is the case, its longevity will be dependent almost exclusively upon its usefulness for familial communication. When all members of the family become fluent in the official language the need, in the narrow sense of family use diminishes, and fluency vanishes. Where, however, there are other real outlets, for example in day-to-day communication with the providers of goods and services, the potential for language use is substantially improved.

For a true picture of language use, it is necessary to turn to each set of group respondents rather than rely on total sample statistics. This is particularly the case in the matter of language use. We have seen that variation between the groups is most marked. As one example, we noted that more than six in ten Greeks used only Greek with family members compared with two in ten Dutch respondents making similar exclusive use. There can be no real justification therefore in treating Greek and Dutch responses in the aggregate as representing combined patterns of non-official language use in the two groups. Nevertheless, the data often reflect substantial similarities among groups. This is especially so between Greeks and Italians who are regularly joined in their viewpoints by the Portuguese, the Chinese and Ukrainians, occasionally by the Poles, rarely by the Hungarians and Germans, and almost never by the Dutch and Scandinavians. But all do share a common trait — knowledge and fre-

quency of use of the language decline together and generational differences are closely linked to this decline. Therefore, we believe that for all groups (whatever their aspirations concerning language retention), unless direct intervention aimed at language preservation is undertaken as early as the second generation, a lack of opportunity and justification for continued use of the ancestral tongue will rapidly reduce and eventually extinguish non-official language knowledge in the descendents of Canada's residents of non-English or non-French origin.

There is no doubt that success for the organizers and producers of the non-official language media is currently very much determined by levels of language knowledge which, as we have seen, is highly related to generation. Thus, there is a potential interaction present between language retention and the effect and success of non-official language media. On the one hand, the media is dependent on retention and, on the other, it can serve as an agent in retention. Fluent respondents do use the ethnic press a great deal; almost three-quarters of them over all groups read non-official language newspapers. This readership was quite evenly spread through all groups. Furthermore, it is strong among groups who have been a long time in Canada while the Portuguese, who are largely a recently arrived group, indicated the least proportion of regular users. The Portuguese experience may be partly a matter of literacy rates, or the lack of a variety of well-established Portuguese language papers. In any case, there is clear evidence that the press is substantially used by a very large proportion of fluent first generation respondents from all groups and as such, represents a powerful agent for potential exploitation in language retention programs should these be desired.

The use of the language by audiences of ethnic television and radio programs was more difficult to measure because of the scattered availability of such programs. However, those who knew of available programs and who reported fluency, or at least some knowledge of the ethnic language, were asked to report the frequency with which they watched or listened. In spite of the scarcity of ethnic television programming, a large group of fluent respondents report regular viewing of known programs and nearly one-quarter watch sometimes. Almost identical results were obtained amongst respondents reporting some knowledge of the language. Ukrainians appeared to be very regular viewers of programs in their language; Italians and Greeks also indicated regular patterns of viewing. The difficulty of the measurement became clear when the statistics for Dutch and Scandinavians were examined. Programming availability was very limited for these respondents and this is clearly an important determinant of viewing frequency. It will always be a very difficult task to accurately interpret patterns of viewing until more programs become available.

Television programming was reportedly much less accessible to respondents than was radio. No more than six in every ten knew of ancestral language television programs broadcast in their area.

The situation with respect to attitudes toward the media is not clear cut. Of respondents who were not aware of any available television programs, a little less than one-third expressed strong interest in the provision of non-official language television while a similar number was somewhat interested. But approximately one-third was not. Very strong support for television programming was shown by Chinese of whom five respondents expressed interest for every one not interested. There were somewhat similar findings for Ukrainians who returned a ratio of approximately four to one, as did Hungarians and Portuguese. By contrast, the Dutch, Germans, Scandinavians and Greeks were almost equally divided.

It is one thing to express a general desire for newspapers or for radio and television programming to be made available and another to actually watch it were it to be provided. It can be said, however, that a substantial number of respondents do read the ethnic press and have, thereby, given evidence of their interest in using the non-official language. These same people would likely be prepared to watch, at least once, programs for television made in the ancestral language. Thereafter, it becomes a question of relative production quality and interest levels. It is a truism that people will watch only what they like in television, and therefore, if an attempt is to be made to develop non-official language programming, that programming will have to be at least as compelling as its competition if it is to be successful.*

The Greeks, Italians and Portuguese were the most aware of radio programs in their local areas. The programs themselves were well supported with almost a quarter of all respondents listening to them regularly. More than a third of our sample among groups for whom radio programs were readily available made extensive use of them and the medium is doubtlessly an important source of language exercise among the first generation respondents.

Apparently, the Chinese and Hungarians are not well served with radio in their respective languages. For the Chinese this may be a fairly complex problem altogether, since there will probably be a variety of languages involved. Nevertheless, both groups reported marked interest in having such programs broadcast.

The radio program appears to be the most flexible current means of providing real-life exercise in language retention. The high degree of its acceptance apparent in our findings indicates that it could play a very important role in efforts designed to maintain non-official language fluency and general use in Canada.

If linguistic diversity is to become a permanent and integrated feature of Canadian society, it may indeed be necessary to encourage the electronic media to provide high quality productions in the various languages. The media have, clearly, a potential following of sufficient number to make them commercially viable if they are qualitatively competitive. It would (in our estimation) be

*It should be pointed out that questions dealing with radio and television in our study were formulated in terms of existing technical facilities. Enquiry was not made into the use, actual and potential, of short-wave radio transmission or about the changes that satellites might introduce in international television reception.

a definite loss to ignore the contribution they might make to the frequency of language use among those who are currently able to do so, and for those who may wish to retain or regain that ability.

The crux of the study and of the philosophy of multiculturalism which gave rise to it, turns on the desire of Canada's non-English or non-French residents to retain their ancestral heritage. In the particular instance of this research, the key variable was expressed support for language retention, and we turn now to an examination of our findings in this issue.

Support for Non-Official Language Retention

Support for retention of the non-official language is very widespread among Canada's metropolitan ethnic groups. However one defines support, whether in terms of absolute numbers, proportions, or intensity, the data very clearly show it to be substantial. In the sampled cities and groups alone, nearly a million persons — almost one-twentieth of Canada's entire population — support the concept of non-official language retention. Moreover, an estimated 400,000 members of ten ethnic groups in five major cities across the country *strongly* support the concept of language retention. Over 150,000 Italians, 66,500 Germans and 54,000 Ukrainians (the three largest ethnic groups sampled) strongly supported language retention, while substantially more in each of these groups were in *general* favour of such a position. An estimated 118,000 persons from the ten groups in the five cities were unfavourably disposed towards language retention, while the remaining 270,000 were indifferent. Overall, 70 percent of the respondents support language retention, and in each group, there is majority agreement that language retention is desirable. Overall, less than one in ten of all respondents were reported to find the concept of support for language retention either somewhat or very undesirable.

Were this a soft voice, or a "motherhood" vote, we might have expected a greater degree of general indifference to have appeared, but there is a most marked consistency in the data that indicates a high degree of reliability in the responses. Our evidence specifically on the intensity of support is consistent with this interpretation. Overall, language loss was mentioned most often as the most serious problem facing the ethnic group, by contrast with problems such as job discrimination or educational opportunities. Almost all of those who support language retention gave specific reasons for their position, but many in the small opposed group gave no reason at all.

The lack of serious opposition to the principle is striking. It is very strong evidence that our residents of other than French or English origin view their language as an important factor which can and should exist in conjunction with the official languages. We found very little to suggest even a moderate urge to suppress the language of origin in favour of the official languages. Furthermore, there are some very powerful group-by-group statistics which force the conclusion that language retention is a key issue among Greeks, Italians, Chinese and Ukrainians. It occupied much less prominence among Hunga-

rians, Scandinavians and Dutch, but even among these groups there was fairly widespread support for language retention.

We believe our data are quite powerful on the issue of support for language retention, and that they clearly point to the need for programs to be developed to meet the expressed views of the respondents concerned. Our data contain also very detailed information on opinions about types of programs which need to be developed, and how they should be financed. On this point there are a number of conflicting views, and it is not possible for all suggestions to be implemented. But it is important to know that opinions do exist on these detailed questions, and should be taken into account in decision-making.

Support for language retention does decline somewhat in the second and third generations, but this decline is much less marked than the decline in actual language knowledge and use. This indicates that current rates of language loss are viewed as unsatisfactory not only by the immigrants, but also by their children and grandchildren. Our data show that highest levels of very favourable views on support were found among first generation respondents while the highest reported indifference and unfavourability were found among second generation and older family respondents. One in five first generation respondents were very favourable towards support, twice as many somewhat favourable, a quarter were indifferent and less than 10 percent unfavourable. Among the other generation respondents, a majority were in favour, and most of the rest were indifferent, rather than opposed.

Much of the support for language retention occurs among those respondents who already possess a substantial degree of knowledge of the tongue concerned. But this was by no means confined to such people only. Many who reported total loss of the ancestral language expressed firmly positive views on supporting its preservation. In other words, there is general support for language preservation by those who have lost it as well as language retention by those who still possess it.

The group-by-group support for language retention across all levels of current language knowledge is formidable evidence that a strongly felt need has been expressed and is worthy of recognition.

On a group-by-group analysis, it was clear that among first generation respondents, Greeks, Ukrainians and Italians expressed the highest percentage favourably disposed towards language retention. Very similar but lower positive intensity results were obtained in groups with sufficient representation for other generations.

Support for language retention does not appear to adopt a curvilinear mode as some scholars have suggested. That is to say, there is no evidence that a decline for support occurs for the second generation followed by a reawakening of interest among the third and older generation respondents. In fact, the data indicate a more linear relationship with a levelling-off effect as generation increases. That a very important relationship between generation and support exists has been demonstrated by the study and this should be taken into account when multicultural policy decisions are being formulated.

Perhaps the greatest significance of the analyses linking generation to support lies in their reflection of the importance that language viability holds for the new settlers in Canada. While there is a reduction of this perceived importance for their children, there is little doubt that official recognition of both a substantive and moral nature would be well appreciated by the majority of Canada's non-official language residents and is actively sought after by several specific groups. We suggest that the data point quite clearly to the areas of greatest receptivity for active government support of preservation of non-official languages and that such support would be generally well received across all generations but primarily in the first and second.

One of our major interests was to see how retention is related to the persistence of ethnic self-identification, that is, whether a person of Italian origin defines himself as "Italian-Canadian," "Canadian of Italian origin" or simply as a "Canadian". Almost half of those defining themselves with a simple ethnic label see language retention as *highly* desirable. Very few found such retention undesirable. Of respondents identifying themselves generally as Ethnic-Canadians or as Canadians of ethnic origin, a third considered retention highly desirable and only one in twenty claimed it to be undesirable. These two groups do differ strongly from respondents who identified themselves as Canadians. But even in this latter group, a majority expressed general support for language retention.

On a group-by-group basis, among those describing themselves using an ethnic label, degree of demand for retention was highest among Greeks, Italians and Chinese and lowest among Scandinavians and Dutch. Scandinavians reported the highest percentage of respondents considering language retention undesirable, but Hungarians, Chinese and Portuguese were also relatively high in this regard.

The pattern is relatively clear-cut: self-identification — which was closely related to generation — is a guide to support for language retention. While the strongest support is definitely located among those who see themselves as still primarily attached to the ancestral country there was, nevertheless, no substantial overall opposition to language retention among most of those who identify as Canadians. Thus, it is suggested that a policy designed to preserve the languages of origin would be popular among non-French and non-English Canadians whether they identify themselves as Canadians or otherwise.

We have some illuminating data on the nature and perceived seriousness of problems confronting the groups in the retention of their language which we intend to consider.

As was mentioned earlier, the groups exhibited a generally consistent pattern in which loss of language was represented as the prime cause of a major, usually *the* major, problem facing the group. This is a particularly interesting finding in the context of the study since, overall, almost a third more respondents listed loss of language over job discrimination in the most serious problem category. That such a finding should appear is very significant indeed, in that it shows clearly the importance placed on language above the

more economically related problem of job discrimination. Furthermore, language loss was considered a more pressing problem than a generalized fading of customs and tradition.

Every group but the newly-arrived Portuguese listed language as the main problem. While it is clear from the data that the mass of respondents were not overly concerned with a multiplicity of issues and that even language loss itself was not considered an overriding concern, there is little doubt that the variable is a key to successful efforts in multicultural preservation.

In specific group terms, it should be noted that Chinese respondents reported the highest level of perceived job discrimination and that members of this group were also concerned about the fragmentation of their communities. We suggest that this latter problem may be a result of changes in the nature of the Chinese sections in the downtown areas of Vancouver and Toronto, where the cohesion of the "Chinatowns" has been threatened by development and rapidly rising taxes. Certainly it is a problem of significance for the Chinese and it is very difficult to offer suggestions for a possible solution. We do have a very substantial data bank on specific groups, such as the Chinese, and we would recommend an early re-visit to that data bank for a closer analysis. These data could be usefully correlated with other information (for example, on the economic break-up of Chinese communities, the program of instruction in Chinese language schools, etc.).

Some of our most intriguing findings concerned the reasons given by respondents for supporting language retention. Very large percentages of respondents expressed reasons related to intra-group use and to direct cultural retention. These data, when combined, show that very large numbers mention two qualities of the non-official language, that of permitting communication between group members and assisting the group to maintain its own integrity and cultural viability.

Of those in favour of support who were asked for reasons why language retention might be undesirable, approximately 10 percent felt that it may prevent mixing between group members and other Canadians. A sensitivity to the possible negative effects of the use of the language on the user's relationship with other Canadians may be present. This might reflect only an awareness of the possibility that others may become uncomfortable when they cannot understand a conversation, or it may indicate a by no means general concern that continued retention of the language directly inhibits relationships with others not of that ancestral language. Should the latter possibility be true, it could imply a disadvantage of such support. A similar trend was evident in responses drawn from those who regarded themselves as indifferent towards language retention and, as might be expected, a large percentage of respondents among those expressing opposition to language retention suggested that non-official language preservation may prevent mixing with other Canadians.

It seems that the mixing question is most prominent as the problem inherent in language retention. We suggest this to be a relevant finding of the study, since it documents a concern of some members of non-official language

groups opposed to language retention. Their views are important since any decisions arising out of the study should also take into account possible effects on Canadians of ethnic origin who may be opposed to language retention.

In this study, those respondents negative to support were generally in a very small minority and were not completely related to a particular generation or to a single non-official language group. There is very powerful evidence that positive reasons for the support of language retention are held by the vast majority of respondents and it is reasonable to assume that policy directions aimed at supporting non-official language would be very well received by the groups involved.

The study examined questions concerning several types of ethnic organizations which might contribute to language retention. Our data showed that participation in organized clubs and groups, other than churches, by members of the sample was not markedly high. While it was not possible to suggest that groups and organizations are not presently factors in ethnic groups' activities in the cities studied, it would certainly seem that the various clubs and such are not dominant in the social structure of the respondents' lives in Canada and that they currently should not be overestimated as sources of cultural and linguistic retention. It should be pointed out, however, that without such clubs, cultural and linguistic viability might be further impaired. Moreover, the club leaders may have some potential to mobilize political support for their points of view. Nevertheless, only one in ten respondents was engaged in an ethnic club or organization. To estimate relative importance of ethnic clubs, etc., compared with similar French or English organizations, we would require a study of, or figures concerning the latter.

On the other hand, there may be a factor of "cultural" retention potential among the organizations used by the low retention support groups, such as Scandinavians and Dutch. In short, the possibility exists that cultural factors, other than linguistic, can be preserved by ethnic clubs, particularly those which deal with sports, arts, and social facets of ethnic relevance.

The relationship of the church to language retention was of considerable interest. It is very clear that there is a relationship between language preference in church and support for language retention. There are hazards in drawing conclusions of a causative nature from correlational data, but we did consider it likely that the church plays some role in language maintenance. Quite possibly, like the media and language support, the roles are interactive and the church might, in some instances, be strongly sustained should language be preserved. On a group-by-group basis, the relevance of the church becomes even more notable. Its importance in the case of the Greek language is most marked. This is in sharp contrast to its very low relevance in the preservation of the Dutch language where almost all services were conducted in the official languages. It may be that a continuation of the trend towards use of the dominant local language in some churches will diminish the viability of the non-official language concerned and possibly erode its basis of support among those concerned in religious factors.

We investigated a number of other organizations and activities which might encourage the retention of the non-official language. These included the question of more visits to the old country, the establishment of summer camps for children, the establishment of group cultural centres and the provision of more books in the ancestral language. Each of these was examined in the context of language knowledge by groups and the data obtained illustrated the close relationship that existed between knowledge of the language and support for its retention. Generally, these organizations do not currently play a very substantial role in language retention, but they may well be developed to do so. Currently, they received most support from those who already have some knowledge of the ancestral tongue and least from those whose linguistic retention is very small or has vanished.

At present perhaps the most direct attempt made at language retention is through instruction in group-supported schools. Since the schools are intended for the instruction of children, they are a direct expression of parents' interest in providing for language retention. Where parents are concerned, language retention is almost universally considered to be a good thing for their children whose time could be readily made available by parents for learning the non-official language. Whether this would be the case if there were to be conflicts with other activities considered essential for the child's education was not ascertained. In any case, there is very clear evidence that the ethnic schools are an active force in language retention.

The schools were found to be in widespread use for most groups interested in language retention. Nearly one quarter of our respondents would have supported increasing their number and improving their quality. However, at least a third considered such schools relatively unimportant in language retention. In short, our respondents are divided on the issue to a marked degree.

Again the pattern changes when group-by-group results are considered. There is strong support for group schools found among Greeks, Ukrainians, Italians and Chinese compared with minor interest among the Dutch and the Scandinavians. The split is very much apparent in these data and among results bearing on the best type of school to provide instruction in non-official languages.

In general, our respondents indicated that it is *not* the ethnic school which is most favoured as the source of language retention but the public school, and especially the lower grades of the public school. There is very strong and clear support among many members of Canada's ethnic minority groups for inclusion of the non-official languages in the courses of instruction and as vehicles of instruction in the public schools and especially in the elementary schools. This point should not be missed since it reflects a high degree of concern expressed by many parents for the teaching of the ancestral language to their children. Indeed, many said they would insist on their children taking the courses and almost all would encourage them to do so. The degree of intensity was closely related to generation, however, and we

should point out that there was a substantial lessening of insistence and a greater degree of indifference recorded as generation increased.

Not surprisingly, a large number of respondents felt the primary responsibility for the teaching of cultural and linguistic retention lay with parents, but our data on loss-by-generation indicate this task is not being successfully borne by parents. Actually, the job of preserving language is quite possibly beyond them and we feel this is illustrated by the number (more than or close to half in all but the older families group) who nominated the schools as the prime agent of retention.

These data have substantial importance for multicultural policy development at all levels and we suggest that very detailed cross-tabulations of the current data and further studies by educational researchers be commissioned. The roles of educational agencies are difficult to interpret because of the cross-jurisdictional problems involved. However, it is very obvious that, for whatever they are worth, the ethnic schools are not seen by members of their groups as the best agency to shoulder the burden of language and heritage retention. There is a strongly expressed view that the best place to achieve their aim is in the public school system. There is mixed feeling, however, as to who should foot the bill. While more than a third of all respondents in every generational group would call on the Canadian taxpayer to cover the cost of the provision of courses in, of and about the non-official language and culture, almost as many would place it directly on the parents and a substantial number would place it on the specific groups involved. In short, there are very mixed views on the costing of the teaching of the non-official language and culture and we suspect that there would be a strong demand for shared responsibility if programs involving these issues were to be promoted, whether in formal or informal educational institutions.

There are many other areas upon which we have data and which might well be included in this short paper, but we feel that we have touched on some of the more significant findings. Before concluding our paper, however, we need to turn to a brief examination of the more important variables in the correlates of language retention and support.

We have found that generation is the principal correlate of knowledge of the language of ethnic origin, and that this variable is most highly correlated among the groups most interested in language survival. Generational status strongly affects language knowledge which, in turn, affects self-identification. Taken together, these three variables are prime correlates of support for language retention, especially among those groups wherein language is a strong and viable factor.

When generation, language knowledge and self-identification are included in the regression equation, they tend to absorb almost all the variances that might have been contributed by other factors. We are aware of the statistical distribution problem in some of the data, especially in the high first generation representation, but we argue that the three variables described above are very important determinants of support for language retention and

awareness of their effects should be a useful major facet in policy making and further investigation.

Having arrived at the end of a very long and complex report, we must note that in terms of study of the problem of language and culture in the context of Canadian multiculturalism, we are in fact at the beginning. This statement is more than a clichéd turn of phrase, because what we believe to be the most important fact of our research is that it has *provided* a beginning. We have, for the first time in this country, a wealth, almost an abundance, of information on our citizens and residents of origins of other than French or English. We have data that will fuel research, both theoretical and applied, for several years and we have a base against which change and effect can be measured.

We sincerely hope that our report will have given impetus to initiatives in multiculturalism and provide the knowledge essential to the success of those initiatives.

6

Majority Attitudes Study

Summary — Multiculturalism and Ethnic Attitudes in Canada

by

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The present study was designed to investigate the attitudes of Canadians toward multiculturalism. For the purposes of this research, multiculturalism is related to the fact of the existence of ethnic groups in Canada which derive from cultural traditions other than French or British, some members at least of whom wish to maintain their identity. The term also refers to the current policy of the federal government which seeks to promote the retention of these heritages and the sharing of them among all Canadians. The historical roots of the research lie in Book IV of the Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism concerned with "the contribution made by the other ethnic groups to the cultural enrichment of Canada, and the measures that should be taken to safeguard that contribution" (Book IV, p. 1). In 1971 a "policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework" was announced by the Prime Minister in response to the recommendations contained in Book IV. It sought to promote the retention of characteristic cultural features by those groups which desired to do so, and to encourage the sharing of these cultural features with other members of the larger Canadian society. The policy was based upon the assumption that if an individual is to be open in his ethnic attitudes, and have respect for other groups, he must have confidence in his own cultural foundations. Given this assumption the policy is also designed to help break down discriminatory attitudes and cultural jealousies.

The Research Question

A number of questions for research are implied in the policy. Two of the more obvious are whether Canadians view cultural diversity as a valuable

resource, and whether confidence in one's own identity is a prerequisite for accepting others. These two questions constitute the core of the present study. The first question is dealt with explicitly here, the second will be treated in full in the final report.

More specifically, the research reported here consisted of an examination of four attitude domains. The first dealt with the attitudes held by Canadians toward a variety of ethnic groups in the country; in this study these are referred to as "ethnic attitudes." The second domain involved general beliefs regarding cultural diversity, and more specific attitudes concerning various aspects of the multiculturalism policy; these are referred to as "multicultural attitudes." Third, as the Report of the Royal Commission (Book IV, p. 5) indicates, immigration from a variety of national origins creates the possibility for multiculturalism; clearly, attitudes toward immigration form an essential part of the study of attitudes toward multiculturalism. And finally, sections of this study were directed toward an area of concern implied in the Prime Minister's statement, namely, the psychological phenomena of ethnic prejudice and discrimination.

The Survey Instrument

A survey instrument was developed to gather information in all four attitude domains, and to assess demographic characteristics of respondents. The instrument not only employed "opinion" questions, but also made extensive use of psychological scales and sorting procedures in an attempt to improve reliability and validity of the data. For most opinion questions, respondents were provided with seven-point rating scales. These scales were used to express respondents' degrees of agreement/disagreement, their behavioural intentions, and the degrees to which specific ethnic groups possessed given characteristics.

The Sample

The sample of respondents was selected from a national sampling frame, covering approximately 95 percent of the population of Canada. Excluded were persons located in the extreme northern parts of the country, and those living on reservations and in institutions.

The sample design was complex and included stratification as well as clustering. The principles guiding the stratification procedure were region and population density. All census metropolitan areas were included in the sample. Stratification further ensured that in the rest of Canada, in each region and within regions each level of population density was adequately represented in the sample. Clustering was basically a way of making the sampling procedure economically feasible. It involved limiting the geographic areas from which sampling units were to be obtained. The sample selection process involved three stages. In the first, 374 census enumeration areas were chosen; in the second 2,844 households were selected; in the final stage 2,628 eligible persons were obtained. To be eligible for inclusion in the sample, a person had to be at least 16 years of age and able to speak English or French.

Interviews were completed with 1,849 respondents, that is, the completion rate was 70 percent.

Each respondent was interviewed in person. On the average an interview took about one hour to complete. It was held during June and July 1974, in either French or English. The interviewers were members of the field staff of the Survey Research Centre at York University and the *Centre de Sondage* at the *Université de Montréal*.

An examination of the sample's basic demographic (region of residence, age, sex), ethnic (ancestral country of origin, mother tongue) and socio-economic status (occupation, income and education) characteristics indicates that it approximates closely the characteristics of the Canadian population as revealed in the 1971 Census.

Variations in attitudes according to a number of background variables were examined. Among these were region of residence, ethnicity and socio-economic status of respondent. In addition, analyses were carried out to examine variations in attitudes according to degree of urbanization, religion, political party preference, age and sex.

Demographic Variables

Geographic Region. Respondents were categorized according to region of residence (Atlantic provinces ($N = 176$)/Quebec ($N = 488$)/Ontario ($N = 695$)/Prairies ($N = 291$)/British Columbia ($N = 199$). Additional analyses were carried out on the five largest metropolitan areas (Montreal/Toronto/Winnipeg/Calgary-Edmonton/Vancouver). Degree of urbanization was also considered within each region (rural/towns/small cities/and where possible, metropolitan areas).

Ethnicity. A complex code was used to group respondents into four categories. This code took into account: (1) father's origin, (2) mother's birthplace, (3) ethnic self identity, (4) mother tongue, and (5) language of interview. In simplified terms, an Anglo-celtic Canadian was defined as a respondent whose father's ancestry was British or Irish. A French-Canadian was a person who derived his ancestry from France. An anglophone "other-ethnic" was a respondent whose father's ancestry was other than Anglo-celtic or French and who gave the interview in English. A francophone "other-ethnic" was a person of non-British/non-French origin who gave the interview in French.

Generational status was another aspect of ethnicity that was examined. Respondents were categorized as immigrants, second, or third and higher generation Canadians. Since relatively few francophones in Canada are immigrants or second generation, generational status is strongly related to ethnicity. In order to control for ethnicity, francophone respondents were excluded from this analysis and it was carried out separately for Anglo-celtic and "other-ethnic" respondents.

A further analysis of ethnicity categorized respondents of "other-ethnic" origin into the most numerous national descent groups (Dutch/German/Italian/Polish/Russian/Scandinavian/Ukrainian).

147

Socio-economic Status. Three indices of this demographic variable were employed: (1) head of household's occupational status (Blishen index), (2) head of household's income, and (3) respondent's educational level.

Political Party Preference. Respondents were grouped according to which of the four major federal political parties they supported. Since party support is related to ethnicity (French-Canadians tend to be primarily Liberal) separate analyses were carried out within anglophone and francophone subsamples. Respondents who expressed a preference for something other than the four major parties were excluded from this analysis.

Age and Sex. These were the final variables that were used in the analysis of attitudes.

Interrelationships Among Demographic Variables. Many of these demographic variables were related to each other. Of particular interest are those variables within the socio-economic cluster, and their relationships to ethnicity and region. First, the three socio-economic indices were substantially interrelated, with occupational status and educational exhibiting the strongest relationship, and education and income the least. However, they were far from identical as measures of status, and so the three indices were employed separately in all analyses.

Among regions. Ontario was high on all three socio-economic variables, and the Atlantic and Quebec regions were lower, particularly on income and education. Of course there was also a strong relationship between region and ethnicity, with the largest proportion of French-Canadian respondents residing in Quebec. And finally, there was a clear relationship between ethnicity and all three socio-economic variables. French-Canadian respondents tended to occupy lower educational and occupational status categories, while Anglo-celtic respondents were notably higher on all three status indices.

Psychological Variables

In addition to collecting demographic information on respondents, some of their psychological characteristics were assessed. The survey instrument included measures of authoritarianism, ethnocentrism and values, all of which have previously been related to ethnic prejudice. Since these measures have been extensively used in other societies, primarily the U.S., it was possible to provide a tentative comparison of U.S. and Canadian residents in terms of these characteristics. The scales for authoritarianism and ethnocentrism were shown to measure coherent belief systems which correlated substantially with each other. While precise comparisons are difficult, it appears that Canadians were more authoritarian than Americans, but they were, if different at all from Americans, less ethnocentric. Canadians, like Americans, valued a world at peace and family security most highly and a world of beauty and social recognition the least. The value equality, which is predictive of ethnic tolerance, appeared in the middle of the value hierarchy in the present Canadian as well as in a U.S. sample. Analyses of differences within the present sample showed that French-Canadian respondents occupied a unique position in

terms of the psychological characteristics under consideration. They, as compared with anglophone Canadians, were more authoritarian and ethnocentric, and they placed a relatively higher value on salvation and social recognition and a lower value on freedom and true friendship. Francophone ethnic Canadians were like French-Canadians in some respects and like anglophone Canadians in others. Anglo-celtic and anglophone ethnic Canadians were not different from each other in terms of these psychological characteristics. A geographic analysis showed remarkable similarity among residents from Ontario to British Columbia. Quebec, being populated primarily by French-Canadians, showed a profile essentially similar to that of French-Canadians. Respondents from the Atlantic provinces were more authoritarian and ethnocentric than residents from other anglophone regions. Socio-economic status differences were completely in line with previous research. Educational level, the index of socio-economic status chosen here, showed a strong linear and inverse relationship with authoritarianism and ethnocentrism. With regard to values, it was found that the highly educated, as compared with the less educated, placed a lower priority on a comfortable life and on salvation, and a greater priority on freedom and self-respect.

Attitudes Toward Immigration

Attitudes toward immigration were assessed in the present survey because of their relevance to multicultural ideology. Since multiculturalism and immigration are obviously related, it was crucial to know Canadians' reactions towards immigration issues. Three attitude areas were tapped: (1) perceived consequences of immigration, (2) the acceptability of various types of immigrants, and (3) behavioural intentions toward immigrants and discrimination against them.

To assess perceived consequences of immigration, respondents were asked for their opinions regarding possible consequences of further immigration. They had to indicate their degree of agreement/disagreement with 10 potential outcomes. Among possible consequences were "more unemployment," "this country would be better off" and "the purity of the Canadian race would be affected."

Analyses of responses showed that the 10 items reflected a general attitude toward immigration consequences. The responses to the 10 items were averaged to obtain an overall attitude score, with a high value indicating the perception of positive and a low value the anticipation of negative consequences. Subsequent analyses were performed on this total score as well as on the specific items dealing with "unemployment" and the "purity of the Canadian race."

The assessment of acceptability of immigrants was accomplished by asking respondents whether the government should accept or reject various types of immigrants, such as immigrants "who are coloured," and "who have relatives in Canada," "who are highly educated," and "who are from communist countries." While some of these categories may be ambiguous

(e.g., are immigrants from communist countries "pro-" or "anti-" communist?) it would have been difficult to be specific within the context of a national survey. After establishing that responses to the 10 separate items reflected a general attitude, items were averaged to yield a total acceptability score. A high value on this measure would indicate that immigrants of all types are acceptable and a low value that all types of immigrants should be rejected. Subsequent analyses emphasized the total score but also dealt with the specific items concerning "coloured immigrants" and those from "communist countries".

Behavioural intentions toward immigrants were assessed by asking respondents a series of questions dealing with their willingness to interact with immigrants and members of the majority groups, of high or of low status, in business or personal relationships. A discrimination score was constructed to reflect respondents' preference for English-Canadians (in the case of anglophone respondents), or French-Canadians (in the case of francophone respondents) over immigrants.

The attitude scales just described correlated significantly with each other. However, the correlations were far from perfect, indicating that while the scales reflect a general attitude toward immigration, each scale also measures something unique.

Attitudes Toward Immigration in the Total Sample. Perceived consequences of immigration were slightly positive, but there was considerable difference of opinion. Of greatest concern to respondents was the possibility that "there would be more unemployment" with continued immigration. There was, however, reasonably strong consensus that the identity of English- and French-Canadians, and the relations between these two groups, would not be affected.

Most types of immigrants were rated to be quite acceptable. Considered as most acceptable were "immigrants who could be useful to this country," "immigrants with a skilled trade," and "immigrants who are highly educated." The only types of immigration that received negative ratings were immigration from communist countries ("immigrants from communist countries") and unselective immigration ("anyone who wants to immigrate").

In view of the abundant public debate on the issue, it is notable that "immigrants who are coloured" were found to be acceptable.

Regarding their behavioural intentions, respondents showed a considerable willingness to interact with immigrants. However, they also expressed a slight but consistent preference for members of the majority groups. These results suggest that there is still discrimination against them, with other things being equal. Discrimination was greatest against high status immigrants in a business relationship, and was least against low status immigrants in a business relationship. The combination of these results with those reported earlier suggests the following paradox. While highly educated and skilled immigrants are considered highly desirable for admission to Canada, there is some reluctance to use their services, especially if they are of high status.

Geographic Differences. Quebec residents were least positive in their perceived consequences of immigration, they found "immigrants from communist countries" less acceptable than residents of other regions, and they were most prone to show discrimination against immigrants. The Atlantic provinces followed Quebec in these attitudes. The more negative attitudes in Quebec and the Atlantic provinces were primarily obtained from rural respondents. Residents from Ontario, the Prairies and British Columbia were very similar in terms of these attitudes, except that Ontario residents were least concerned about unemployment ensuing from immigration. There were virtually no differences in the views of respondents from the five largest metropolitan areas, except that Montrealers showed a greater tendency to discriminate against immigrants than respondents from other cities.

Ethnicity Differences. The pattern of results from the geographic analysis suggests that ethnicity may be the basis of geographic differences. Such was in fact the case. French-Canadian respondents were least positive in their perceptions of the consequences of immigration. They were also most concerned about "unemployment" and the "purity of the Canadian race." French-Canadians also found immigrants of all types, and particularly "immigrants from communist countries" less acceptable than members of the other ethnic categories, and they were most prone to show discrimination against immigrants. Detailed analyses showed that French-Canadian attitudes cannot be explained as a Quebec response, or as a result of the Catholic religion. French-Canadians outside Quebec were very similar in their attitudes to French-Canadians from Quebec. Anglophone Catholics were indistinguishable in their attitudes from anglophones of other religions.

There was a remarkable similarity between the attitudes of Anglo-celts and members of "other ethnic" groups as a whole. Recency of immigration was virtually unrelated to the attitudes under consideration, after controlling for ethnicity of respondents. The classification of respondents from "other ethnic" origin showed that those of Russian and Ukrainian descent were somewhat less positive in their perception of immigration consequences, most were concerned about unemployment, and found immigrants of all kinds less acceptable than members of other non-English/non-French descent groups.

Socio-economic Status Differences. Three indices of socio-economic status showed very similar relationships with immigration attitudes. The higher the socio-economic status of respondents the more positive they were in their attitudes. Education was most strongly related, followed by income and occupational status.

Political Party Differences. Attitude differences between the supporters of various political parties were more pronounced among francophones than among anglophones. Among francophones, Liberal and New Democratic Party supporters had more positive attitudes toward immigration than supporters of the Progressive Conservative and Créditiste parties. In the case of anglophone respondents, differences among supporters of the four political parties were small or nonexistent, except that supporters of the

Social Credit party showed the least acceptance of immigrants, especially "coloured" and those from "communist countries."

Age Difference. The relationship between age and immigration attitudes depended on the specific attitude variable involved. Respondents in their thirties and forties were most positive concerning perceived consequences of immigration. Younger and older respondents were less positive. Concerning the other attitudes, the older the respondents, the less acceptable they found all types of immigrants and the more they tended to discriminate.

Sex differences in attitudes toward immigration were very small or nonexistent.

The Relative Importance of Predictors of Immigration Attitudes. A more complex strategy, was employed: (1) to isolate the most important variables predictive of immigration attitudes, (2) to assess their relative importance, and (3) to compare the predictive power of psychological versus demographic variables. Results of this analysis showed that of the demographic variables ethnicity and educational level were the most important independent predictors of immigration attitudes. Ethnicity was more important than educational level. Other demographic variables were related to some specific attitude variables, but these relationships did not attain the strength of the two major predictors. When psychological variables were included in the analysis, ethnocentrism consistently become the most important predictor of immigration attitudes.

Attitudes Toward Ethnic Groups

Respondents' attitudes toward various ethnic groups in Canada were assessed in three ways. Firstly, respondents were asked to indicate which groups they were aware of in the Canadian population. Secondly, they were provided with a set of cards, with names of ethnic groups on each, and were asked to sort the cards on the basis of their perceived similarity. And lastly, respondents were asked to rate a number of ethnic groups on ten attitude dimensions.

Awareness of Ethnic Groups. Respondents were asked which groups, who originally came from various parts of the world, they were aware of now in Canada. The purpose of this question was to discover the relative visibility of various groups in an open-ended manner.

The groups mentioned most often (around 50 percent of the time) by our respondents were Italians, English-Canadians, French-Canadians and Germans. Other groups such as the Ukrainians, Chinese and Poles were the next most frequently mentioned groups; however, these groups were only named by a quarter or less of the respondents. In general, the most numerous groups were also the most visible. However, the Italians who are less numerous than the Germans but who have more recently immigrated to Canada were more visible than the Germans. Such a finding suggests that both group size and recency of immigration are important determinants of visibility.

A second finding is that while Anglo-celtic and French-Canadian respondents tend to be aware of the same groups, and in much the same order, there were a few notable differences. For example, Anglo-celtic respondents were more aware of Ukrainian-Canadians, Scottish-Canadians and Dutch-Canadians, while French-Canadian respondents were more aware of Greek-Canadians, Jewish-Canadians and Belgian-Canadians.

Perception of Ethnic Groups

The second step in the analysis of ethnic attitudes was to find out how respondents organized their perceptions of ethnic groups. The method used to examine this issue was to provide each respondent with 27 cards, with the name of a different ethnic group on each card. On a 28th card was printed "Myself." The respondent was asked to sort the cards into piles according to which ethnic groups were thought to be similar to each other. The respondent was free to create as many piles, and to put as many ethnic group cards in a pile as he or she wished. By assessing the frequency with which any two ethnic group cards were placed in the same pile, we were able to perform an analysis of how respondents perceived or categorized the ethnic group. Using multi-dimensional scaling, separate analyses were carried out for Anglo-celtic and French-Canadian respondents.

The ethnic groups which Anglo-celtic respondents considered close to "Myself" provide important insights into ethnic relations in Canada. The "Myself" and "English-Canadian" cards were placed together frequently (75.3 percent) and both "Myself" and "English-Canadian" were placed with "French-Canadian" about half of the time. Anglo-celtic respondents appeared to focus on two major features of the other ethnic groups when making their categorizations. The first was the length of time a particular group was established in Canada in considerable numbers. The second dimension appeared to be racial or based upon visible physical group differences.

French-Canadian respondents also made a "charter groups" – "other ethnic group" distinction in their classification of groups. "Myself" was most often placed with "Québecois" (90.2 percent), "French-Canadians" (84.0 percent) and "English-Canadians" (56.4 percent) while the frequencies for "other ethnic groups" was much lower. French-Canadian respondents frequently placed the "English-Canadian" and "French-Canadian" group cards together (69.3 percent). The results of the analysis for French-Canadian respondents mirrored those of the Anglo-celtic respondents. French-Canadian respondents appeared to categorize the various ethnic groups along two dimensions, again an established Canadian-new Canadian and a racial dimension, although the dichotomies were not as clear as for the Anglo-celtic respondents.

Attitudes Toward Selected Ethnic Groups

In the study of attitudes it was necessary, for purposes of comparison, to pre-select a number of ethnic groups to serve as the focus for study.

The pre-selection of groups was guided by statistics on ethnic concentration in the 1971 census, the results of informal pilot research, and the literature on ethnic group relations. On this basis nine groups were chosen: English-Canadians, French-Canadians, Immigrants in general, Canadian-Indians, German-Canadians, Chinese-Canadians, Ukrainian-Canadians, Jewish-Canadians and Italian-Canadians. In addition, for each respondent two groups which had been nominated earlier were added making a total of 11. Respondents were asked to provide ratings for each of the 11 groups on 10 adjective dimensions: hardworking, important, Canadian, clean, similar to me, likeable, stick together as a group, wealthy, interesting and well known to me.

Attitudes in the Total Sample

In general respondents appeared to be at least tolerant of "other ethnic groups," and there was no evidence of extreme ethnic prejudice; however, respondents did have clear preferences. They reacted very positively to the two charter groups in comparison to other ethnic groups. Of the non-charter groups, north European groups were evaluated relatively favourably (e.g., Germans, Belgians, Dutch, Scandinavians) compared to the south and east European groups (e.g., Greeks, Italians, Poles, Yugoslavs), who were in turn rated more favourably than several other groups (e.g., East Indians, blacks, Spaniards, Portuguese).

Geographic Differences. Respondents in Quebec were generally the least positive in their evaluation of non-charter groups. In addition, certain groups such as the Germans, Ukrainians and Chinese were rated relatively more favourably in the Prairies and British Columbia than in other regions, and Canadian Indians were rated relatively less favourably in those two regions.

Ethnicity Differences. The most important determinant of ethnic attitudes to emerge from numerous analyses was the ethnicity of the respondent. Firstly, both Anglo-celtic and French-Canadian respondents evaluated each other relatively highly. However, own-group evaluation by French-Canadian respondents was higher than own-group evaluation by Anglo-celtic respondents, and Anglo-celtic respondents' evaluation of French-Canadians, while relatively favourable, was not as positive as French-Canadian respondents' evaluation of English-Canadians. Each charter group, then, serves as a positive reference group for the other.

In contrast, both Anglo-celtic and French-Canadian respondents held less favourable attitudes toward all other groups, but these less favourable attitudes were relatively more negative among French-Canadian than among Anglo-celtic respondents.

Socio-economic Status Differences. Generally respondents lower in socio-economic status (particularly in education) held more favourable attitudes toward their own group, and relatively less favourable attitudes toward non-majority groups. Although a fairly consistent trend, the finding is not as strong as that found for ethnicity.

Attitudes Toward Multiculturalism

This attitude domain is concerned with the ideology and policy of multiculturalism. "Ideology" refers to the general beliefs associated with the existence of cultural diversity in Canada. "Policy" refers to the present multiculturalism policy of the federal government. Specifically we were interested in respondents' knowledge of the policy and their attitudes toward it. In all, six series of questions in the survey were directed at these issues.

The multicultural ideology of respondents was assessed through the use of a nine-item scale. Two examples illustrate the nature of the items: "Canada would be a better place if members of ethnic groups would keep their own way of life alive" and "The unity of this country is weakened by ethnic groups sticking to their old ways." In the first example a positive and in the second, a negative statement is made about the existence of cultural diversity in Canada. By averaging responses to all nine items (taking into account the positive or negative direction of each item), an overall indication may be obtained about the acceptance of a multicultural ideology.

The perception of one aspect of multicultural policy was assessed by presenting respondents with three options, describing how a country might deal with immigrants. One option involved "assimilation" (people are encouraged to give up ways of life), another "permissive integration" (people are allowed to maintain old ways of life), and a third "supportive integration" (people are encouraged to maintain old ways of life). Respondents were asked which option they thought was current policy in Canada.

Knowledge about the policy was assessed by asking respondents whether they knew about the federal government's policy of multiculturalism, and if not, if they had heard about it.

Perceived consequences of multicultural policy were obtained by getting respondents' reactions to five statements, such as, "our Canadian way of life will be destroyed" and "Canada will be richer in culture." An average score across the five items was calculated.

Attitudes toward multicultural programs were measured by presenting respondents with six present or potential multicultural programs, such as, "community centres where people from various cultural backgrounds can meet each other and share their heritage." Respondents' reactions were summed to yield an average program attitude score.

Behavioural intentions to multiculturalism were measured by asking respondents' intentions concerning three possible political actions: "vote for a political candidate who supported such a program", "try to convince other people that the program was a good one" and "be willing to pay taxes to support such a program. Responses were averaged to yield a general behavioural intentions score.

The approach taken to multicultural attitude assessment was to begin with a broad and somewhat abstract enquiry into ideology, and from there to proceed to more concrete attitudes concerning policy consequences and programs, and then to very concrete examples of behaviour which might

be exhibited in response to the policy. All four attitude domains were significantly related among themselves; for example, respondents with a positive multicultural ideology score tended also to have positive attitudes on the other three scales. Furthermore, the four attitude scales and the two knowledge questions were also consistently related. For example, those who perceived the policy as being one of assimilation tended to have lower multicultural ideology scores and also less favourable attitudes on the other three scales. That is, we have obtained evidence of a cluster of attitudes which appear to be stable and internally consistent. This finding implies some degree of reliability for the results as a whole.

Attitudes Toward Multiculturalism in the Total Sample. Knowledge of the multiculturalism policy was not widespread and most people perceived the government's current policy to favour "permissive" rather than "supportive" integration. Despite this low level of knowledge and the inaccurate perception of the policy, multicultural attitudes were generally positive. With respect to multicultural ideology, respondents were on the whole slightly in favour of cultural diversity in Canada. The perceived consequences of multiculturalism were also slightly positive. Although program attitudes were greeted with general acceptance, there was evidence of greater acceptance for some programs (e.g., "community centres" and "folk festivals") than for others (e.g., "radio and television shows in languages other than English or French" and "teaching, in regular school programs, of the languages of the major cultural groups who have settled in Canada"); indeed, respondents showed slight rejection of the last two programs. Finally, behavioural intentions were less favourable than attitudes. This contrast in support between the ideology and the behavioural intentions may be understood in terms of the abstract through to concrete dimensions which was presented above. It may well be that Canadians think that the idea of multiculturalism is good, that some of the programs are fun, but that they do not want to get involved. Overall, however, the climate for multiculturalism is fairly positive; the ideological base is supportive, and there are some specific programs which appear to be generally highly acceptable. Detracting from this conclusion is the existence of some programs which, if promoted, may be rejected, and the notable lack of acceptance when personal commitment is involved.

Geographic Differences. Respondents from Quebec were less positive in their attitudes regarding multiculturalism than those from other regions. This regional analysis is supported by the pattern of attitudes across the five metropolitan areas; the response in Montreal was consistently less favourable than in the other major cities. With respect to degree of urbanization, there was a tendency, especially in the Atlantic region, for increased urbanization to be associated with more positive attitudes.

Ethnicity Differences. A likely interpretation of the above regional differences is in terms of ethnicity, since Quebec is largely populated by French-Canadians. This interpretation was confirmed; French-Canadian

respondents were consistently least positive in their multicultural attitudes. Furthermore, the less positive attitudes were not limited to French-Canadians living in Quebec, but extended to those outside of Quebec. Anglo-celtic respondents, whether from Quebec or elsewhere, had consistently more positive attitudes. Religion did not account for these attitude differences; anglophone Catholics were generally more positive than francophone Catholics, and were indistinguishable from anglophones of other religions.

Multicultural attitudes were highly similar among Anglo-celtic, anglophone and francophone "other ethnic" respondents, all standing in contrast to the attitudes of French-Canadian respondents. Recency of immigration in terms of generation was not related to these attitudes. There was evidence, however, that among some groups of "other ethnic" origin (notably Ukrainian and Russian) perceived consequences and behavioural intentions were somewhat less positive than among others. These differences did not extend to multicultural ideology and program attitudes.

Socio-economic Status Differences. The three measures of socio-economic status were very similar in their relationship to multicultural attitudes; the higher the socio-economic status the more positive the attitudes. And of the three variables, it was consistently education which was related most strongly.

Political Party Differences. For most multicultural attitudes, the political party preference of the respondent was a significant factor. Generally, among both anglophone and francophone respondents, Social Credit supporters were least positive, while Liberal supporters were most positive. Among anglophone respondents, New Democratic Party and Progressive Conservative supporters were generally favourable and similar to Liberal supporters; however, among francophone respondents, Progressive Conservatives were similar to Créditiste supporters in having less favourable attitudes.

Age Differences. On three of the four multicultural attitudes, as age increased, attitudes became progressively less positive. However, on the fourth (perceived consequences) and the question regarding knowledge and perception of policy, no age trend was apparent.

Virtually no sex differences appeared in any of the multicultural attitudes. When differences did appear, they were for single items only, and suggested that females were somewhat more positive than males.

The Relative Importance of Predictors of Multicultural Attitudes. Multiple regression analyses showed that among the demographic variables, ethnicity and education were consistently the most important independent predictors of multicultural attitudes, with age contributing as well on all but the perceived consequences. When the psychological variables were included in the analyses, ethnocentrism emerged (in three cases) as the most powerful predictor, surpassing but not eliminating the demographic variables; on behavioural intentions, the ethnicity of the respondent remained the single most important predictor.

General Trends from the Survey

The question of the acceptance of multiculturalism in Canada has been approached from a number of directions. The two major approaches involved the use of multiple attitude scales in four attitude domains, and the collection of demographic variables to assist in the interpretation of the psychological data. In this section evidence is first presented for the coherence of the attitudinal data; then a number of consistent themes are outlined with some possible interpretations.

Coherence Among Attitudes. Across all attitudinal domains a fairly coherent cluster of attitudes has emerged. Specifically, those respondents who held positive multicultural attitudes tended also to hold positive immigration attitudes, and to be low on ethnocentrism and authoritarianism. Conversely, those high on scales of multicultural attitudes were also high on immigration attitudes and low on ethnocentrism and authoritarianism. And within each attitude domain, there was evidence that the specific attitude scales co-vary. Two implications arise from this finding; firstly, a degree of reliability and validity may be attributed to the results and, secondly, evidence is provided that the study has penetrated to the psychological core of a complex of attitudes.

The Issue of "Race." The question whether there is racism in Canada is often raised in the context of immigration and multiculturalism. The present survey clearly shows that Canadians reject explicit racism. Several questions involving "race" were asked, in two of the attitude domains. A majority of respondents rejected the idea that it would be wrong to have coloured people as foremen and leaders over whites, or that the "purity of the Canadian race" would be affected by further immigration. A substantial majority also found coloured immigrants acceptable. A skeptical or even cynical interpretation of these findings would have it that the racial tolerance shown was due to the explicit and blunt form of the questions. The survey format, depending on relatively direct questions, cannot tap the more subtle manifestations of racism. But even a more straight-forward interpretation of the finding that grants a sizable level of racial tolerance in Canada warrants caution. Racism may be endorsed by only a minority of Canadians. However, it may become a problem for the implementation of multiculturalism and immigration policies to the extent that the racist minority becomes vocal and active.

Although explicit racism may not be characteristic of Canadians, race – visible physical differences among groups – is nevertheless an important dimension in the perception of groups. Canadian Indians and Chinese were rated lowest on the adjective dimension "similar to me." Race appeared also as one of two basic dimensions in the structure of perceptions of ethnic groups. To argue that Canadians use racial cues in the perception of ethnic groups does not mean, of course, that they are racist in the sense of treating certain races as inferior. It does mean, however, that race is an important aspect of intergroup relations.

Attitudes in Anglophone Canada. Before examining differences in attitudes according to various breakdowns, it is instructive to note some similarities. A number of factors might lead us to expect differences in attitudes between Ontario, the Prairies and British Columbia, since the concentration of "other ethnic" Canadians is greater in the west, and immigration patterns have differed in terms of time and origin. Furthermore there is the supposed "rift" between east and west (between metropolis and hinterland) which has figured in Canadian political history and is still frequently mentioned in the press. Yet the psychological orientations and immigration and multiculturalism attitudes were remarkably similar from Ontario westward. The most notable exception to this attitude similarity was the more positive evaluation of Ukrainians, Germans and Chinese in the Prairies and British Columbia.

The Atlantic provinces, although primarily anglophone, differed in several respects from the rest of English Canada. Atlantic residents were second to those from Quebec in ethnocentrism, authoritarianism, and had more negative attitudes toward immigration than residents of Ontario and regions to the west. However, the multiculturalism attitudes of Atlantic residents were as positive as those of the rest of English Canada. The signs of ethnic intolerance revealed by the first-mentioned attitudes may well be due to a combination of factors. The Atlantic provinces are more rural, and less affluent than the rest of English Canada. These are generally factors associated with lower ethnic tolerance.

Attitudes of Anglo-celtic and "Other Ethnic" Canadians. An argument can be made that Canadians of "other ethnic" origin should have particularly positive attitudes in the areas of immigration and multiculturalism. These Canadians may wish to retain their ethnic heritage and ethnic identity and hence expect tolerance from others. Even those "other ethnic" Canadians who have integrated with the larger Canadian society might be sensitized to cultural diversity and accepting of it. The probable difference in attitudes between Anglo-celtic and other Canadians did not occur. In fact, there were very few, if any, attitudinal differences between these categories of respondents. This finding can be interpreted in two ways depending on the perspective taken. We can take the response of "other ethnic" Canadians as a standard and regard it as a position of ethnic tolerance and acceptance of ethnic diversity. From this point of view, it is remarkable that Anglo-celtic Canadians, who are in a more favoured position of power in Canada, are as ethnically tolerant as Canadians in minority positions who have a direct stake in ethnic tolerance. From this perspective, the outlook for ethnic relations in Canada is quite positive.

Another perspective is possible, however. We can take the response of Anglo-celtic Canadians as a standard and judge it as positive, but not extremely so. From this perspective, the less than completely positive response of "other ethnic" Canadians requires explanation. A likely possibility is the fact that "other ethnic" Canadians is a very inclusive category.

It is comprised of persons from a variety of ethnic origins, of recent arrivals in Canada and those who have been here for generations. It also includes those who wish to preserve their ethnic heritage and identity and those who have assimilated. In other words, we are putting together a heterogeneous set of people who have a variety of attitudes which average out to the same level as those of Anglo-celts. Whatever interpretation is favoured – and it is possible that both are correct – the present results clearly show that in terms of the attitudes under consideration, an "ethnic block" has no psychological reality.

Generational Status. Another aspect of ethnicity, namely generational status, was remarkably unrelated to immigration and multicultural attitudes. This result must be contrasted with findings from the Non-Official Languages Study, where generational status was shown to be a major determinant of the desire for ethnic language retention, which is one aspect of multiculturalism. The apparent discrepancy between the two studies must be examined by taking note of differences in procedure between them. Respondents in the NOL study were from the 10 most numerous "other ethnic" groups in Canada and lived in the five largest urban centres. "Other ethnic" respondents in the present study were a much smaller sample but a more representative sample of "other ethnic" Canadians from 95 percent of the total population. The sample included respondents from most "other ethnic" groups, those from rural as well as all urban areas. A second major difference between the two studies lies in the variables under study. The NOL study restricted its focus mainly to an investigation of the desire to retain the language of the respondent's own ethnic group. This desire is a wish for the preservation of one's own ethnic heritage and identity, or in broader terms, a wish to apply the multiculturalism policy to one's own group. The variables under investigation in the present study were broader in several respects. A number of attitude objects were involved: immigration, multiculturalism ideology, multiculturalism programs, and ethnic groups. It is possible that the most crucial difference between the two studies may lie in the definition of the multiculturalism policy. Therefore, what appeared to be a contradiction between the two studies turns out to be the result of dealing with two quite different attitudes toward multiculturalism.

Attitudes of Ukrainian- and Russian-Canadians. In this context, a second apparent discrepancy between the present and the Non-Official Languages Study must be acknowledged. The NOL study found substantial support for multiculturalism among Ukrainian-Canadians. The present study showed that Ukrainians as well as Russians were less positive than all other "ethnic", as well as Anglo-celtic, respondents in their perception of multiculturalism consequences and behavioural intentions regarding multiculturalism. The less positive nature of their attitudes also extended to the perception of immigration consequences and the acceptability of various types of immigrants. The apparent contradiction between the two studies may be resolved when the different nature of the variables studied is again

considered. The desire to retain one's own ethnicity is not necessarily associated with a general tolerance of ethnic diversity. Whatever the merit of the present analysis, it points out the problem of defining what constitutes support for the multiculturalism policy.

Attitudes among French-Canadians. One of the most consistent trends discovered in the present study is the unique response of French-Canadians. They scored higher on authoritarianism and enthnocentrism scales. They were less favourable in their attitudes toward immigration and multiculturalism and they proved to be more positive about their own group and less positive about "other ethnic" groups than members of the other ethnicity categories. This is not to say that *all* or even a majority of French-Canadians are ethnocentric. It does mean that French-Canadians are *more* ethnocentric than members of the other major groups in Canada. Two possible explanations for this finding have already been eliminated through detailed data analysis. It might be argued that because most French-Canadians are Catholic, their ethnic attitudes may have something to do with Catholicism. The present study found however that anglophone Catholics were no different in their attitudes from members of the United and Anglican Churches. It might also be argued that because French-Canadians live in Quebec, the socio-political climate of Quebec may be responsible for their attitudes. Results from our study indicated that such is not the case. French-Canadians outside Quebec were very similar to French-Canadians living in Quebec and anglophone Quebeckers resembled anglophones from other regions.

The pattern of results obtained casts doubt on another strategy for explaining some of the findings. It may be tempting to take one attitude domain at a time and explain it historically. We can take immigration attitudes and argue that French-Canadian attitudes are simply a reflection of the official xenophobic immigration policy of the Quebec government from confederation until recent years. Although the congruence between long-standing public policy and private attitudes in French Canada cannot be denied, it is unlikely that the policy caused the attitudes. If the immigration policy alone were at the basis of these attitudes, it would be difficult to explain the more general manifestations of ethnocentrism.

The most likely explanation of the French-Canadian response lies in their history and culture. The French-Canadian population grew from about seventy thousand right after the conquest to millions today. This increase is all the more remarkable when it is realized that it occured with virtually no migration into French Canada from any source, including the country of origin. Not only did migration from France stop with the conquest but French Canada was orphaned from its mother country which soon was to undergo a revolution not shared in French Canada. As a result, a cultural posture arose which has been called "siege orientation." The primary goal of the French-Canadians became preservation of their way of life. In part this was accomplished by isolation from the surrounding English culture.

Psychologically, self-protection involved the development of ethnocentric attitudes.

Socio-economic Status. The role of socio-economic status variables in the patterning of these attitudes has emerged from many sources. Consistently, on attitudes toward immigration, on measures of discrimination, on multicultural ideology and program attitudes, on scales of ethnocentrism and authoritarianism, and on a number of attitudes toward specific ethnic groups, those respondents of lower socio-economic status exhibited less tolerant attitudes. And in those cases where attitudes toward one's own group were assessed, lower socio-economic status respondents exhibited more favourable attitudes toward their own group. This pattern is again one of ethnocentrism, a pattern in which positive ingroup attitudes are combined with relatively negative outgroup attitudes, and in which intolerance of diversity and outgroup discrimination are manifested. Of the three socio-economic status variables, education emerged as the strongest, and the most consistent variable.

A number of explanations are possible for this pattern of results. Firstly, it may be the case that those lower in education were less wary about expressing ethnocentric attitudes; this possibility is often advanced, and is acknowledged here, but there is little direct evidence either for or against it. Another possibility which has often been suggested is that those in lower socio-economic groups are more threatened by immigration and by ethnic groups which may compete directly with them for economic resources. This too is plausible, but there has been a dramatic shift in recent years toward higher status immigration. This being the case, such a general explanation would lead one to expect more ethnocentric attitudes among higher status respondents as well, but this pattern did not emerge. However it may be that lower status respondents still think of immigration as being primarily in the lower socio-economic ranges; this would maintain a "perceived threat" among these respondents, a situation consistent with their more ethnocentric attitudes.

Political Party Preference. Many of the attitudes were consistently patterned by the political party preference of respondents. Multicultural and immigration attitudes, in particular, differed according to the reported federal party preference of the respondents. Consistently the most negative attitudes were held by those supporting Social Credit and the Créditiste parties, among both anglophone and francophone respondents. There was also a consistent, but less strong, tendency for Liberal supporters to be the most positive in their attitudes among both anglophone and francophone respondents. However among anglophone respondents, both Progressive Conservative and New Democratic Party supporters tended to hold positive attitudes similar to those of Liberal supporters, while among francophone respondents the attitudes of Progresssive Conservative supporters were more negative and similar to those of Créditiste supporters. It is difficult to provide a single explanation for these findings.

Mutual Attitudes of English- and French-Canadians. From the data there has emerged a fairly consistent indication that Anglo-celtic and French-Canadian respondents possess relatively positive mutual attitudes. For example, on the card sorting task, each group often included the other in the same pile, and on the evaluative attitude dimensions, each group held relatively positive attitudes toward the other. Furthermore, Anglo-celtic and French-Canadian respondents tended to rate each other fairly highly on the "similar to me" dimension. Finally in those immigration and multicultural attitude items concerned with English and French relations and the positions of English and French in Canada, there is little indication that the two charter groups feel apprehensive; however, this is relatively more true for anglo-celtic than for French Canadian respondents. Thus, over all these indicators, there is evidence for mutually positive attitudes, rather than the "rift" which is often assumed.

One possible explanation is that when Anglo-celtic and French-Canadian respondents are asked about their attitudes in the context of multiculturalism, a relative similarity and mutual acceptance will emerge; but when they are asked about their attitudes in the context of biculturalism, a relative dissimilarity and mutual rejection will become manifest. That is, the comparative context of intergroup relations (and of studies of these relations) may be a crucial factor in determining how Anglo-celtic and French-Canadians will relate to each other. If this is the case, the multicultural context may actually promote bicultural acceptance, however, it may do so at the risk that the charter groups reject the "other ethnic" groups.

Another possible explanation of this set of mutually positive attitudes is that the "rift" the public assumes does not now exist. It may be that in recent years the two charter groups have actually come to accept each other. Perhaps the cultural and political resurgence in French Canada has led to a positive self-image among French-Canadians (and there is evidence for this in this study) which is sufficient to permit the development of positive attitudes toward the other charter group; and perhaps this same resurgence has convinced Anglo-celtic Canadians to respect French Canada as a co-equal in a bicultural federation. However, the earlier discussion of ethnocentrism among French-Canadian respondents would tend to discount this latter interpretation.

Overall Climate for Immigration in Canada

Given the results from the present study, what is the climate for continued immigration in Canada? Clearly, it is not negative, as a majority of Canadians see a primarily positive consequence of immigration and are willing to accept new immigrants. Although there is discrimination against immigrants (in the sense that own group members are preferred over immigrants), there is no outright avoidance. On the issue of "race," a majority shows tolerance.

Besides signs of general tolerance, there are some indications of concern. Greater unemployment is seen as a possible consequence of further immigration. Should economic circumstances decline and concern for unemployment increase, attitudes toward immigration may well change. While a majority of Canadians show racial tolerance, there is a minority for whom "race" is an important concern. The admission of an increased number of non-white immigrants may mobilize the racist minority and/or increase its membership. Another sign for concern is the inverse relationship between socio-economic status and attitudes toward immigration. The more negative attitudes toward immigration among lower status people may be reinforced to the extent that they see immigrants as competitors for scarce jobs. A deterioration in the economy may make such attitudes even more negative. Another chilling factor in an otherwise favourable climate is the fact that one of the founding groups holds a less favourable attitude than the other. This difference in attitudes may make it difficult to achieve national consensus concerning immigration.

Overall Climate for Multiculturalism in Canada

On the basis of the distribution of attitudes examined in this study, there appears to be a fairly positive climate for the promotion of multiculturalism in Canada. Although some specific groups appear to be less acceptable than others (both as immigrants and as established ethno-cultural groups), and some multicultural programs appear to be less desirable than others, there is an overall positive orientation toward multiculturalism, and an overall tolerance in the population as a whole. This general conclusion, while supported by the bulk of the data, must be qualified by a reminder that among two segments of the population (those who are French-Canadian and those who have lower socio-economic status) there is relatively less support — but certainly not rejection of — multiculturalism. It is likely that the existence of a supportive ideological base, and of some popular multicultural programs, could serve as a vehicle for the promotion of multiculturalism in Canada.

Special Presentation

by

Mr. Wsevolod Isajiw

Essentially, I was asked to make some comments about two research projects, the Non-official Languages Study and the Majority Attitudes Report, in terms of comparing the differences or similarities between them from a methological point of view. I would have liked, actually, the authors of the projects to answer some of the points that I was going to make. Let me simply say that I think those studies are significant because they have used the national sample and the national sample is not easy to obtain. It is quite extensive.

There are not many studies which use national samples so for this they should be commended. I think this is an achievement in its own right.

However, there are some differences in the results and conclusions that the studies have made, and it would have been preferable perhaps to see some of these differences and the reasons for them.

I just wanted to suggest a few ideas that have to do with these, and may possibly explain some of the differences without actually making reference to the specific differences themselves. I do hope that the participants will have read their reports and realize some of these differences.

First of all, the two studies. Although both of them have national samples, they do have two different samples. The differences in samples and the differences in the way the sample is taken and the objective of samplery very often does reflect a difference in the result. I think this should be kept in mind when evaluating those studies. For example, the NOL study emphasized urban population in its sample, and the emphasis was on non-English and non-French groups. It ended up with a high proportion of recent immigrants in the sample itself. The Majority Attitudes Study emphasized regional and majority population as its sole objective.

Another difference is in the definition of variables themselves and different definitions of variables are bound to produce different results. For example, the attitudes toward multiculturalism were defined differently and measured differently in both studies.

In the Majority Attitudes Study, from what I can gather from the report presented with all the other reports in this conference, in the Majority Attitudes Study, the attitude toward multiculturalism was defined in terms of attitudes to specific programs, multicultural programs, and the programs themselves were defined in specific ways which favour the immigrants retaining certain cultural preferences.

In the NOL Study, the definitions were in terms of definitions stated by the authors themselves, though the official multiculturalism presumably is. Then the agreement or disagreement with the definition was elicited; strong agreement, somewhat agreed, and so on. So there is a difference in the way these variables were defined and this is bound to produce different results.

I don't want to necessarily criticize the studies too much because I think their positive aspects are more important than their negative aspects. There are, however, some problems. For example, the NOL Study has as its key variable the generations, the differences between first, second and third generations. Yet, on the other hand, the assembly design does not include generations as its objective for practical purposes.

However, this seems to be an inconsistency which is to some extent within the conclusions made about the differences in generations.

Another reason for differences is that all the questions are always answered within context, a certain context which the people who answer them assume and it is impossible to interpret all the contexts in which people answer questions.

The study on the attitudes, the Majority Attitudes Study, found that there is lack of rift between English and French and the attitudes of the English toward the French and the attitudes of the French toward the English do not show too much hostility, the way I understand the study.

Now, the reasons given for this are several. One of the possible explanations is precisely the context in which the attitudes are elicited as the authors point out. The context was whether the attitudes toward each other were in the context of multiculturalism, or in the context of bilingualism, and in each context you are bound to have different attitudes elicited.

In the NOL Study, you have a similar situation. It may be difficult to interpret the context. What you find, for example, in the NOL Study is that there are differences between generations in the terms of attitudes favouring multiculturalism and attitudes favouring the retention of language. The differences between the first, second and third generations in favouring multiculturalism decreased with each generation. But the differences, the total differences, between those who agree, including both those who strongly agree and those who somewhat agree, were not very large at all.

So by the time the third generation was studied, the third generation is almost as high on somewhat agreed on multiculturalism as the first generation.

Now, what is the difference between strongly agree and somewhat agree? How should one interpret the differences in statement? This is not clear at all. Again, this may depend upon the context which is not shown in the study

itself. It could be that the third generation agrees just as much but they have certain qualifications to put on multiculturalism which the first generation doesn't have. So one would have to know these contexts and qualifications to assess the significance in the difference between these two answers.

I will not prolong this much further. However, what I want to say is that there are similarities between the two studies which are just as important. By and large both the studies have shown favourable attitudes toward multiculturalism and the retention of language, and they raise a question about it which was raised by the authors themselves this morning, as a matter of fact. It is a matter of common issue. Maybe the way the questions were asked of the last sample elicit favourable response.

Few people want to be disagreeable and they tend to give agreeable answers in agreeable fashions. This may be the problem with the studies. However, I think that to a large extent, it probably does reflect the feelings of the population. But, I think, to check on this would be quite important and I think the Secretary of State should think seriously in terms of undertaking further studies that would be more qualitatively oriented studies which would go more into depth asking the various definitions of multiculturalism or qualifications on multiculturalism. I think this should be strongly urged to the Secretary of State.

Finally, I think an important question was not asked this morning, but I think it is important to ask of the government, is what is to be done with these studies? What does the government do? All right, two major studies, very important studies, not only in terms of policy information, but I think they are important studies in terms of sociology and social psychology as a field in Canada. But, in terms of their input into the policy information, is the government going to use them? How is the government going to use them to develop the policy further? Or, are they going to be shelved? I would like to have that question answered sooner or later.

7

Special Presentation

by

Clive Linklater
(on behalf of the National Indian Brotherhood)

From time immemorial our forefathers have lived in this land.

This is our land. This is our home.

We have no memory of existence in any other lands across the oceans. Our history and our allegiance is to this land and to no other.

Today, we still live in this land that belonged to our forefathers, that still belongs to us, and that we will pass on to our children yet unborn.

Our existence in this land predates the coming of the European explorers and immigrant settlers.

Our existence in this land predates the establishment of colonial settlements and governments by Europeans.

Our existence in this land predates the Confederation of Canada in 1867. Before the English and French came, we were here. We are a pre-Confederation nation of peoples.

As a pre-Confederation nation of peoples, we consider ourselves to be charter members of the Canadian nation, and even as the French and English consider themselves to be founding nations of Canada, so are we also joint members of the founding nations.

Hence, our ownership and entitlements to this land does not arise by virtue of any rights granted to us by foreign sovereigns of the Europeans or their succeeding governments; rather, the European immigrants and their descedents live in this land by virtue of the rights we have granted them. The rights we have granted them are merely the rights to use and share these lands with us.

The foreign sovereigns of the European immigrants recognized our nationhood and so dealt with our forefathers in some areas by solemn treaties which recognized our ownership and rights to the land. Where we have signed treaties agreeing to let the Europeans use and share portions of our land, we have done so in exchange for certain other rights and guarantees in return and in compensation for their use and sharing of our land.

We have become overwhelmed and outnumbered by the Europeans that immigrated to these lands and they have considered us to be subject and subservient people and have so treated us.

Since the time our forefathers signed the treaties with the agents of the foreign sovereigns, we gave up much by agreeing to let the Europeans use and share our land.

We have paid a very grave and exhorbitant price: we face the danger of being wrongfully dispossessed of much of our other lands; our religious beliefs and practices were outlawed; we were denied the use of our languages; our music and dances and arts were declared barbaric, we were prohibited to live and practice according to our own cultural customs; and our entire way of life, based on the land, was endangered and weakened by deliberate acts of destruction of the animals which sustained us, and our movements were restricted so our very survival was made perilous and precarious.

Yet we have survived. We have not perished. We have not vanished.

We will not vanish as long as we have our lands to sustain us. Our attachment to the land is strong.

So long as the European immigrants and their descendents continue to use and share our lands, and, so long as they continue to derive benefits and riches from these lands, great in their bounty, we fully expect and demand of them and their succeeding governments, that they honour, respect and own up to the terms and spirit of the treaties and agreements that were signed with our forefathers and any other agreements we may enter today.

But we are not, also, merely people of the past.

We are of this land today.

And we will be of this land in the time yet to come.

But our survival in this land today is still perilous and precarious.

If we are to survive as a people in the future, strong and independent as we once were, we must develop and strengthen our separate existence with a special relationship with the Europeans in this land today.

The powers of numbers and the powers of laws are not in our hands today, but in the hands of the Europeans. The powers to make laws that govern our people must be returned and restored to our people.

We declare and proclaim that as we have always been nations of Indian people or Indian nations; and as we remain distinct nations of Indian people or Indian nations; that it is our desire and intent to continue existing as nations of Indian people or Indian nations for as long as there is time in this land, and *"As long as the sun rises, the grass grows, and the waters flow."*

We declare and proclaim that even though there exists in the present reality a larger majority nationhood called Canada made up of the European immigrants and their descendents; that we are and will continue to remain as nations of Indian peoples or Indian nations within the larger Canadian nation.

Therefore, let it always be known, as it has always been known and accepted by us, that we are nations of Indian peoples or Indian nations of

Canada; and that we declare and proclaim a special and separate relationship within the Canadian confederation.

This is the understanding that exists in the minds and hearts of our people.

Relevance to this Conference:

Before the coming of the Europeans and other recent immigrants, our tribal forefathers lived a multicultural and multilingual existence, and still do to this day.

You are recently discovering for yourselves a fact that has existed in this land since time immemorial.

As the indigenous peoples of this land who live today in a minority situation, we declare our intent to continue to exist as Indian peoples.

As Indian peoples we intend to share, to contribute, and to profit from the riches and bounties of this land.

But we have not been allowed to share fully and abundantly of the riches of our land.

The intent of the European immigrants is to exterminate, to terminate, to dispossess, to extinguish and alienate us from our lands and to make us beggars, strangers and outcasts in our own lands.

But for yourselves, you now seek to establish a nation with a multiplicity of races, cultures and languages.

You would leave us, the indigenous owners of this land, out of such an arrangement.

We consider such an action to be immoral, illegal, unethical, unChristian, undemocratic and contrary to all the values and mores you profess to believe.

We do not wish to live as islands unto ourselves. We must live as part of the Canadian nation. But we wish to live as participating productive, accepted and contributing members of the Canadian nation.

We hereby declare that as the indigenous inhabitants of this land from time immemorial, we will continue to exist as unique, distinct peoples and as charter members of the Canadian nation.

The coming of the European and other immigrants has strained our Indian societies to near the point of destruction.

We hope your societies have the strength, the resilience and the will to withstand the continued existence of our Indian peoples as distinct members of a Canadian multicultural and multilingual nation.

8

Multiculturalism – A Neighbour's Viewpoint

Presentation

by

Mr. Michael Novak

As you know, I began working and still do work in the field of philosophy and religious studies. When I first came of age, as a young man many years ago, the chief event in my field was the meeting of the many churches, not only the Christian churches, but of the churches of the world.

It is indeed a phenomenon of our century that all of us from all over the planet are meeting one another together culturally, immediately, for the first time in human history. And, out of our different religious traditions, we moved into a period that began to be called ecumenism. After the excitement of voicing our differences and learning to appreciate one another's strong points, there was developed a disease which went by the name of ecumenia — the disease manifested by the state in which everybody began to think that every other church was good but his or her own. I think there is a parallel here in this other movement of a decade or so later.

We start from a point in which, as I said a moment ago, we know amazingly little of each other, particularly about our interiors. Of course, we know one another, but about the inner music of our souls we know painfully little, many of us, one of another.

As we first come together there is quite naturally a tendency for us to voice our grievances, and to let out our little screams about everything that has injured us. That is all an advance, an important advance. But I hope that what happens as we develop for a while, as we get accustomed to this new activity of multiculturalism, of the new ethnicity, that we develop our own form of disease parallel to ecumenia.

We are not yet there, I think you will agree, to that state in which we agree that every other ethnic group is good but our own. We are not yet there, and we wouldn't want everybody to feel that and believe that. But it wouldn't be so bad if there were some signs of it.

I do look forward quite hopefully, because the future of the human race is at stake, to the time at which all of us, each of us as individuals and as the social groups we are a part of, begin to spend a considerable amount of our energies learning to appreciate publically and privately those strongest doubts in those cultural traditions. It is our privilege to meet and to share in a pluralistic society in a pluralistic planet.

There is a definition of hell which goes "Hell would be that state in which every ethnic group would appear in the worst light, and in which every ethnic stereotype would be realized, the worst qualities of each of us."

Just because we are Slovak doesn't mean we represent the best that is Slovak. Just because we are French or English or whatever, doesn't mean that we represent the best that was ever in our traditions. Far from it. We may be something of a disgrace to our ancestors, but what we're hoping for is that we move, each of us, all of us, to the point at which we represent the best that comes out of our own tradition. Not only that, but that we so learn to know and admire and to love the best that is in our neighbours and friends, that we make that part of us too.

There is one meaning of assimilation which means you give up what you were in order to become what you were not. There is another meaning of assimilation which means recognizing the infinity of the human heart and the human mind. We each absorb the best of everything we find everywhere in the world, and so advance our own traditions.

The reason why ethnicity lives, the reason why cultures pass on and disappear for thousands of years, is that they change often. They grow. New ideas, new insights and new feelings develop. New currents of activity and of exploration and discovery emerge and the people welcome them. So, each of our ethnic traditions is changed often.

Ethnicity is not static and it is not backward-looking. Two summers ago I visited Slovakia. The first of my family to go back. My name, as you know, is Michael — Mehal, Michel. There is no one else in our family. My father is named Michael, but there was no one else in the relationships that we knew of. I discovered there was an uncle, lost in memory, a great-uncle. I also discovered that he was known in the village as the chicken thief. Some day I'm going to write a little essay called "My Uncle The Chicken Thief."

We came from a very poor part of Slovakia, very poor indeed, from a part of the world in which at least one out of two were forced to emigrate within the last 100 years.

The circumstances were bitterly ethnic. The reason for the moving was partly ethnic, partly economic, yet I was struck by the fact that my own cousins, those my age or younger, are not where my grandparents were. They have changed too in three generations.

Culture is not standing still there or here. I am not as my parents were. They are not as their parents were, and that is why the thing lives. That is why it goes on.

Now it is a great honour for me to take part in a meeting like this, which I believe is almost without precedent in the world, almost without precedent in human history. I would like to call to your attention as it has been forcibly imposed upon mine, what a marvelous thing is happening here. How unexpectedly, to everyone's surprise, the most vital force in the last quarter of the twentieth century, virtually every group struggle on this planet, bitter and military, or social and economic, is ethnic.

In Angola, the civil war, which divides very closely along tribal lines, is in the headlines. In the Near East, in Ireland, in Scotland, there is an independent movement. The struggle in Vietnam was very largely an ethnic struggle, and Pakistan and Bangladesh, and India.

To everyone's astonishment there has come to be at the end of the twentieth century, an enormous rebirth in power of ethnicity, the power of culture.

Now, here we are in this extraordinary meeting. Faces representing every part of the world – you have to travel all over the planet to visit the villages to find faces like ours. Here we are trying to discuss in a democratic and civilized and decent and reasonable and frank way, our fears.

It is perfectly obvious to an outsider, to a neighbour, that there are great rifts fuming in this room as there are in this nation of ours, but these are dangerous territories we are walking on, strewn with land mines. Yet here we are, not going to war, but attempting in a civilized way to deal with differences that have been in the human race from the beginning of time, at least the time of battle. It is a remarkable achievement.

I want to commend all the writers of the papers, which I read in advance, for their intelligence, their civility, their generosity, and also for their frankness – their frankness about the fears. As I read the papers, the fears of the anglophones are very real but very different from the fears of the francophones, and those are different yet again from those of the non-francophone ethnics and from those of the Indians and the Eskimo, and so forth. *We* are all part of the meaning of ethnicity. In fact, there is an ethnic proverb which I dearly love, which points to the fact that every time we deal with ethnicity we're not dealing merely with language, we're not dealing only with culture. We are always dealing in part with status and power and money. The proverb goes: "When a fellow tells you it's not the money, it's the principle. It's the money."

It is an Irish proverb and absolutely unvaried. It has a varient in every language, at least in those of East-European cultures which are very strong in cynicism. I always say an Eastern version of that comes out so different from Anglo-European optimists.

Unless the world is going terribly, unless everything is gloomy and impossible, I find I don't believe it. I don't feel happy. I am only happy when things are going badly because that is the way it has been for thousands of years if you come from Eastern Europe. You know you

are in touch with reality when everything is going badly. When it is going well, you get nervous.

The situation in Canada is different from the situation in the United States. I don't know enough about the situation to specify the differences. I was struck by a sentence in one of the papers which pointed out that there is in Canada no equivalent to that bitter-sweet word in America, that painful word in America – Americanization.

We were obliged in my family, and in most other families, to become something we were not, and very quickly. There is an old saying: "It takes two generations or three generations to make a gentleman." I think the feeling was it was going to take three generations to make Americans of us at least; nobody counting the costs thereof. Nobody counting what it cost in psychic energy to learn to speak as others speak, to learn behaviours that others learn easily.

We read in schools in Anglo-Saxon literature – which I dearly love and it is one of the greatest literatures of the world – of the families which were not at all like the family I grew up in. The relationship between man and wife, and between parent and children, and between the children and the relatives, were just very different. The families all had names that were like words in the English language, of course, Smith and Brown and so forth. They never had names like Koutsovasilis or Jaworski and so forth. So we learned the style of behaviour – a very attractive style. We learned a second vocabulary, if you want.

In many families, people learned to put on a public behaviour and then they had a home behaviour, just as many Eastern Europeans in the United States have what we call pizza names. That is, they have a real name with its complicated spelling and its accent marks and so on, which nobody else can master. Then there is the name you use when you call out for a pizza and you give the short form because you're tired of spelling it all the time.

Now neither the United States nor Canada are the only multicultural nations in the world. It is not true. The Soviet Union is a multicultural nation, and believe me, a very tormented one. The review of my book in Pravda, so I am told, was almost as bitter and worried and anxious as the review of my book in the New York Times.

They don't want to talk too much about it in the Soviet Union. There are people in prison at the moment for writing and speaking in Ukrainian and in other languages. Exactly the sort of reason that led my grandparents to flee from Slovakia where it was a crime to speak Slovak.

China is a multiethnic-multicultural nation. India, from time immemorial, has canonized and codified ethnicity in an extremely complex series of arrangements. Argentina and Brazil – we are not alone in struggling with these problems.

Many of us are here in this room, I do believe, because in the lands of our home of origin these problems could not be solved. Even those

who are English-speaking very largely came here because of the inadequacy of the homeland to solve problems of this sort, often along religious lines, but often with a very strong ethnic content.

It is worthwhile to study, and I have seen studies from among you so I know it's being done, the course of the immigrant. I know of a study which took a comparable body of Koreans who emigrated from Korea and went to Russia, and a body of almost the same size went to China, and a body of almost the same size came to the United States and Canada. The study looked over three generations at the differential achievement and reaction that they had to these moves to these three different parts of the world.

What happened to the Koreans who chose three different cultures in which to implant themselves? It is a fascinating story. In Russia, they were politically more successful. In China, they were culturally more successful. They have retained in the third generation quite strong languages. In the United States and Canada, little political power, little cultural retention, but a lot more money.

What I am trying to stress is my first point. It is that we are engaged in an enterprise which is unique in history, I believe. At least the way we are tackling it is unique in history. I also believe it is exceedingly important for the future of the planet because, for certain, this is going to be a multicultural planet.

The only other option is to homogenize the entire planet. How would you like a whole planet of Campbell's soup, thoroughly homogenized? How awful it would be.

The only human hope of liberty on this planet is that there be differences and diversity. But how will this be done? What social, political, and economic motto will allow diversity to thrive on this planet?

We in North America, I believe, are engaged in a great experiment. Trying to live out in advance for the rest of the world a way in which multicultural differences and diversity can be lived humanely and civilly and democratically. If we cannot do it here, how would it be done elsewhere.

I believe you share with me the vision that it is not altogether guaranteed that we shall be free long enough and strong long enough to achieve that.

I believe many of you will share with me a feeling very akin to the feeling that one sees reported from the 1930's in which the threats to us are much more severe and much more dangerous. We are much more isolated, much more alone, and much weaker than we have let ourselves imagine for the last 20 or 30 years.

There are so few democracies left in the world. We are a small sea of democracies. Only 100 years – only 50 years ago – one could read extravagant prose about the twentieth century, the Anglo-Saxon century, the century of democracy. Where has it gone – the Anglo-Saxon century? Where has the democratic century gone?

Most of the world, it appears, is turning quite against democracy, and indeed even in ethnic terms, quite against our own cultures. So what we do is of extraordinary international importance.

Why is it, I would like to ask, and this is my second point, that ethnicity is a new, great, international issue? There is happening what I call the new ethnicity, the new turn to roots which is of a different sort than before. It is different because now we have had a chance to meet each other. Now we have had a chance to try other things.

This time when we turn to ethnicity, it is clear in our head what we are doing. It is not simply a gut reaction based on ignorance, lack of travel, on self-protection, much more than that is operating. Why? I venture these reasons.

First, ethnicity is always associated with power, with differential power, power unevenly distributed. It is associated with temporal diversity because different cultural traditions are at different points in their development, particularly at points in their development with respect to the conditions of modern society.

An example of what I mean: In New York City over the last 30 years, a multitude of Puerto Rican immigrants have been much poorer and lower on the scale than black Americans who also migrated to New York City in extraordinary numbers in the last 50 years.

The population has eight times multiplied in 50 years. The Puerto Ricans were below the blacks on every index in the last census, in the last economic reports. The Puerto Ricans have drawn even, and in some cases begun to pass the black community just on the economic scale, not on the scale of those going to college. Not on the education scale, but on per capita income scale.

You see evidence all around New York of Puerto Rican families almost immediately going into business for themselves. Blacks, by and large, work for others. In the United States, at least, the way to succeed is to go into business for yourself.

Those of us from Eastern European backgrounds, by and large, went to work for others in the mines and in the mills. We have not done nearly as well in the United States as those other groups, the Greeks for example, the Jews, the Lebanese, the Italians, who so often went into business for themselves. They are now considerably farther ahead of us than those from Eastern Europe in the United States.

The strategy is different from the modern line of capitalistic environment. So an awareness of their struggle for equality and of justice is leading us again to a consideration of what makes for differences.

It is not only discrimination that makes the difference. Discrimination there is, racisim there is, injustice there is, but all of us come to a point where we cease spurning others if we want to be independent. If we want to be independent, mature, responsible for our own destiny, we cannot blame others for our predicament. We have to assume on ourselves the responsibility for

our own destiny. In proportion, people are doing that. They are noticing that different groups come to different preparations for the conditions of society in which we find ourselves. We might as well notice that because it is true. Statistically, it is true.

The second reason, I think, for the new ethnicity is that homogenizing tendencies are so strong that the buildings are the same. Sometimes, if you are on a political campaign and your plane lands at the airport and you are picked up in the cars and driven, you can't remember which city you are in. There is nothing about the airport or the freeways or the automobiles or the buildings which will tell you what city you are in. They are all the same. We all wear clothes coming out of the same factories. We splash ourselves with the same "Brut" and everything else. I believe those of you who are in colleges, at least, will appreciate this. That all the college food in North America is prepared in kitchens somewhere underground in Nebraska and distributed equally all over the country, every cafeteria in the country. It's all the same wherever you live.

So the homogenizing conditions of contemporary life are so strong that it leaves us freer to talk about how we differ. There's not so much danger in diversity any more. Our danger nowadays, by and large, is not so much diversiveness as it is homogenization — that we shall cheapen, grow narrower, grow shallower, and loose those things that are important.

A third reason is the disappointment with modern life, a disappointment with what I have called the coca-colinization of the world. Modern life promises it will make us freer, happier and more content and more independent. Instead, in Africa and Latin America, the United States and in Canada there has emerged a new resistance to modernization, a new feeling that we are often cheated by modernization.

My grandmother, now dead, was always of a cynical mind. I thought she was old fashioned, from the old country. I didn't realize that she was just ecologically minded. But I remember after World War II when supermarkets introduced tomatoes treated so when you cut open a tomato it was rarely diseased and came all wrapped in cellophane, protected from being bumped and so forth, and cleaned. Not so Latin, my mother was very impressed. She said, "Isn't this marvelous how you can go down to the store and find these so perfect tomatoes." My grandmother said, "But they don't taste like tomatoes anymore."

Professor Erlich, one of my collegues at Stanford, does what so many professors have taken over from preachers. He predicts the end of the world in the next so many years. He is always to say that in five years the ozone will be destroyed. Ten years from now we shall have used up a very high part of the oxygen. Twenty years from now the waters will be blackened. Thirty years from now we will all have died the most horrible death of all, up to our armpits with babies with the population explosion. We're going to have a horrible ending, you know, he would have said.

I know what my grandmother would have said if she would have heard him "Ah-ha, she knew it all the time. The world was going to end badly. She didn't know when. The time was uncertain, but it would end badly."

But it is that sort of insight that not everything that goes by the name of progress is progress, because not everything that goes by the name of modernization is better. Progress, as we say in the United States, is our most important product. We are not so sure as we once were that it is a good product, that it makes for a stronger, more spiritual, more profound, more beautiful civilization. It is not so clear.

Now too, if modernization is somewhat cheating us, where do we go? Those things that we used to consider old fashioned, out of date, crazy, we now begin to explore. Was there a wisdom there we did not understand? Was there a beauty there we were too shallow to appreciate?

When you look for creative direction, every artist, every political leader goes to his gut, goes to his deepest instinct. It is from there that creative ideas come. When you go to your gut, you discover that you didn't make your gut yourself. You did not create your eternal life. You did not choose your grandparents. You are a product of a thousand years of history. The way your mother helped and the way they talked to you, man and wife, and what they allowed you to try out and what they encouraged you not to try out, how they laughed, how much noise was in the house, and it differs ethnically, how anger was distributed.

I know in American politics we have interesting code words, ethnic code words. Senator Muskie who is of Polish background was always described by the press as "testy." He got angry easily. That is just a code name for Polish. Every decent Slav, male and female, has a moral obligation to get angry at least three times a day. It is not among us that inhibited emotions are considered mature. If you have ever been in Rome in a traffic jam, people get out of their cars and scream and yell. There are 60 different words for "stupid" in Italian.

Of course, the Americans visiting there commonly think how immature this is and we think more, I believe, in the Anglo-Saxon style, we believe that mature behaviour is, for example, sitting in a traffic jam in New York with your windows up listening to your stomach juices drip.

These are things I say that we learn in our family. Dr. Spock doesn't understand them, thank Heaven. There are no books about them, and that is why they endure. Ethnicity endures and culture endures because parents convey it to children in ways that parents don't even have any theory for. They just do it and children pick it up without knowing that they pick it up. Yet it is internalized in the inner music of their souls forever more.

I am only worried about one aspect of multiculturalism: That we may sometime discover the theory and then everything will be lost. As soon as we professors get hold of it, it is dead. There is no hope.

180

Now the fourth reason that I think diversity has become popular is related to this third one. I think it is seeking for the fact that the human being is an historical animal. We are historical people.

I have a hobby nowadays, when I find young men with beards or mustaches, I ask them if they have a picture of their grandfather because almost invariably somewhere about 80 percent of the time I am right. They wear their hair exactly the same way their grandfathers wore it but they never thought of it. They never knew their grandfathers did it that way. They just feel that it is right and they get it the way they have it and, by God, so did their grandfather. Now that is astonishing today.

But what I am trying to suggest is there are so many things in our behaviour that we think were born with us because we have such a high theory of the individual. We think everything began with us. We are beginning to learn, I think, in our experiences of life, that we are historical animals, that we repeat in patterns hardly known yet to the human mind the behaviour of some uncle or aunt we never met. I may end up a chicken thief, who knows?

I must tell you, by the way, that I tell this story very often when I speak with black audiences in the United States and it puts me on an instantaneous common ground with a number of them.

In any case, this looking for the dimension of the human self which is symbolic, is historical and is social. The fact is that we are mere social creatures. Our disposition, our character was not invented by us. Mine was not invented by me. It turns out everybody who meets me in my family, though they have never seen me before, are struck by the way that I even walk like an Uncle Ben that I never even saw. They say it's uncanny that I walk like him. Ever since I heard that, it is hard for me to walk because I have to watch myself walking. I am trying to figure out how he walked.

I became interested in ethnicity because, when I read accounts of what was happening in American politics, although I count myself on the liberal and progressive side, even slightly on the radical side I guess, of most political issues, I still was out of sympathy for the ordinary spokesman of radicalism, liberalism, or progressiveness. My head would go along with them. I didn't have arguments exactly but my stomach didn't feel right. They were missing things. They weren't saying the things I say.

The more I try to find out exactly what I do believe and why I disagree with them, the more I kept being thrown back into my family and beyond my family, if you wish, into a national history.

There are certain things you can't help knowing when you come out of Central Europe. Certain themes that when you begin to hear them, they begin to make you nervous. I think it is general among Catholics in the United States that every time we hear a politician in the United States talk about morality, about reform, we begin to get nervous in our stomachs. We know he is out to get us but we don't know how yet.

The great experience of being Catholic in the United States is you are always guilty even if you play guilty. You are immoral. There is no way you

can win a moral sweepstake in the United States. If you are a Catholic, you can never win. A Protestant American, at least from the upper class, will always have the moral edge no matter what he will do. Well you get that sort of instinct.

Now it is the looking to find out why our reactions are as they are, and to find a good theory for our actions. One of the functions of literature, of drama, of folklore, is to present on the stage exhibitions which externalize what you are feeling in your soul. You should go to literature as to a mirror. Literature enables you to say what is happening in yourself. You read Thackeray or Jane Austen, or whomever, and you discover, my God, how can they know so much about what I thought I was the only one in the world who ever thought of it.

For many of us in the United States, and I presume in Canada, there is no literature. For many of us there are no dramas, no plays, no poetry, the mere insight, at least if we don't know the mother tongue. This has been committed in our families — linguisized — the killing of the mother tongue. So we are tongueless and speechless.

It is also the search for this sort of thing which is very important. I would say it is even very important for a generation who have lost the language. It is very important even for a generation that does not live in a cultural ghetto or in a cultural group. There are millions of us now in the United States and Canada who don't know the language and the cultural traditions and yet who discover that we are ethnic in important ways.

One category was not in your papers. There was a category of anglophones, francophones, I can't quite master the expression but I guess it is ethnic non-francophones, other ethnic groups, and then there were Eskimos. There was one other group that is most significant in Canada which isn't mentioned. Let me call it rock-and-rollaphone. That is to say, a new culture which is not angloculture.

Capitalism, as Daniel Bell recently said, begins in Calvinism and ends in heathenism. There is a drive deep in capitalism towards the individual and the pleasures of the individual. The higher one goes in the capitalistic system, by the way, whatever one's head does, the more one internalizes the code.

This is a form of modern culture which is really the enemy of multiculturalism. This is the homogenizing culture. This is the culture which destroys our sense of ministry. This is the culture which destroys our sense of community. This is the culture which destroys our spiritual lives. It belongs to none of our ethnic groups. We who belong to different cultural traditions are not each other's enemies. We are all struggling to survive in a world of Coca-Cola and Campbell's soup and *Time* magazine and the movies and the pop singers and so forth. It is a very important category to get into our theory.

There are those who prefer to live and want to live in this very highly modern culture which, from my point of view is enormously destructive, the result of which is the *Towering Inferno* and all the other images of destruction which so fascinate the contemporary mind.

A last point, if I may. Nothing can happen anywhere in the world without affecting the families of the people in this room and other families in Canada. There are members of our families in Montego Bay, in Jamaica, in Bombay, in Budapest, in Bratislav, in Estonia, in Angola. We are living in a planetary culture and we in North America particularly are so extraordinary in being composed of people who have come from all over the planet, to make a home here.

The real reason, in my mind, to multicultural activity is to make conscious and expressive and artistic and intellectual, the real facts of our existence which is that we are the nervous system of the whole planet. If something happens, if there is a flood in Pakistan, if there is an earthquake in Guatemala, if there is an outbreak of war in the near East, if anything that happens on some other part of the planet, it reverberates in the families of people here who wonder how their cousins and brothers and relatives are. What has happened to them? Are they all right? This means that we in North America are in a position to be the most sensitive people on the face of the earth to what is happening everywhere in the planet. If there are new young poets in Greece or in Italy, young intellectuals here who are Greek and Italian should know it right away. If there is a new political movement in Poland or in Ukrainia, we here should know it right away. If there are new young intellectuals and theories happening in Africa, Afro-Americans should be the first to be in touch with it. We should be, I believe, the nervous system of the planet. People who grow up in Canada and the United States should be the most planetary people on this planet. We should have, in our consciousness, the consciousness of all the other cultures of the world. That is the reason for multiculturalism, so that these people will be in touch with reality.

When I grew up, I learned nothing in school about Vietnam. How was I to know that the destiny of my generation would be settled in Vietnam? I couldn't tell you whether Vietnam was the same as Siam or where it stood in relation to it. I knew nothing about the 138 ethnic groups of Vietnam and different languages. I knew nothing about the five major religions of Vietnam. I knew nothing about the Hundred Year Revolution there. Yet in my country, there was no single graduate school in the United States with a program in Vietnamese studies, not one. We had, I think, not 12 people in the United States who could speak Vietnamese. Yet our destiny was so determined by what happened in Vietnam and we were off stride, perhaps, for a generation or more by what we did there.

Had there been less violence against the rest of the world, had there been more sensitivity to the rest of the world, the United States could, I think, have saved itself this enormous mistake.

I could not help feeling in Czechoslovakia when I was there visiting the cemeteries and seeing the great Russian monuments in Russian script, I could not help feeling that the Anglo-centric bias of my education and of the education of the leaders of the United States, their relative indifference to Eastern Europe, had led the decisions which made people willing to write off a part

of Eastern Europe that need not have been surrendered, that might have been in the Anglocultural orbit.

Therefore, we are not talking about romantic things. We are not talking about dreams. We are talking about practicality, the real economic, social and political destiny of real live human beings on the face of the planet who are members of our families. That is our greatest destiny and our greatest vocation: to be, here in Canada and in the United States, a planetary people, the nervous system of the whole planet, thinking in a multicultural way because God's people are multicultural.

9

An Overview

by

Mr. Saul Hayes, O.C., Q.C.

The stories you have heard are not true, that the winter Olympic Games are over. There is one more event to be run off and I think I will get a Gold for it, and that is to complete what I have to say in the shortest possible time.

Before I speak, however, to use the delicate phrasing of someone, I want to make a few remarks. First, I want to thank you, Dr. Novak, for a truly entrancing and helpful speech, and an educational one intermixed with telling effects and the light touch of fascination.

Secondly, I want to assure you that we in Canada also have not solved the problem of homogenization of Campbell's Soup and Coca Cola, but the Department of Secretary of State is taking care of *Time*.

Thirdly, I want to give you the answer to the question which was posed in the Snoopy cartoon that one of our delegates referred to "that Christ is the answer" but "what is the question?" The question was asked about 40 or 50 years ago by an Englishman, "Isn't it true that Christ is a member in good standing in the Church of England, that Christ is a graduate of Oxford University, that he is a member of the Tory party, and in good standing in the Atheneum Club?" Well, fortunately times have changed since then and they are no longer the answers. But, at one time, it was significant and not a little jest, that Anglo-Saxon domination characterized the whole aspect of life in Canada, particularly outside of Quebec. The British civilization was a great one, maybe the world's most persuasive, and its heritage still permeates the whole world, particularly as explained by Eugene Forsey Friday night. But, nevertheless, the fact now is, to use the parlance of your country Dr. Novak, it is another ball game.

I also want to quarrel with you. I don't think this is a planetary age at all. I think it is the age of acronyms, the acronyms of WASP, the acronym of our own society that you described. There is another acronym that I am going to make up right now, and I am going to allow this Multiculturalism Committee to use it without charge. It is called Of Mice and Men. The "MICE" part of it means the Multicultural Identity Crisis Enigma. The question: are we mice

or men? The "MEN" stands for Multicultural Enigma Nullified. And, in case Rosemary Brown is here, with some of her women's liberation friends, it could also be "WOMEN" or the War on Multicultural Enigma Nullified. And, I think if we succeed in using this acronym for our purpose, we will succeed in achieving the objectives of the CCCM.

I would like frankly to raise only two or three points. I think you all have enough intelligence to wrap up the results of this conference on your own with perhaps considerable prescience and with considerable respect for the values inherent in it. But, I would like to give you my own points of view which will be only part of what I had originally intended to do. As time was pressing for you in not being allowed to ask your questions, it is also pressing for me not to keep you here too long with the exposition of my views.

It is not the fact that multiculuralism that is being fostered is a new policy. The salient fact is what has always been a policy through the initiative of people of the organizations, of groupings. Now for the first time it becomes a government sanctioned policy. That is all important. You have a warrant before you of a declared governmental policy. Therefore, a government which gives on one hand can take away with the other. In my opinion, the government as I see it, is strengthening multiculturalism and not taking away and that is the encouraging feature. It may have different accents. The CCCM does not have all the wisdom in the world. While we are supposed to advise the Hon. Mr. Munro that doesn't mean to say that we have all the wisdom and he has to take our advice. I hope he listens to us and that is all he is bound to do.

In listening to us, he may come to conclusions that fostering multiculturalism is done in a better way by giving priority to our Number 6, and promote it to Number 1 spot or to put our Number 1 to Number 5 and various aspects of playing around with priority questions. That is a matter of judgment and a matter of judgment is a matter of human understanding, and a matter of human understanding is people.

Now, people may be more magnetized by accepting your view or other advisory views as to what should be the cabinet's priority as long as it does not depart from the target itself, and the target itself — and that is our principal advice — is in fostering multiculturalism as a state policy.

The second point I want to make is that I have considerable not only respect, but sympathy for the French-Canadian aspirations. It is an insult to suggest that they should have sympathy being born and brought up in the province of Quebec in the city of Montreal. We have in Jewish life almost the same creed of *notre langue, nos institutions et nos lois* translated into elegant Hebrew which I can't do and we have the same road to survival. It is therefore easy for me to see the French-Canadian point of view completely. Yet I cannot see why, despite the learned paper of Professor Rocher, the paper that wasn't given but read by Professor Rioux, and the statements made by a number of our panelists by our francophone friends, I cannot see why the two policies of bilingualism and multiculturalism are in such great contradiction. Sad will

be the day in my opinion, sad indeed will be the day in my opinion, if the progressive development of multiculturalism means that it will be at the expense of French culture. It will be the most devastating sense of resignation by French Canada if that thesis is true. I don't believe it is true. I think the policies should and can live in perfect harmony. I cannot see that the advancement of the position of French Canada, to respect its traditions, to live its life, to advance its culture, to vouch safe its language, in short to do all the things necessary cannot succeed because at the same time in a parallel course there exists a movement to support and advance the cultures of various strands in Canada.

The third point I want to make is that there is nothing — I think Dr. Novak mentioned it — static about culture. Of course, it is not static. It is very dynamic. If you think that culture of French Canada is the culture of Normandy, you are very much mistaken. There were no voyageur boat songs in Normandy. There were no fur trader or lumbermen's songs in Normandy. There were none of those things in Normandy that makes the French-Canadian rich. It is an indigenous culture. Its provenance may be from France, but it developed its own culture completely. Now that can be true of every culture and indeed it is true of many.

I was fascinated not only by the appearance of one of the delegates from Newfoundland, but also by her charming accent. She made a statement which denigrated the fact that the Scottish dances were really no part of the culture of Scotland because they were British military exercises in the first instance. I would have to say that is nonsense. The fact that it started as a military exercise does not in the least bit depart or deviate from the fact that over a period of time it became customary and now is a part of the culture of Scotland, whatever its origin was. In other words, if the folklore goes on long enough, it easily becomes part of what is legitimately called the culture of the country.

I think it is necessary always, to remember that there is nothing static in culture. If you think that the Jewish community's culture today is anything like that in the Polish ghettos of small towns of a century ago, you don't know your history. I don't expect you to know it, but in fact you would not know your history. It is entirely different. It is moulded by the ambience of new population centres. I dare say that it is very different in parts of Canada than it is in the United States.

In fact, I may refer you to an article that I wrote on the essential differences between American Jewry and Canadian Jewry. These two Jewries came mainly from exactly the same areas of Europe. They lived in contiguity and yet the Jewish community of Montreal and Toronto is not the same as it is in Pittsburgh, Detroit, or Chicago. It is very different indeed. So, I think we ought to recognize that in developing a cultural ecology there is nothing heinous about it being different.

Is the Greek culture in Canada today the same as the Greek culture of the Golden Age of Pericles or of Aristotle? I think it was Socrates who said

that the unexamined life is not worthwhile. In that we are not today far removed from what was said in Greek time. But otherwise, there is no similarity. It is not frozen in time like Greek freezes or like the Parthenon is frozen. Culture isn't frozen and if it is, I must say who wants it? It has got to be a living, organic thing.

As a trained lawyer, I was brought up to believe that the law is not static. It is like a tree. It has to be an organic growth, Lord Haldane's phrase, and if it is not an organic growth, what it is doing is revenging itself on civilization because it cannot meet the needs of civilization unless it is an organic growth. This is equally true of culture.

Now, I come to one of the more difficult questions facing us, that of language retention. Since you at this conference have been such a peaceful group, and since I am not a warlike creature, I do not want really to embark on a fighting thesis about the mystique of language and whether you can have it only as a means of communication without it being the necessary vehicle of cultural survival. It is a very powerful argument, but I want to ask a few questions. Again the unexamined life is not worthwhile.

Would you say that the Welsh, the Irish and the Scottish have no culture because hardly anybody in Ireland or Wales speaks Erse and Gaelic is not flourishing in Scotland? I remember being in Dublin for two-three weeks on one of the most enjoyable holidays of my life, and I picked up a very good paper every morning, the Dublin Times, an exceptionally fine paper. Here the Dublin Times of about eight pages, on the front page there was about one sixteenth of a column which was in Erse; the rest was in English. Does that mean that there is no Irish culture? It is nonsense to contend that there is no Irish culture.

Of Scotland it is said that there is more Gaelic spoken on Cape Breton Island than there is in Scotland. Now there is a political movement which was mentioned by Professor Novak which is becoming more serious, it is not the laughing matter any more of a few boys stealing the Stone of Scone. It is a very serious matter of the evolution of the United Kingdom meaning that Wales and Scotland and possibly Northern Ireland will soon be reminiscent of federal and provincial problems in Canada concerning the redistribution of power, otherwise there will be some very serious trouble. But one thing is true, that the serious trouble will be expressed in the English language and it will not be in Gaelic and it won't be in Erse.

Now, these are facts of life. That is not to say that people should give up ancestral languages as a means of communication. Speaking highly personally, I can indicate that I have to believe in that because I fought for so many years for Jewish schools in order that Hebrew be taught so that I can't have it and don't want it both ways. But, I am not prepared to say that there aren't millions of Jews in the United States today of its six million, who live a Jewish life with Jewish needs, Jewish customs, and Jewish traditions, and still don't know a word of Hebrew or of Yiddish, I merely want to say, it doesn't answer anything, that there is this other side of the story. My good

friend Prof. Dr. Manoly Lupul takes an absolutely opposite point of view, so completely opposite that one is black, one is white, one is night and one is day. His view is dogmatically that there can be no survival of cultures without ancestral language retention.

I want to pass to the matter of immigration. This is another difficult question. It used to be considered that the lifeblood, even before mulicculturalism was a state policy, of a multicultural society had to be the fresh infusion all the time of newcomers from the homeland. Does that mean that the Ukrainian culture in Canada is going out because in our time we are not likely to see any fresh immigration from the Ukraine out of the USSR or from the Baltic Republics of Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia? Does it means that there will be no Hungarian culture in Canada because you are not likely to get any Hungarians now for the foreseeable future, or from Rumania for that matter? I just don't happen to accept Freda Hawkins' thesis, that is if I have it correctly and I may not. Sometimes these microphones play the devil with you and I may not have heard and thus interpreted her views in correctly. But, if she said what I thought she said, then I disagree with her. If she is here, she can tell me. I do not believe that immigration and multiculturalism are two sides of one medal. There are two different medals entirely and each has its sides. I want to apologize in advance to Miss Hawkins in case what I have done has set her up as a man of straw.

MISS HAWKINS: Could I say what I did say?

MR. HAYES: Yes .

MISS HAWKINS: I said that they are closely related. Of course they are not the same thing, but they must be closely related, and they must talk to each other.

MR. HAYES: In any event, if we depend on immigration for the sustenance in Canada of cultural values, we are, to be guilty of a colloquialism, dead pigeons.

Finally, on the basis of insecurity of minorities, I thought Dale Thompson made a very important point which got lost sight of, and that is this matter of the general malaise, the feeling of insecurity on the part of minority peoples which is nothing but a reflection of the fact that all peoples suffer that insecurity. They do suffer the malaise of not knowing what tomorrow will bring. They do suffer from the fact, even as the majority of Anglo-Saxons do, that they are not too sure to what extent they will retain their values which mean, in a sense, their traditions.

Now, what is the test of success? One of the writers on these matters, was Horace Kallen whose name Mr. Novak will recognize. Horace Kallen, who was 92 years of age when he died, was in his younger days a professor at Harvard and he coined the phrase "cultural pluralism." I think he said that it is the difference, and asked what difference does the difference make? Well the difference is everything. It determines the behaviour. It makes a difference that people can reject it or accept it or other people can accept or reject it. And for 100 years in the United States, other people rejected it. I am not the

seventh son of the seventh son. I have no gift for prophecy. Any crystal balls that I have ever used have been awfully cloudy. So I can't guarantee that what I am going to say will have validity, but I do say at least as a proposition that we do not know what the future is going to bring even in these matters, but what we do know is that if we don't perpetuate the differences and don't believe in the differences, then I think we will have a very much poorer civilization entirely.

Now, to wrap up the session, I first want to thank the number of people, not because it is protocol to do so but because deep down in my heart I feel that the staff worked much beyond anybody's call of duty. I wasn't used to a civil servant working past 4:30, but I found out that they did. Evenings, week-ends found the staff at work.

The Executive Secretary of the CCCM, Manuel da Costa, for part of the time was on a French language course, but that didn't deter him from being very helpful throughout. Madame Monique Quéry-Boucher, did a fantastic job. So did their staff adjutants. I only have one quarrel with them. I think they have spoiled me for any future work I will have to do with any other organization. They were absolutely superb.

I also want to thank Mr. Mike Andrassay, Department of Secretary of State, for the fact that he made it possible for us to do a number of things here. Instead of an intransigent civil service attitude towards it, he was warm and helpful. Quite frankly without the help of a number of individuals in the civil service, there would be no possibility of holding a conference, particularly when we were taking such desparate chances with it theme and purpose.

For a while I thought our Committee was out of its mind to accept the program for a conference inviting enemies of the concept of multiculturalism, which didn't seem to make sense. But, I think we will agree finally, that if you really want to know what is going on, you better ask people who are either antagonistic or indifferent or apathetic, and it makes no sense to keep on talking only to ourselves. That is why this conference was staged as it was staged.

Well, ladies and gentlemen, I have left out in this summary of where we are going and what the issues are a lot more than I put in. In other words, I am really a humanitarian, the same way as Professor Novak is. I really have pity on you sitting here for three days punctual as can be, I have never seen anything like it, and I have had 40 years of suffering at conferences. I congratulate the delegates.